Clashmore Mike

Notre Dame vs. Purdue: Keys to an Irish Win

Anthony Pilcher — Thu, 02 Sep 2010 18:56:41 +0000

The Brian Kelly Era begins Saturday with the home opener against annual foe Purdue. After an off-season spent parsing coaching comments, grasping at limited practice footage, and discussing the positives/negatives of the Blue-Gold game, Irish fans will finally be able to evaluate their new head coach.

If Kelly is to meet fans’ expectations, he needs to get started on the right foot. In this regard Purdue is somewhat of an ideal opening opponent. The Boilermakers should rank in the bottom half of the 2010 Irish schedule with question marks on both sides of the ball including the secondary, at running back, and along the offensive line. This uncertainty makes it difficult to imagine Purdue improving on last year’s 5-7 record—4-4 in Big Ten play—that included only one impressive win (Ohio State at home).

Purdue, Version 2009 and Beyond

Head coach Danny Hope enters his second year in West Lafayette and makes his first trip to Notre Dame Stadium, likely hoping to erase the memory of last year’s defeat where a questionable timeout gave quarterback Jimmy Clausen and tight end Kyle Rudolph one last chance to seize victory.

Hope hasn’t significantly altered the blueprint of former Purdue head coach Joe Tiller. The Boilermaker offense likes to spread the field and throw the ball, and the defense operates out of a 4-3 alignment.

Last year’s unit struggled to control and protect the ball, ranking 87th in the country in turnover margin at -5. The Boilermakers were, however, a fairly disciplined team, ranking in the top 30 in penalties per game (5.3), and in the top 15 in penalty yards per game (41.3). If this discipline carries over into 2010, the Irish can expect little help from opening game jitters.

Offense

Offensive coordinator Gary Nord returns for his second year directing the Purdue offense. Nord operates primarily out of four wide, spread formations and likes to throw the ball (ranked 100th in rush attempts per game, 17th in pass attempts per game in 2009). Last year’s unit ranked in the top half of the FBS in most total offense statistical categories.

The 2009 Boilermaker offense generated the majority of their production through the air (34th in pass yards per game), was decent on third down (37th in third down efficiency), and very efficient in the red zone (20th in red zone efficiency, 5th in red zone touchdown efficiency). But the strong performance was limited to these areas.

The production in the red zone was mostly wasted by a unit that struggled to sustain drives (107th in red zone appearances per game). Yards on the ground were difficult to come by (75th in rush yards per game), turnovers were more rule than exception (107th in fumbles, 73rd in interceptions), and the pass offense wasn’t terribly efficient (81st in yards per attempt and pass efficiency).

An offensive line with minimal experience, no proven option in the backfield, and a new quarterback should make it difficult to improve on these numbers in 2010.

Purdue will field the least experienced front five the Irish will face all season. The Boilermakers must replace three linemen from last season and the projected starters have very limited experience (less than 40 combined starts).

Running back Jaycen Taylor exhausted his eligibility and fellow back Ralph Bolden—the leading rusher in 2009—tore his ACL in the off-season and is expected to be unavailable this year. Taylor and Bolden combined for roughly 80 percent of the rushing production last year and there is no experienced runner waiting to replace them. Running back Al-Terek McBurse does have potential and converted wide receiver Keith Carlos has big play ability, but both have virtually no experience at the position.

Former Miami Hurricanes quarterback Robert Marve replaces the departed Joey Elliott and will open the season as the Boilermaker quarterback. Marve sat out last year due to NCAA transfer rules and Purdue fans hope it allowed him to mature and improve upon a freshman campaign where he completed only 54.5 percent of his passes and threw 13 interceptions compared to only nine touchdowns. Still, Marve has the physical tools to be a strong passer and, if given time, is capable of getting the ball to his talented receivers. Additionally, Marve has good mobility and is a threat to scramble or pick up yards on designed quarterback runs.

The receiving corps took a hit with the loss of the second leading receiver from 2009 (Aaron Valentin), but Keith Smith returns after leading the Big Ten in receptions and receiving yards per game and Kyle Adams is back to provide a very capable option at tight end. Smith, Adams and Carlos were three of the top four receiving targets in 2009 and should form the nucleus of a strong receiving unit in 2010.

See the tables below for an in-depth look at the 2009 Boilermaker offense (the Opponent Average and Opponent Average Rank columns refer to Purdue’s 2009 opponents).

2009 Purdue Offensive Efficiency

Statistic	Purdue	Purdue Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank
3rd down efficiency	42.3	37	40.2	70
4th down efficiency	35.2	100	52.6	66
Red zone appearances/game	2.8	107	3.4	54
Red zone efficiency	88	20	81.7	55
Red zone TD efficiency	73.5	5	59.2	66

2009 Purdue Total Offense

Statistic	Purdue	Purdue Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank
Points/game	27.8	58	25.4	61
Touchdowns/game	3.5	54	3.1	59
Plays/game	69.8	35	67.1	59
Yards/game	391.3	53	361.5	59
1st downs/game	19.7	58	19	59
Yards/play	5.6	58	5.4	61

2009 Purdue Rushing Offense

Statistic	Purdue	Purdue Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank
Attempts/game	32.3	100	35.5	54
Yards/game	136.1	75	137.3	54
Yards/attempt	4.2	62	3.8	54
Fumbles	15	107	11	48
Attempts/fumble	25.9	115	48.1	56
TFL allowed/game	5.3	44	5.9	56
1st downs/game	6.8	96	7.7	53
Touchdowns/game	1.4	71	1.4	54

2009 Purdue Passing Offense

Statistic	Purdue	Purdue Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank
Attempts/game	37.4	17	31.7	65
Completions/game	22.7	22	18.5	65
Yards/game	255.3	34	224.2	68
Yards/attempt	6.8	81	7.1	65
Yards/completion	11.3	86	12.1	67
Interceptions	14	73	13	54
Attempts/interception	32.1	64	37.8	57
Sacks allowed/game	1.7	49	2.2	49
Attempts/sack allowed	22.5	28	15.3	53
1st downs/game	12.1	23	9.9	65
Touchdowns/game	1.9	31	1.5	68
Completion %	60.5	35	58.4	58
Pass efficiency	128.6	81	127.9	65

Defense

Purdue will operate defensively with dual coordinators after Hope hired Gary Emanuel in the off-season to work alongside Donn Landholm. Emanuel was most recently the defensive line coach at Rutgers while Landholm is in his second season as the defensive coordinator and was with Hope at Eastern Kentucky prior to Purdue.

The Boilermakers hope to improve on the defensive side of the ball as the 2009 unit ranked in the bottom half of the country in a host of defensive categories. Among other things, last year’s defense struggled to get off the field (80th in third down efficiency, 90th in plays per game), allowed 29.1 points per game (89), and surrendered 173.4 yards per game on the ground (94). About the only bright spot was a penchant to get upfield—the unit averaged 6.5 tackles for a loss per game (32) and one sack per 11.6 pass attempts (17).

The unquestionable strength of this year’s Boilermaker defense—and perhaps the team—is the front seven. Purdue returns six players in this group that started all 12 games in 2009 including pass rushing specialist Ryan Kerrigan. Kerrigan led Purdue defensive linemen in tackles with 66, led the team in tackles for a loss with 18.5, and was third in the country and first in the Big Ten with 13 sacks.

Alongside Kerrigan are defensive tackle Kawann Short and end Gerald Gooden, the former of which was a freshman All-American last year. Behind the defensive line Purdue returns linebackers Joe Holland, Jason Werner, and Chris Carlino, active players that posted three of the top four tackle totals from last season.

But while the front seven has experience and the talent to be a strong unit, the backend of the defense is almost entirely untested. Emanuel and Landholm have the task of replacing four members of the 2009 secondary, all of which were seniors. The new starters are, for the most part, veteran players. But breaking in a completely new secondary is never easy and figures to be an especially daunting challenge against a pass-happy offense in the season opener at Notre Dame stadium.

See the tables below for an in-depth look at the 2009 Boilermaker defense (the Opponent Average and Opponent Average Rank columns refer to Purdue’s 2009 opponents).

2009 Purdue Defensive Efficiency

Statistic	Purdue	Purdue Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank
3rd down efficiency	40.6	80	40.3	56
4th down efficiency	50	56	56.4	43
Red zone appearances/game	4.2	99	3.7	56
Red zone efficiency	80	43	83.3	54
Red zone TD efficiency	58	65	59.3	57

2009 Purdue Total Defense

Statistic	Purdue	Purdue Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank
Points/game	29.1	89	28.2	52
Touchdowns/game	3.6	83	3.5	53
Plays/game	70.3	90	68.5	54
Yards/game	376.6	69	391.1	50
1st downs/game	19.2	57	20	54
Yards/play	5.4	54	5.7	52

2009 Purdue Rushing Defense

Statistic	Purdue	Purdue Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank
Attempts/game	39.3	94	38	51
Yards/game	173.4	94	164.3	51
Yards/attempt	4.4	89	4.3	52
Fumbles	12	27	11	59
Attempts/fumble	32.3	19	48.5	61
TFL/game	6.5	32	5.8	60
1st downs/game	8.7	74	8.7	52
Touchdowns/game	2.2	103	1.8	52

2009 Purdue Passing Defense

Statistic	Purdue	Purdue Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank
Attempts/game	31	64	30.5	64
Completions/game	17.4	49	18.4	62
Yards/game	203.2	37	226.8	60
Yards/attempt	6.6	38	7.4	53
Yards/completion	11.7	46	12.4	53
Interceptions	12	50	12	56
Attempts/interception	31	49	36.1	65
Sacks/game	2.7	22	1.8	55
Attempts/sack	11.6	17	18.5	56
1st downs/game	9.6	55	10.1	58
Touchdowns/game	1	21	1.5	58
Completion %	56.1	38	59.7	50
Pass efficiency	115.4	32	131.9	54

What Does It Mean for 2010?

It is difficult to imagine the Boilermakers taking a step forward on offense. The lack of a proven runner and shuffle in offensive line personnel don’t bode well for a unit that struggled to pick up yards on the ground last season. In all likelihood there will be a minimal running threat and pass protection could also be questionable. Marve’s athletic ability could prove to be an asset extending plays, but he could struggle as the centerpiece of the offense and will need the skill position players to make plays.

Even with virtually the same front seven last year, Purdue struggled to stop the run. The Irish ranked 84th in the country in yards per game (128.3) and 76th in yards per rush attempt (3.8) in 2009, but still managed 167 yards on the ground in West Lafayette. Stopping the run has been a focus for Emanuel and Landholm in the off-season, but with a completely new secondary it may be a “pick your poison” scenario for the Purdue defense. The Boilermakers should continue to be able to get upfield, but, like last year, it may not be enough to turn in a complete performance.

Keys to Winning

Offense

Protect Crist. Purdue’s defensive strength in 2009 was the ability to get upfield. With six of the front seven returning, the trend should continue. Protecting quarterback Dayne Crist will be paramount to success, and it has as much to do with play-calling as it does offensive line play. The Irish offensive game plan must counter Purdue’s defensive pressure with runs, screens, shovel passes, and the quick-release, short-drop passing attack that is a staple of the Brian Kelly offense.
Hit the edge, pressure the secondary. The matchups in the passing game strongly favor the Irish. Schematically, the spread offense is designed to get the ball into space, and the talented Irish receivers should have productive days against an inexperienced Purdue secondary. Wide receiver Michael Floyd and tight end Kyle Rudolph are certain to impress, but it will also be important for Crist to distribute the ball quickly and decisively to his other targets.
Execute. The Boilermaker secondary makes the offensive game plan fairly simple. The untested and inexperienced starters likely exclude the use of exotic coverages such that the challenge for Crist and company will be to execute. Kelly’s offenses have proven more than capable of this in the past, but many Notre Dame fans still remember last year’s lingering execution problems. The Irish offense must transition to the former and leave the latter behind.

Defense

Win first down, win the game. The cards are stacked against the Boilermaker offense, but execution is always easier when the entire playbook is open. First down play will be critical to success on defense. Win first down, force long down and distance situations to prevent the effectiveness of a quick-release passing offense, and the Irish defense has a significant advantage against an offensive line that should struggle to protect Marve for extended periods of time.
Pressure is the name of the game. Green quarterback plus inexperienced offensive line plus no proven ability to run the ball equals a pressure-based defense. Notre Dame must play the pass first and consistently pressure Marve without allowing him to extend plays with his feet. Coverage should be tight to prevent quick throws and defenders should be prepared for the cheater plays Nord will likely employ to slow the pass rush. Disrupting route timing and applying pressure will prevent Marve from getting comfortable, establishing a rhythm, and gaining confidence.
Give up nothing easy. The Boilermakers struggled to sustain drives in 2009 and, with so much personnel turnover, yards will likely be hard to come by Saturday. The Irish defense can’t do any favors and allow their opponent to generate big gains via broken plays, poor tackling, or mental errors. This has certainly been a problem in the past, and more than half of the yards (55.1 percent) surrendered in last year’s contest came from eight big plays (three runs, five passes), two of which resulted in touchdowns. Defensively, the game plan is as much about not doing something wrong as it is doing something right. Defensive coordinator Bob Diaco’s scheme is a decided departure from the blitz-heavy philosophy of last season, and should help in this regard.

Prediction

If the Irish offense comes out prepared, this could be an ugly affair. Notre Dame has the talent in the receiving corps to apply pressure to the inexperienced Boilermaker secondary and and Kelly’s offensive scheme amplifies this advantage. The key to offensive production will be protecting Crist and consistently affording him time to throw.

Offensively, Purdue doesn’t have the pieces to field an explosive unit. There are far too many questions marks and the lack of experience along the offensive line has the potential to be extremely limiting. Without running lanes for a depleted backfield or consistent pass protection, the Boilermaker offense should struggle against a very talented, albeit unproven, Irish defense.

Notre Dame 27, Purdue 13

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This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

A Clashmore Mike Roundtable: What Are You Looking for in 2010?

Anthony Pilcher — Wed, 01 Sep 2010 02:29:59 +0000

September 4th marks the debut of the Brian Kelly era in South Bend. For the fourth time since 1997 Notre Dame has a new coach, and, once again, Irish fans are wondering if he can lead them back to prominence and succeed where his three predecessors failed.

To be certain, Kelly brings with him many attributes absent from the three previous coaches. He has college football head coaching experience, and lots of it. He’s had success at each of his three previous stops—elevating the programs at Grand Valley State, Central Michigan, and Cincinnati above any level in their history. And he’s progressed—rather naturally—from FCS, to the Mid-American conference in FBS, and finally to the Big East. It is these qualifications that have many fans excited about Kelly’s potential at Notre Dame, as well as the impending season.

But does immediate improvement in the win column mean athletic director Jack Swarbrick found his man? Does meeting, or exceeding, fans’ expectations of a 9-3 season in year one guarantee long-term success?

No. And a cursory look at the last two Irish coaches will tell you that. Tyrone Willingham went 10-3 in his first year before suffering through an 11-12 record the next two. Charlie Weis compiled the same opening year record in 2005, and even improved by a win in 2006, but subsequently faltered down the stretch winning only 16 of 37.

Wins and losses early in a coach’s tenure can be deceiving, and the real measure of success is in improvement and consistency over a period of time—it is far more instructive to measure Kelly’s inaugural season in terms of the overall direction of the program rather than in wins and losses.

To this end, the staff at Clashmore Mike sat down to answer a simple question regarding the offense, defense and coaching: What are you looking for in 2010 that shows marked improvement in the direction of the program?

Offense

Andrew

A run game. And by that I’m not talking so much about an offense that piles up rushing yards, but rather one that is consistent and successful when they do run. Not a single Weis team managed to average greater than four yards per carry, while only one Kelly team in the past six years has failed to do so. Despite Kelly’s air-it-out offense, he’s generally been able to establish the run wherever he’s been, and one of the keys to Cincinnati’s undefeated 2009 regular season was a quick-strike running game that had the 13th highest yard per carry average in the nation. The deepest position on the Notre Dame roster is at running back: the talent is there if the offensive line can open up holes for them. Once we start seeing 20-plus yard runs out of this offense, then I’ll know we’re heading in the right direction.

Andy

There are no more important two items to offensive success this year than offensive line protection and the establishment of an effective ground game. That being said, another area that I hope to observe progress in 2010 is at the quarterback position. Quarterback Dayne Crist will play a substantially different role than his predecessor—Jimmy Clausen was charged with making decisions on the field and generating much of the offensive firepower himself—acting as a distributor to the skill positions in the offensive unit. It is vitally important to Notre Dame’s success in 2010 that he appears comfortable, not only in Kelly’s system, but moving around in the pocket and executing his role with confidence. If Crist is consistently relied upon to win games in much the same role as Clausen, Irish fans could be in for a long season.

Anthony

It seems like ages since Notre Dame fielded a competent offensive line. College football starts up front and Weis put far too much emphasis on skill position play and not enough on the front five. This is particularly important in 2010, the Irish face several strong defensive fronts including Purdue, Pittsburgh, Utah and USC, and winning the battles in the trenches will be paramount to success. Offensive line coach Ed Warinner has talent to work with, but recently technique and fundamentals have been lacking. There is experience and skill at the wide receiver, running back and tight end positions, and Kelly has a history of developing very productive quarterbacks. If Warinner can instill better footwork, correct hand placement, and (perhaps most importantly) produce more physicality, the Irish could field a very prolific offense.

Jon

While the running game will be key to Kelly’s new offense, and Dayne Crist will have a big load on his shoulders this season, my colleagues already touched on those topics. Therefore, the biggest thing that I would love to see this season on offense is a competent passing game that starts with production at wide receiver. Biletnikoff Award contender Michael Floyd is still playing for the Irish, but the other wide receivers are largely untested. Deion Walker and John Goodman were wide receivers who were praised while in high school, but have been buried on the depth chart the past few seasons—largely because of the production of Floyd and Golden Tate. Another promising receiver, although one that was a work-in-progress, Shaquelle Evans, left the team because he was unhappy about his place on the depth chart. Then there are other receivers like Roby Toma, Theo Riddick, and some of the incoming freshmen who remain a mystery. The other x-factor for the unit is Duval Kamara. Was his freshman year a fluke? If he can have a Maurice Stovall-type season, he could redeem his lackluster sophomore and junior seasons. Because defenses will be keying in on Floyd and Kyle Rudolph, who is actually one of the top receiving tight ends in the country, the offense desperately needs other receivers to increase their production in order help Crist as well as open up the running game.

Defense

Andrew

I’m looking at you, Harrison Smith. Kyle McCarthy isn’t there to bail you out this year, so stop grabbing at people with your hands and finally run into someone with your body. A lack of tackling ability was a defense-wide issue, but Smith stood out like a sore thumb time and time again in nearly every game. If Kelly and his staff can fix his fundamentals, they should be able to fix anyone’s. Second, I’m looking for pressure in the backfield. How many of Jon Tenuta’s blitzes hit the other team’s offensive line like they ran into a brick wall? As Notre Dame fans have painfully learned, you can only do so much to manufacture pressure from designed blitzes; the rest needs to come from good technique, strength and speed. It’s been a long time since I’ve looked at an Irish defense and felt that they were the physically superior group of players on the field. When I start seeing the other team’s offensive line get pushed around, and I see players dropped with hard-hitting form tackles, then I’ll know we’re ok.

Andy

Coverage. The Irish have been so poor in many defensive areas over the last few years that it’s tough to pinpoint a specific unit that needs improvement the most, but one thing Notre Dame must do this season is keep their opponents’ big play production in check by providing sound coverage in the secondary. This can’t come at the expense of solid run tackling, but all too often Irish fans have been subjected to daggers through the heart by a poorly timed fade pass defended, or a blown assignment. These types of fundamental errors cannot be allowed to happen and defensive backs coach Chuck Martin will have his hands full focusing on removing the potential for huge shifts in momentum as a result of poor secondary play.

Anthony

Similar to the offense, there is plenty of talent currently on the Irish roster to field a defense in the top quarter of the country. The Irish have athletes—Darius Fleming, Manti Te’o, Steve Filer, Ethan Johnson, Gary Gray, and Jamoris Slaughter to name a few—but the raw skill hasn’t translated into production because of poor fundamentals. In other words, progress on this side of the ball is directly proportional to improving the basics. Better tackling, correct pursuit angles, and an increased ability to shed blocks are desperately needed to maximize the potential of the personnel. If the Irish can make progress in these areas, the athleticism should take care of the rest.

Jon

Fundamentals seems to be a prevalent topic, here, but solid execution of the fundamentals seem to get more sporadic throughout the season without the proper conditioning. I’m afraid that, because Kelly’s offense is designed to score quickly and often, the increased work load on the defense may begin to take its toll as the season winds on. While Paul Longo has the Irish putting up some impressive bench and squat numbers, the real key to the game for the defense will be endurance. If the defense can keep from losing steam as the season wears on, they will put the Irish in a good position to win. However, if they can’t maintain their endurance, they will put that much more pressure on Crist and the offense to dig the Irish out of preventable situations, a prevalent theme throughout Weis’ final three seasons.

Coaching

Andrew

I want a killer instinct. What I want to see is how we play against teams with less talent than Notre Dame: do we play paddy-cake with them, or do we bury them? Do we struggle to beat the San Diego States or do we enter half-time with a 40-0 lead? The elite teams close out games against inferior opponents early and often, and Notre Dame has not been able to do that on a consistent basis since Lou Holtz left. Part of being an intimidating team and having a psychological edge before a game even starts is to make opponents worried. Squeaking out victories doesn’t do it, you have to have a reputation for dismantling and demoralizing teams. It’s part of college football, and it’s part of being an elite program. You don’t take your foot off the gas pedal until the game is over, Charlie. Your team won’t learn to close people out and you send the message that you take it easy on your opponents. I think we’ll be OK if we start seeing Notre Dame handling itself like an intimidating and elite program once again.

Andy

What I have been dying to see for more than a decade is a return to classic Irish football. The same Notre Dame that popularized the forward pass has always had a distinct, smashmouth brand of play that every successful Irish unit has embraced. It involves a bedrock of tradition, an appreciation of excellence, and an approach to playing this glorious game that begins with the fundamentals: tackling, perseverance, grit, energy, emotion, determination, and a fighting spirit. It means playing for “Our Lady” instead of the individual and for each player and staff member to personalize that credo for themselves. It appears that Kelly “gets it”—I hope this is reflected in the squad he leads out of the tunnel this Fall.

Anthony

Holtz always fielded teams with several trademark characteristics—they were physical, energetic and emotional, well-conditioned, and almost never started a game flat. Lately, this has seemed more like the exception than the rule. If Kelly can transform the lethargic (pre-game smack-talking notwithstanding), finesse team with a penchant for slow starts he inherited into a unit more closely resembling those of the Holtzian Era, he will certainly be on the right path. Additionally, better conditioning is needed to reverse the second-half season skids of the past two years. These items should be priority number one for the new Irish head coach, as developing the proper team psyche in the early going is paramount to long-term success.

Jon

While Notre Dame has the talent to compete with nearly any program in the nation, a large portion of it is untested. Given the fact that Kelly’s style of offense will put added pressure on the defense, it will be imperative that conditioning is a high priority. However, the bigger issue for the Irish, and one that falls directly on the coaches, is the need to employ a fresh rotation of players throughout a game. The depth at some positions is thin, but depth will be paramount to success this season. Finding quality players to fill in behind the starters at the quarterback, wide receiver, offensive line, defensive line, middle linebacker, and cornerback positions is key to ensure that if something disastrous happens—you know, like Dayne Crist pulls a Ron Powlus and snaps his collarbone—it won’t be an excuse to throw in the towel. A significant drop-off in production and mental competency from the first to second team is just the thing to shoot an arrow in the Achilles Heel of the season.

Trends and Outliers

The predominant themes that resonate above are a focus on fundamentals and a return to the Notre Dame of old. No one is advocating for Kelly to abandon his spread offense in favor of two tight ends and an I-backfield, but the teams Holtz coached certainly had characteristics that have been lacking over the past several years. Getting those back will indicate a marked improvement in the underlying contributors to success.

Fundamentals, physicality, a running game, a defense that doesn’t give up big plays, smashmouth football—these are all items synonymous with a Holtz brand of football as well as other Irish squads that excelled, and perhaps even overachieved, on the field. There are plenty of players that will be pivotal to success this year, but if Kelly can get the team to buy into his mantra, play with passion and physicality, and focus on the details, the talent will take care of the rest.

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This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

A Theory on College Football Performance: Part 2 – Institutional Factors

Andrew Crafton — Sat, 28 Aug 2010 22:02:28 +0000

Part 2 of this series of articles will cover the effects of scheduling and the benefit that playing home games have on a program, and how these areas have affected Notre Dame. While Part 1 focused on the player impact on a program, recruiting and development—something the coach and his staff have greater control over—this article specifically looks at factors that tend to be tied to a school’s institutional management of its football program.

How It Works

Each team is ranked separately according to six key variables (listed below). For the most part, the lower the ranking the better—the only exception being ease of schedule, where a lower ranking simply implies an easier schedule. For example, a team ranked #1 in recruiting means that, in theory, they were the most talented team throughout the 2005-2009 time period. The rankings correlate with a team’s overall win percentage during the 2005-2009 time period, and they basically state “this is why each team had the winning percentage that they did during this time frame.” I think it will make this concept easier to digest if I only introduce two variables at a time.

The more complicated version: Team Win % = b_o + b₁R + b₂D + b₃S + b₄H + b₅CL + b₆G + ε

R — Recruiting Ranking
D — Player Development Ranking
S — Ease of Schedule Ranking
H — Home Field Impact Ranking
CL — Clutch or Luck Factor Ranking
G — Gameday Factors Ranking

The b‘s are parameters to be estimated, and ε is a random error term.

Ease of Schedule Ranking

Click to enlarge.

The ease of schedule ranking is determined by taking the five year average Sagarin strength of schedule ratings (2005-2009) and then ranking each team’s average schedule from easiest to hardest. The graph on the left is not showing this ranking, but rather the actual relationship between overall win percentage and the actual Sagarin SOS rankings. What jumps out at me is that the trend is essentially saying that the harder the schedule, the better a team’s expected performance. This doesn’t make any logical sense, and the low fit of the trend line with the actual data suggests that there is not a strong relationship between how many games a team wins and its strength of schedule—at least not when you’re looking at SOS by itself.

So, for example, while many bemoan that Boise State relies on their weak schedule to be successful each year, there are plenty of teams with equally weak or even weaker schedules who cannot replicate Boise State’s success. On the other end of the spectrum, Florida played the third hardest average schedule over the last five years, according to Sagarin, yet also won the national championship twice in that time. While SOS is actually statistically significant and worth looking at, it hardly seems all that deterministic. Instead, SOS needs to be looked at in conjunction with the other variables involved in this study to be of real use.

Ease of Schedule from ND’s Perspective

Think scheduling has been on the minds of ND fans lately? Former Athletic Director Kevin White’s head-scratching scheduling model is out the window, but the 2010 season still features some opponents that are not exactly going to excite many Irish fans. While the Utah game has all the appearances of being one of those under-the-radar matchups that could prove to be the most difficult game outside of USC on ND’s schedule, Western Michigan, Tulsa, and Army are essentially lay-ups. This year’s schedule should prove to be ‘easier’ than just about any recent ND schedule and will continue a general trend of easier schedules that began when Kevin White became A.D.

Click to enlarge.

But while 2007-2009 were some of the easiest schedules in recent Irish history, the results were, frankly, terrible: a 43% winning percentage during those three seasons. In that same time period, the Kelly-lead Cincinnati program played a somewhat comparable schedule with much less talent and came away with an 83% winning percentage (only Boise State, Texas, and Florida had a higher winning percentage during those three years). This, in a microcosm, supports the assertion that ease of schedule is not as important of a variable as people make it out to be—highly-rated talent and an easy schedule don’t guarantee anything. Despite the relatively easier schedule the past few seasons, Notre Dame still had the 21st hardest average schedule since 2005. With Oklahoma, Texas, and Miami all on the docket for future Irish schedules, it’s likely that the recent trend of easier schedules is about to end. But as has been shown, that’s not really anything to worry too much about as long as the other program variables are up to snuff.

Home Field Impact Ranking

Click to enlarge.

Home field impact ranking is sorted by the difference between a team’s actual five-year home game win percentage versus it’s expected five-year overall win percentage based on home field factors. The lower the ranking, the larger the home field advantage a team is considered to have (represented on the graph to the left). The intent of this ranking is to represent how much of an advantage some teams have over others in terms of the difficulty of their home stadium for opponents, as well as the leverage that program has in scheduling a large number of home games each year.

The reason we’re using a predicted overall win percentage for the comparison is because it provides a better basis for evaluating how a team is expected to perform overall given its normal performance at home as well as the number of games played at home. By doing it this way, we can use the expected overall performance to show that teams like Ohio State do indeed have a huge home field advantage; if you compare Ohio State with their actual overall win percentage, the advantage of playing at home looks minimal (about a 4% difference). But the estimated overall percentage shows that there’s actually a huge home game advantage for the program (about a 20% difference).

We don’t directly compare a team’s home win percentage with its away win percentage because doing so doesn’t take into account the previously mentioned factors (number of games at home, etc.). That, and it’s more of a measure of which teams utilize their home field as a crutch (Kansas State for example, won 71% of its home games, but only 17% of its away games) rather than teams that have a significant home advantage over the average team during each home game.

Lastly, it’s important to note that this method shows that every team has some kind of advantage from playing at home versus away. Even lowly Eastern Michigan, owner of the worst home field impact ranking, has about a 2% positive difference between their actual home winning percentage and their expected win percentage.

Beaver Stadium (Penn State)

When discussing the concepts behind this ranking with other stat-heads, a few issues were brought up: first, the definition of a home game is becoming increasingly murky (i.e. how does one classify ND vs. Washington St. in San Antonio, or ND vs. Miami at Soldier Field—are these really neutral sites?); second, some voiced that this metric was more of a scheduling thing than a true measure of a “home field advantage;” third, it’s been said that this metric seems like it could be skewed because teams that schedule a lot of cupcakes each year will appear to have a better home game record.

So, for now, let’s just define home games as games played in a team’s home stadium. As far this ranking appearing to be measuring a scheduling thing rather than a true home field advantage: if a team has more leverage than other teams to schedule an above average number of home games, that’s an advantage. The top ten home impact teams play an average of 10% more home games per year than the bottom 10 teams. Additionally, some stadiums are definitely harder for visiting teams than others. While Sagarin standardizes home field advantage to be the same for every home team across the board, I don’t think that’s a fair reflection of what the college football universe looks like. Who can say that Penn State (56% of games at home) with 100,000+ fans at each game has the same home field advantage as Eastern Michigan (37% of games at home), who cannot even fill a stadium fit for a large high school?

Finally, while one can look at Florida (ranked 5th in home field impact) and say, “Hey, they play teams like Charleston Southern at home, so of course they have a higher home winning percentage,” you’d be neglecting the fact that, again, Florida played the 3rd toughest schedule in the country over the last five years. Their 2008 schedule, for example, featured home games versus Miami, Mississippi, LSU, and South Carolina. I think that conference schedules will cancel out cupcake games in the long-run, and so it shouldn’t skew this ranking a whole lot.

Home field impact will be discussed in greater depth as it relates to college football as a whole in a later article.

Home Field Impact from ND’s Perspective

Notre Dame Stadium

To put it bluntly, Notre Dame does not have the home field impact of other elite and/or successful programs—the Irish possess a less-than-impressive ranking of 55th. It’s important to note that this metric is tracking the “boost” a team should get from its home games, not specifically its winning percentage at home. So what it’s saying is that Notre Dame only has the 55th best “boost” in its performance from home games—not much of an advantage.

From a purely qualitative standpoint, Notre Dame crowds tend to be rather tame in comparison to, say, crowds at SEC schools. Anyone that has ever been to a Notre Dame game and has received the “SIT DOWN!” treatment from a 60 year old couple knows this all too well. Notre Dame stadium-goers are often yuppy tourists that are there to experience a Notre Dame game, not actually participate in it.

Other issues: like clockwork, NBC takes a 5 minute commercial break after just about any key play which completely kills any kind of crowd involvement. Also, only playing day games contributes to a tamer crowd because:

The atmosphere is simply more dramatic at night games.
Night games allow more time to drink prior to the game, which will lead to a more raucous crowd.

An increase in alcohol consumption is the reason why Notre Dame doesn’t play night games, from my understanding, and so don’t expect that part to change (I’m not necessarily suggesting that it should, only that other programs do have night games and it helps them).

Finally, the school wants its stadium to be as family-friendly as possible and lately has gone to extreme measures to maintain that appearance—to the point that you could be removed from a game just by appearing to be intoxicated, and banned from future games if you actually were intoxicated. Even alumni were not immune from this treatment. Nobody wants a drunk guy puking on them during a football game, but having to look over your shoulder for an usher eye-balling you if you’re standing and yelling is not exactly going to encourage fans to go crazy during games.

So what can be done to make the stadium more difficult for opponents? I’m not suggesting that the Irish lose any traditions, encourage binge drinking, install a jumbotron, or pipe in crowd noise. But small things like figuring out how to encourage the crowd to actually stand throughout the game and get involved (especially on the South side of the stadium) would help. Brian Kelly and Jack Swarbrick have already gotten NBC to agree to shorter commercial breaks, but a lot more could still be done there: how about actually specifying that breaks can only be taken after touchdowns, unblocked punts, during timeouts, and other similar plays that won’t kill crowd interest? The administration could also stand to be less draconian about keeping the stadium family-friendly on game day—I thought ushers were supposed to show you to your seats, not act as a security force? With all of that said, perhaps nothing would help more than reinvigorating the energy of the program after a nearly 15-year malaise: only time will tell if Kelly can accomplish that.

At the end of the day…

Institutional factors are something that Brian Kelly has some input on (the NBC commercial situation, for one), but the onus of leadership essentially falls onto current A.D. Jack Swarbrick. There’s little-to-no evidence to show that Notre Dame needs to schedule easier games to get to the national championship, and Swarbrick should concentrate on getting opponents on the slate that excite the Notre Dame fan-base. The recent addition of traditional football powers to future schedules gives reason for optimism. Of course, it will be up to the man whom Swarbrick hired, Brian Kelly, to get the program into a condition to be able to win those games.

Of greater concern, in my opinion, is finding a way to make Notre Dame stadium a more difficult venue for opposing teams to play in. When programs like Syracuse, Navy, Air Force, and Connecticut are coming onto campus and winning games, it says a lot about the difficulty of the home field, not just the quality of those specific Charlie Weis teams. Simply put: are other teams really all that intimidated about coming to South Bend?

I’ve elaborated briefly on some things that the administration can change, but Brian Kelly can glean something from one of his predecessor’s faults. The Irish need to regain a killer instinct. Visiting teams should not feel comfortable at Notre Dame stadium, and one way to get a psychological edge is by earning a reputation for burying inferior teams. Charlie Weis, when he had the chance, often simply chose to take his foot off the gas pedal, lest we embarrass the other team. What kind of message does that send to your team? Or to the other team for that matter? This isn’t pee-wee football, sometimes you have to bully and intimidate your opposition: it’s part of college football and being an elite program. Look at the 2008 Oklahoma results (with the exception of the bowl game) for guidance.

The third article in this series will look at on-the-field factors: clutch/luck ranking, and game day factors like play-calling and execution.

Similar Posts:

A Theory on College Football Performance: Part 1 – The Players

2008 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Eight

2009 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Fourteen and BCS Championship Predictions

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

A Theory on College Football Performance: Part 1 – The Players

Andrew Crafton — Wed, 25 Aug 2010 03:42:19 +0000

I originally came up with the idea of creating “five-year profiles” because I wanted to evaluate the entire Charlie Weis period at Notre Dame on a scale relative to the rest of college football. The thought was that if we could create a snapshot of what the last five seasons (2005-2009) looked like at ND in comparison to what that same period looked like for other programs, then we could identify what areas of impact the team needs and/or should expect from Brian Kelly and his staff.

This project evolved into something else in the process: a way to determine the relationship between a team’s performance and the normally hard-to-quantify college football variables (i.e. player development). So while the main objective still stands—to evaluate the Weis era and provide an outlook on ND football—we will also explore the general usefulness of this model when looking at college football from a macro perspective further down the road. There are six main variables that are plugged in: I’ll evaluate two per article.

How It Works

The more complicated version: Team Win % = b_o + b₁R + b₂D + b₃S + b₄H + b₅CL + b₆G + ε

R — Recruiting Ranking
D — Player Development Ranking
S — Ease of Schedule Ranking
H — Home Field Impact Ranking
CL — Clutch or Luck Factor Ranking
G — Gameday Factors Ranking

The b‘s are parameters to be estimated, and ε is a random error term.

Recruiting Ranking

Note: This ranking is independent of the actual rankings that are given out by Rivals.

Click to enlarge.

A brief introduction on why I’m using four-year average Rivals star ratings: it’s a statistic more correlated with win percentage than the straight-up Rivals yearly ranking. To determine recruiting ranking, the four-year average is found for each season from 2005 through 2009, and then that result is averaged out. Each team is then ranked by their overall average—the lower the ranking, the better. The recruiting ranking represents the raw talent, independent of any player development or coaching, that a team possessed in the five-year time period. This ranking does not factor in “random” occurrences such as transfers, injuries, academic/disciplinary issues, etc.

There’s a relatively decent correlation between this method of evaluating recruiting performance and a team’s overall win percentage. But most will notice that it doesn’t come close to explaining the full picture; there are plenty of teams at the lower end of the recruiting performance picture with high win percentages. So, while recruiting is obviously important, there are other team factors that must be evaluated. This seems obvious, but the other variables are harder to quantify.

Recruiting Ranking from ND’s Perspective

Click to enlarge.

Charlie Weis inherited a strange situation when he took over the Notre Dame head coaching job in 2005 in that Tyrone Willingham’s 2003 recruiting class was pretty good, however Willingham’s subsequent 2004 and 2005 recruiting efforts were, for the most part, absolutely terrible. This left the on-campus talent top heavy, and a drop-off in 2007 was expected—just not to the degree we all observed. Still, as the graph shows, Weis did his best during his tenure as head coach to rope in talent and really raise the bar on recruiting. Weis has left ND’s cupboard stocked, at least on an aggregate level (certain positions are more bare than others—QB for example), and Kelly is stepping into a much better situation, talent-wise, than Weis did.

Click to enlarge.

Despite the relative lack of talent in the beginning of the Weis era in relation to where it is today, Notre Dame was still ranked 11th overall during the 2005-2009 period in terms of recruiting ranking. This means that, theoretically, there were only 10 other teams with more raw talent than what the Irish had on campus during the 2005-2009 time frame. As shown on the graph on the right, the 2009 team had more raw talent on it than the eventual national champion, Alabama, and many of the other teams that had played in the national championship in the last five years. Notre Dame underachieved big time, especially in 2009. ND fans know the story all too well: Weis could recruit talent, but he couldn’t develop it. If there’s one thing the fans will want Kelly to maintain from the Weis regime, it’s recruiting. Here are some reasons why:

No team with a 4-year average Rivals star rating below 3.43 has played in the national championship game (Ohio State, 2006) in the last five years.
No team with a 4-year average Rivals star rating below 3.61 has won the national championship in the last five years (Alabama, 2009).

Player Development Ranking

There is an excellent correlation between long-term recruiting performance and the number of NFL draft picks a team produces in a period of time.

Click to enlarge.

A team that produces a lot of NFL draft picks may not necessarily be better than other schools at developing recruits into NFL players, but rather has better incoming talent to work with—less work is needed to turn them into draft picks. Therefore, the more a team exceeds its expected number of draft picks, the better that team is considered at developing its recruited talent—including non-NFL talent. I don’t think it’s a stretch to say that this ability to produce NFL talent can be extended down to the players who aren’t drafted—that there’s better physical strength, speed, and fundamentally-developed players on teams which produce a higher than expected number of NFL players.

This graph shows 2005-2009 recruiting performance versus draft performance. The team with the largest positive deviation away from the expected number of draft picks is Virginia Tech (Cincinnati had the second largest). The development ranking, therefore, ranks programs by how many drafted picks they produced over the expected amount.

It should be noted that because we’re looking at the 2005-2009 time frame as a whole, coaching changes are captured in this metric. So, for example, two of Mark Dantonio’s years at Cincinnati are represented here. But, you’ll see in a second that Kelly deserves most of the credit for Cincy’s developmental performance.

Player Development Ranking from ND’s Perspective

It should not come as a surprise to anyone to find that Notre Dame ranked 89th in player development during 2005-2009. Or maybe it’s surprising that Weis even did that well. Thankfully, ND appears to be bringing in one of the best developers of talent in college football. Kelly has had immediate impacts on the programs that he’s taken over. It shows up in the data, and we’re already seeing some improvements along the training front at Notre Dame in terms of weightlifting numbers after a full summer with coach Longo. But before we launch into the charts, here is some qualitative data to backup the assertion that Kelly is a great developer of talent.

Central Michigan did not produce a single draft pick from the 1998-2004 draft classes. In Kelly’s first draft class (2005), Central Michigan had two players drafted. Two years later (Kelly’s last draft class there), CMU had another three players drafted, including a first rounder (Joe Staley) and a second rounder. Mike DeBord, the previous head coach, was 12-34 during his time at CMU, so it’s hard to believe he had a huge impact on these players.
Staley was originally an unknown TE prior to Kelly moving him to OT and developing him into a 1st-round pick.
Cincinnati’s 2009 draft class was the largest in school history (six players) and included second rounder DE Connor Barwin, a two-star player who was switched from TE to DE prior to his senior season and ended up leading the Big East in sacks.
Mardy Gilyard, who wasn’t even evaluated by Rivals, was a CB under Dantonio that was switched to WR by Kelly upon arrival and ended up being an AFCA All-American and 4th-round draft pick.

The graph below shows the two period moving average for both teams in terms of number of NFL players taken. The horizontal bars over the years show when Kelly was at those programs.

Click to enlarge.

This second graph shows the trend when you combine the number of draft picks from CMU and Cincinnati. The red bars indicates Kelly’s influence, and when combined with the overall trend, shows rather definitively that Kelly’s influence can be largely attributed as a main driver in the increased number of draft picks.

Click to enlarge.

Finally, below is a graph comparing Kelly and Dantonio. Looking at both the data and the graph, I feel that Dantonio has had a negligible difference on his teams in terms of player development. First of all, while Kelly was able to ramp up the player development at both CMU and Cincinnati, Dantonio’s teams have tended to level off or even dip down. Second, given Michigan State’s relative advantage in talent level over Cincinnati (MSU 2.78 average stars for the period, Cincinnati 2.09 average stars), you’d expect a higher number of NFL picks almost regardless of Dantonio’s player development abilities: which is missing.

Click to enlarge.

At the end of the day…

There has been quite a bit of grumbling around Kelly’s recruiting thus far, mainly because that’s the only aspect of the program that the average fan really has any level of insight into at this point. This year’s squad’s four-year average star rating is above the minimum benchmarks noted earlier: 3.61 for a national championship; 3.43 for a national championship appearance. However, there are some scattered clouds on the horizon. A few late additions to the 2010 class dropped the star-rating of that individual class down to 3.44. And even though it’s early, and it’s worth noting that the rankings will likely reshuffle in the coming months, the 2011 class is carrying a 3.39 average star rating as of right now.

Recruiting appears to be on the verge of trending downward, and there aren’t a whole lot of scholarships left in this year’s class to correct it. It’s too early to make any actual judgments, but it’s a situation worth being aware of. The real question isn’t whether or not Notre Dame could set a new minimum benchmark in the future, but rather do we feel comfortable having to be put into the position to have to set a new minimum talent benchmark for winning the national championship? Or even appearing in one?

On the flip-side, it’s not out of the question to think that Kelly could set those new benchmark if he had to. Cincinnati from 2005-2009 ranked 92nd in the recruiting metric we discussed earlier, but was 2nd in player development. Kelly has an eye for moving players into positions that take advantage of their natural strengths and it’s hard to find a better duo in the country than he and Longo when it comes to player development.

We should see that attention to development pay dividends at Notre Dame and it will be interesting to watch players like Theo Riddick, who was switched from RB to WR, along with some of the incoming freshmen that are moving over to the defense. If Notre Dame fans should feel comfortable about one thing, it’s Kelly’s ability to develop and then maximize talent.

Part 2 in this series looks at institutional factors: ease of scheduling and home field impact rankings.

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A Theory on College Football Performance: Part 2 – Institutional Factors

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2009 Season Predictions Survey

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

The 2010 Irish Blogger Gathering

Andrew Hunn — Tue, 24 Aug 2010 04:55:56 +0000

Clashmore Mike is proud to announce that we’ve accepted an invitation to take part in this year’s iteration of the Irish Blogger Gathering. Started by Subway Domer, the Irish Blogger Gathering is an ongoing roundtable featuring a who’s who of Notre Dame communities on the web. Each week one site will pose a group of questions and link to the corresponding answers provided by the others.

The participants this year include: Clashmore Mike, Inside the Irish, UHND, Rakes of Mallow, Her Loyal Sons, Subway Domer, OC Domer, We Are Notre Dame, Domer Law, Irish Round Table, Irish Creed, We Never Graduate, Bad Trade, One Foot Down, and Charlie’s Nasties.

The schedule is as follows:

Purdue — UHND
Michigan — Her Loyal Sons
Michigan State — Inside the Irish
Stanford — One Foot Down
Boston College — Domer Law
Pittsburgh — Irish Round Table
Western Michigan — We Never Graduate
Navy — We Are Notre Dame
Tulsa — Subway Domer
Utah — Clashmore Mike
Army — Rakes of Mallow
USC — OC Domer
Postseason Wrap — Irish Creed

We look forward to responding to each week’s prompts as we are able and thanks again to all participating!

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Here Come the Irish 2010

Clashmore Mike Welcomes Andrew Crafton

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

2010 Season Predictions Survey Results

Anthony Pilcher — Fri, 20 Aug 2010 03:34:06 +0000

Thanks to all who participated in the 2010 Season Predictions Survey. When the data to support this analysis was gathered, over 1,500 votes had been cast.

The primary goal of this exercise is to move beyond simply estimating a win-loss record. Selecting the percent confidence in a win on a game-by-game basis is not only much more accurate, it also allows for some interesting follow-on analyses.

Examining the schedule on a game-by-game basis also illustrates the difficulty in going undefeated in a 12-game regular season. Even if the Irish had a 90 percent chance of winning every game, they would still only have a 28 percent chance of running the table. A 75 percent chance of winning each game—close to the mean win confidence of the voters—translates into only a 3.2 percent chance of going undefeated.

The results below aren’t intended to be an exact 2010 season predictor, the guys at Football Outsiders have the corner on that market. Rather, they are intended to represent the expectations of the Irish fan base.

The Simple Viewpoint

A typical win probability distribution is shown in the histogram below. Here Michigan has been used as an example, but the other games follow similar trends and are normally distributed.

Click to enlarge.

From a simplistic perspective, the voting distribution described by this histogram translates to an average win probability of 71.4 percent and a standard deviation of 15 percent. Expressed differently, the majority of those polled (67.4 percent) believe the Irish have a 70 percent or better chance of beating Michigan, while 87.5 percent of voters believe Notre Dame has at least a 60 percent chance of beating the Wolverines.

The table below details the average win probabilities and standard deviations for each game in 2010. Larger standard deviations mean more scatter in the data, i.e more disagreement among the voters about Notre Dame’s chances of winning or losing the game. Lower standard deviations are indicative of a more consistent opinion regarding the outcome of the contest, i.e. more confidence in a win or loss.

Opponent	Mean win probability (%)	Standard deviation (%)
Purdue	82.4	14.1
Michigan	71.4	15.1
Michigan State	62.8	17.1
Stanford	67.4	16.6
Boston College	65.4	17.3
Pittsburgh	62.2	17.5
Western Michigan	95.5	7.7
Navy	84.8	15.1
Tulsa	92	11.5
Utah	69.4	17.3
Army	95.9	9.5
USC	53.1	20.8

The mean win probability for all the games is 75.2 percent with a mean standard deviation of 15 percent—virtually identical to last year’s values of 76.1 and 13.8 percent respectively. USC is the obvious outlier with a 53.1 percent win confidence, but doesn’t significantly alter either value (77.2 percent mean win probability and 14.4 percent mean standard deviation excluding USC).

The simple way to translate the individual game average win probabilities to a season average win total is to sum the values. This equates to nine wins for the Irish. Multiplying the average win probabilities for each game gives the probability of an undefeated regular season at 2.7 percent.

The data also indicates which games are perceived to be sure wins, which could go either way, and which opponents are the most challenging. On average, voters predicted greater than a 90 percent win probability for Western Michigan, Tulsa and Army, and better than 80 percent win confidence for Purdue and Navy. Additionally, Western Michigan, Tulsa and Army have standard deviations below the 15 percent average (average of 9.6 percent for these three teams, high of 11.5 percent). In other words, the voters strongly agree that these three teams are the weakest opponents.

Michigan, Michigan State, Stanford, Boston College, Pittsburgh, and Utah all had average win probabilities between 60 and 80 percent (mean win probability of 66.4 percent), and relatively large standard deviations. These are games where voters believe the Irish have a slight advantage but the amount of variation suggests a relatively low confidence.

Finally, for the second consecutive year, the Trojans are the most feared opponent on the schedule as well as the one with the most disagreement. The contest against USC registered a 53.1 percent average win probability, with a very high 20.8 percent mean standard deviation.

There is, however, more confidence in a win this year despite being an away game for the Irish. It seems that the uncertainty surrounding the Trojan program and the lack of a proven head coach has bolstered fans’ confidence.

In summary, Western Michigan, Tulsa and Army are viewed as near certain wins, the Irish have slightly better than even odds against Michigan, Michigan State, Stanford, Boston College, Pittsburgh, and Utah, and USC is a coin flip.

Monte Carlo Simulation

As noted above, summing the individual win probabilities is a simple way to generate a season win total. But what about the variation of that win total? This is where Monte Carlo simulations are of value.

Using a large number (~50,000) of randomly sampled data points, a Monte Carlo simulation was performed with the average win probabilities in the table above. The results of this simulation are shown in the histogram below.

Click to enlarge.

The results of the Monte Carlo simulation are consistent with the simple summation of game win probabilities, i.e. nine wins is the average expectation. But the variation in this expectation provides additional insight.

On average, voters predicted a 95.7 percent chance the Irish will win seven or more games, an 85.8 percent chance in eight or more victories, and a 65.9 percent chance in nine-plus wins. Expressed differently, the average voter predicts only a 4.3 percent chance Notre Dame will win fewer than seven games and a 71.1 percent chance of a record between 8-4 and 10-2.

The Optimists and Pessimists

The mean win probabilities used to generate the season win histogram above are indicative of the average voter prediction, i.e. they represent a 50 percent confidence interval of the data.

The outlying data, however, can be thought of as optimistic and pessimistic predictions. In other words, the five and 95 percent confidence intervals of the game win probabilities bound voter expectations by approximating optimistic and pessimistic views.

The plot below shows the normalized probability functions for the optimistic, average and pessimistic season win predictions. The average curve is effectively a discretized version of the histogram above, normalized to an integrated probability of unity.

Click to enlarge.

Similar to the average predictions, the optimists and pessimists voted along the same lines for the second straight year. The 2009 optimistic win prediction was 11.4 wins with a standard deviation of 0.7 while the pessimistic prediction was 6.4 with a standard deviation of 1.6 wins. Compare these values to those represented by the curve above—11.5 wins for the optimists (standard deviation of 0.7) and 6.1 wins for the pessimists (standard deviation of 1.6)—and it is quite evident that the expectations in 2010 mirror those of 2009.

Where Did the Voters Go Wrong?

The average win probabilities rank the following teams as the five most difficult on the slate:

USC
Pittsburgh
Michigan State
Boston College
Stanford

Absent from this list is Utah—a team that has compiled a 47-17 record (0.734), 5-0 bowl record, undefeated season, 10-4 (0.714) record against BCS conference teams, and a 19-5 (0.792) out of conference record over the past six years. Additionally, the Utes are 8-3 (0.727) in November away games since 2003. That kind of success shouldn’t be taken lightly.

Offensively, the Utes will have plenty of firepower with two very solid quarterbacks, speed and power options at the running back position, and a seasoned offensive line. Utah’s defense doesn’t return as many starters, but will field a strong front four and have plenty of experienced players waiting in the wings.

Given the uncertainty surrounding USC (new coaching staff and NCAA sanctions), Pittsburgh (retooled secondary, must replace three interior linemen and the nation’s 10th most efficient passer from 2009), Michigan State (three new offensive linemen and a host of new defensive starters), and Stanford (no Gerhart and significant coaching changes on defense), it seems Utah certainly belongs somewhere in the top five.

New Coaching Staff, New Quarterback, New Offense, New Defense…Same Expectations

The expectations for the 2010 Fighting Irish are virtually identical to last year. While a case can be made that Notre Dame should have been far better than 6-6 last season, an off-season of changes doesn’t often equate to a three-win improvement.

Save wide receivers coach Tony Alford, the entire coaching staff is new, and Alford has moved to a position he’s never coached before. The offense must adjust from a pro-style philosophy to a spread-based scheme, replace two of the most productive players in recent history—quarterback Jimmy Clausen and wide receiver Golden Tate—and break-in two new tackles. And for the fourth time since 2006, the defense will have a new coordinator and scheme as Bob Diaco implements his no-crease 3-4.

Moreover, the schedule doesn’t appear decidedly less challenging than a year ago. Notre Dame faces seven foes in 2010 they played in 2009 (Purdue, Michigan, Michigan State, Stanford, Boston College, Pittsburgh, Navy and USC), and replaces Nevada, Washington, Washington State, and Connecticut with Western Michigan, Tulsa, Utah, and Army. The Irish lost to five of the common foes in 2009, but the voters didn’t put the Irish as an underdog in a single contest in 2010.

The expectation is a nine-win season, as nearly three quarters of voters predict between eight and 10 wins. Kelly has a proven track record of winning and maximizing talent, and there is plenty of the latter on the current Irish roster. It seems that the bar has been set hoping he can do at Notre Dame what he has done everywhere else. And as this assessment has shown, he isn’t lying when he says that he has to win, and win right away.

Similar Posts:

2009 Season Prediction Survey Results

2010 Season Predictions Survey

2009 Season Predictions Survey

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Blueprint for BCS National Championship Success V: Measuring the Irish

Anthony Pilcher — Mon, 16 Aug 2010 08:04:22 +0000

Editor’s note: This is the final installment of a five-part series detailing the blueprint for winning the BCS national championship and measuring the Irish performance against this standard.

As Irish fans know all too well, Notre Dame hasn’t been part of the national title picture for over a decade. The last year the lads in blue and gold laid a legitimate claim to a championship was 1993, as a consistently strong team hasn’t been a fixture in South Bend since the end of the Holtz era.

Since 2000 the Irish have posted a pedestrian 70-52 (0.574) record including a 1-5 bowl clip to go along with five non-winning seasons. But there were some bright spots. Bob Davie led the Irish to a 9-2 regular season record in 2000 capped by a Fiesta Bowl appearance. Tyrone Willingham started his tenure in South Bend with a 10-3 mark and an invitation to the Gator Bowl. And the recently departed Charlie Weis opened his career with nine and 10-win seasons and consecutive BCS bowl births.

Unfortunately, the pervasive theme during those four years was a strong—albeit not great—regular season, capped by a bowl invitation that seemed motivated more by the financial draw of the Irish fan base than the on-field product.

Despite solid regular season records that potentially merited an upper-tier bowl invitation, the outcome of these season finales were far from favorable. The Irish were severely overmatched in the 2000 Fiesta Bowl, a 41-9 thrashing at the hands of Oregon State, the 2003 Gator Bowl was a 22-point loss to North Carolina State, and Weis’ 2005 and 2006 BCS bowl teams lost by an average margin of nearly three touchdowns. In many ways these bowl performances highlighted what many fans and detractors knew going into the game—these squads simply weren’t elite, national championship caliber teams.

But how far were these teams from title contention? Furthermore, what was missing, and is new head coach Brian Kelly the man to get the program pointed in the right direction?

Benchmarking Notre Dame to the Blueprint

What follows is a statistical comparison of the last 10 Irish squads to the BCS national championship blueprint identified in the previous four installments. The tables below include a 10-year average comparison of the BCS champions and Notre Dame, the value and ranking cutoffs, and the number of years the Irish met or exceeded these cutoffs for each blueprint metric. As with the previous segments, the data is divided among the three statistical categories (miscellaneous, offense and defense).

Miscellaneous

Benchmarking the Irish: Miscellaneous Metrics

Metric	Quantity	10-year BCS champion avg	10-year Notre Dame avg	Metric cutoff	Years Notre Dame met cutoff
Turnover margin	Value	14.2	4.6	6	2
Turnover margin	Rank	13.9	36.7	29	4

The Irish have come up short in turnover margin over the past decade. The past 10 BCS title winners averaged a turnover margin of 14.2 compared to only 4.6 for the Irish. Additionally, Notre Dame only exceeded the value cutoff for this metric in two years, 2000 and 2005.

In most seasons the problem was generating turnovers and Weis’ more veteran squads were a perfect example of this trend. The Irish only lost 14 turnovers and ranked in the top seven in this category in 2005, 2006 and 2009, but failed to crack the top 35 in turnovers gained in the same years posting an average ranking of nearly 70.

Offense

Benchmarking the Irish: Total Offense Metrics

Metric	Quantity	10-year BCS champion avg	10-year Notre Dame avg	Metric cutoff	Years Notre Dame met cutoff
Third down efficiency	Value	0.44	0.37	0.43	1
Third down efficiency	Rank	--	--	--	--
Yards per play (YPP)	Value	6.3	5.1	5.8	2
Yards per play (YPP)	Rank	15.4	72.1	28	2
Yards per game (YPG)	Value	431.2	354.7	403	2
Yards per game (YPG)	Rank	24.4	69	31	3
Points per game (PPG)	Value	37.8	25.6	32.1	1
Points per game (PPG)	Rank	13.6	61.1	23	2

With the exception of two seasons, the Irish haven’t performed at a championship level in total offense. Over the past 10 years the Irish averaged more than a yard less per play, and 76.5 yards and 12.2 points less per game. The 10-year ranking comparisons are equally as different.

Weis’ 2005 offense was, by far, the best unit. The Brady Quinn-led squad met the value and ranking cutoffs in every total offensive metric including a gaudy 48.9 percent third down conversion rate, 6.1 YPP, 477.3 YPG, and 36.7 PPG. Last year’s unit wasn’t far off, exceeding the value and ranking cutoffs in YPP and YPG, and only narrowly missing the third down efficiency and PPG cutoffs.

The 2007 offense was the low point of the past 10 seasons (and perhaps in the history of Notre Dame football), but the 2001, 2002 and 2003 offensive units weren’t far behind. During these four years the Irish converted a paltry 33.4 percent of third downs and averaged a ranking of 107.5, 106.8 and 99.8 in YPP, YPG and PPG respectively.

Benchmarking the Irish: Rushing Offense Metrics

Metric	Quantity	10-year BCS champion avg	10-year Notre Dame avg	Metric cutoff	Years Notre Dame met cutoff
Attempts	Value	538.6	471.6	476	4
Attempts	Rank	26.6	53.5	34	3
Yards per attempt (YPA)	Value	4.9	3.6	4.3	1
Yards per attempt (YPA)	Rank	20.4	75.6	32	1
Yards per game (YPG)	Value	198.9	141.2	177.4	2
Yards per game (YPG)	Rank	25.3	68	33	2
Touchdowns	Value	32.6	15.5	24	1
Touchdowns	Rank	13.7	72.6	21	0

Notre Dame’s rushing offense has been somewhat of a bipolar affair over the last 10 years.

The focus of the offense shifted from a run-heavy approach under Davie and in the first year of Willingham’s tenure, to a more balanced unit in 2003-2005, and, finally, to a pass-first scheme with Weis at the helm. The offense averaged 532 rush attempts per season and a run/pass split of 68/32 from 2000-2002, 474 attempts and a split of 54/46 from 2004-2005, but only 424 attempts and a 49/51 split since 2005.

During the early part of the decade when there was a strong focus on the running game, the offense performed at high levels. The Irish met every rush metric value and ranking cutoff in 2000 with one exception, and met half of the cutoffs in 2001.

But since 2001 the Irish have only exceeded two value cutoffs (attempts in 2002 and 2005) and only one ranking cutoff (attempts in 2005) while averaging a paltry 3.4 yards per attempt, 126.3 yards per game, and 14.4 touchdowns per year. Compared to the 10-year BCS champion averages of 4.9 YPA, 198.9 YPG, and 32.6 touchdowns per year, these values don’t stack up well.

Benchmarking the Irish: Passing Offense Metrics

Metric	Quantity	10-year BCS champion avg	10-year Notre Dame avg	Metric cutoff	Years Notre Dame met cutoff
Yards per attempt (YPA)	Value	8.2	6.8	7.9	2
Yards per attempt (YPA)	Rank	17.8	62.8	24	2
Touchdowns	Value	25.8	19.4	22	4
Touchdowns	Rank	26.7	55.8	21	3
Completion percentage	Value	0.62	0.57	0.61	3
Completion percentage	Rank	21.2	61.5	30	2
Pass efficiency	Value	148.9	125	138.5	3
Pass efficiency	Rank	14.5	58.6	15	2

It’s should come as no surprise that the last 10 Irish offenses didn’t meet a single pass metric value or ranking cutoff until Weis installed his pro-style scheme.

From 2000 through 2004 the Irish averaged a modest 6.4 pass YPA, a paltry 11.6 passing touchdowns per year, a very inefficient 51.5 percent completion rate, and a pass efficiency rating under 110. The performance during these years was good for average rankings of 78.2 (YPA), 82.6 (touchdowns), 88 (completion percentage) and 80 (pass efficiency)—compared to average rankings of 17.8, 26.7, 21.2 and 14.5 for the last 10 BCS champions. Not only was the passing game an afterthought in terms of production, it was also woefully inefficient.

Weis arrived in 2005, modernized the Irish passing game, and morphed the offense into a much more efficient unit. Since 2005 (excluding the 2007 season) the Irish averaged eight YPA, 31 touchdowns, a 63.6 percent completion rate, and a pass efficiency of 148.8, much more in line with the averages of the last 10 BCS champs in the table above. Additionally, twice—in 2005 and 2009—a Weis-led offense met every blueprint passing value and ranking cutoff.

Defense

Benchmarking the Irish: Total Defense Metrics

Metric	Quantity	10-year BCS champion avg	10-year Notre Dame avg	Metric cutoff	Years Notre Dame met cutoff
Third down efficiency	Value	0.31	0.35	0.33	4
Third down efficiency	Rank	--	--	--	--
Yards per play (YPP)	Value	4.3	5.2	4.5	1
Yards per play (YPP)	Rank	7.4	53.6	10	1
Yards per game (YPG)	Value	277.9	349	303	1
Yards per game (YPG)	Rank	7.4	46.9	10	0
Points per game (PPG)	Value	13.7	23.2	16.4	0
Points per game (PPG)	Rank	5.1	47.4	8	0

The best total defensive unit Notre Dame fielded in the last decade was 2002, a unit that met the value cutoffs for third down efficiency, yards per play, and yards per game, and barely missed the value cutoff for points per game (16.7 compared to 16.4). Additionally, this defense met the ranking cutoff for YPP, and narrowly missed it for YPG (13 compared to 10) and PPG (nine compared to 8). All in all, the 2002 Irish defense was very nearly a top 10 unit.

But apart from 2002, there wasn’t a year that the defense came close to meeting the total defense blueprint value and ranking cutoffs. The Irish fielded (roughly) a top 30 defense in 2001 and managed to exceed the third down efficiency value cutoff in 2000, 2003 and 2008, but did not meet a single other total defense value or ranking cutoff during the last 10 years.

Excluding 2002, Notre Dame has allowed almost a 36 percent third down conversion rate, over 5.3 YPP, nearly 355 YPG, and almost 24 PPG. Comparing this performance to the 10-year BCS champion averages of 31.3 percent, 4.3 YPP, 277.9 YPG and 13.7 PPG shows just how far the Irish have been from fielding a championship caliber defense.

Benchmarking the Irish: Rushing Defense Metrics

Metric	Quantity	10-year BCS champion avg	10-year Notre Dame avg	Metric cutoff	Years Notre Dame met cutoff
Yards per attempt (YPA)	Value	3	3.7	3.4	3
Yards per attempt (YPA)	Rank	14.5	47.7	25	3
Yards per game (YPG)	Value	95.8	135.9	109	2
Yards per game (YPG)	Rank	13.7	46.4	23	2
Touchdowns	Value	8.6	14.4	9	1
Touchdowns	Rank	12.3	38.2	10	1

The story defending the run isn’t wholly different from that of the total defensive metrics. The 2002 defensive unit was one of the best in the country, but the remaining years, with 2004 as a notable exception, didn’t measure up well.

The 2002 Irish defense allowed an exceptional 2.8 yards per attempt and a paltry 95.2 yards per game—good enough to meet the value and ranking cutoffs in both categories. This unit also allowed only 11 rushing touchdowns on the year, good for a ranking of 12th in the country. Both values are just outside the cutoffs (9 touchdowns, 10th place ranking).

But 2004 was an even better year for Notre Dame’s rush defense. This unit met or exceeded every value and ranking cutoff and allowed 2.7 YPA, 88.2 YPG, and only 6 rushing touchdowns on the ground—an exceptional performance that ranked 4th nationally in each category.

Excluding 2002 and 2004, the Irish only met one value and ranking cutoff—3.1 YPA (18th ranking) in 2003—as the defense allowed an average of 3.9 YPA, 147 YPG, and 15.9 rushing touchdowns per year, values that (again) do not compare well to those of the last 10 title winners listed above.

Benchmarking the Irish: Passing Defense Metrics

Metric	Quantity	10-year BCS champion avg	10-year Notre Dame avg	Metric cutoff	Years Notre Dame met cutoff
Yards per attempt (YPA)	Value	5.5	7.1	5.7	1
Yards per attempt (YPA)	Rank	7	67.3	9	1
Yards per completion (YPC)	Value	11	13.1	11.8	2
Yards per completion (YPC)	Rank	21.7	81.7	27	1
Yards per game (YPG)	Value	182	213.1	200	3
Yards per game (YPG)	Rank	23.8	54.7	34	2
Touchdowns	Value	11.5	17.2	14	2
Touchdowns	Rank	15.6	52.9	16	1
Completion percentage	Value	0.5	0.54	0.54	5
Completion percentage	Rank	17.8	34	19	4
Pass efficiency	Value	94.6	121.9	101.3	1
Pass efficiency	Rank	6.2	56.8	9	0

The pass defense follows a somewhat different trend than the total and rushing metrics.

The 2002 unit was tops in terms of scoring and in nearly all of the efficiency metrics, allowing only 12 touchdowns (15th ranking), a very low 49.3 percent completion rating (14), and a 98.2 (10) pass efficiency. Additionally, the Irish surrendered only 5.9 yards per attempt (17), 11.9 yards per completion (39), and 204.8 yards per game (46).

This was good enough to meet the value cutoff in touchdowns, completion percentage, and pass efficiency, in addition to the ranking cutoff of the first two metrics. The remaining metrics (YPA, YPC and YPG) only narrowly missed the value cutoffs.

Apart from 2002 the Irish performed very well in completion percentage and fairly good in a few other categories. Moreover, there were some other years where several value and/or ranking cutoffs were met and others only narrowly missed.

The last 10 Irish defenses averaged a 53.8 percent completion rate which compares very favorably to the 50.1 percent average of the title winners. Additionally, these defensive units allowed an average of 213.1 YPG and a pass efficiency of 121.9. While neither are as close to the BCS champs as the completion percentage comparison, both are respectable 10-year averages, especially considering the number of defensive coaching/scheme changes.

There were also some fairly solid units apart from 2002. The Irish met eight passing value and ranking cutoffs (YPA, YPC, YPG, and completion percentage) in 2007, and missed by small margins in touchdowns (19 compared to 14) and pass efficiency (111.8 compared to 101.3). The 2001 unit also fielded a strong pass defense, and met the value and ranking cutoffs in YPG and completion percentage, the value cutoff in touchdowns, and missed the 94.6 pass efficiency value cutoff by a relatively small margin (113.7).

The Fighting Irish of the Last Decade

It should come as no surprise to those who followed Notre Dame football over the past decade that the Irish did not field a championship caliber team during that period.

There were certainly a few good squads, but there was never an offensive unit that aligned with the BCS championship blueprint, only one defense that very nearly aligned with the blueprint, and never a complete team performance. Even pairing the best offense (2005) and defense (2002), the Irish fall short of meeting every metric value and ranking cutoff.

This trend was most evident in the aforementioned years of upper-tier bowl games where there were deficiencies on at least one side of the ball, and sometimes on both sides. The 2000 Fiesta Bowl squad protected the ball and fielded a strong rushing attack, but certainly benefited from luck and was not a complete defensive unit. The 2002 Gator Bowl team fielded the best defense of the last decade, but paired it with an offense that set many records in futility. And the 2005 and 2006 Weis-led BCS teams were good-to-very-good offenses coupled with below average defensive units.

Offensively, two years stand out. The 2000 team fielded a running attack consistent with those of the blueprint and the 2005 pass offense met or exceeded every pass and total offense value and ranking cutoff. But neither unit completely aligned with the blueprint.

Davie’s 2000 offense was never able to parlay the running game success into an efficient passing attack, and, while Weis’ 2005 squad was efficient and effective through the air, it didn’t match the efficiency and effectiveness of the previous 10 BCS champions on the ground.

Defensively, the 2002 Irish met or exceeded almost every value and ranking cutoff and narrowly missed on the others. But, apart from that year, there wasn’t a defensive unit that aligned with the majority of the blueprint metrics. Additionally, while the Irish offense has been fairly solid protecting the ball, the defense has struggled to consistently force enough takeaways to generate turnover margins consistent with championship level football.

Brian Kelly and Going Forward

The past is the past, Kelly is the future. And while it is difficult—if not impossible—to use his past to predict the future, his past is the only data available, limited as it may be.

His time in FCS isn’t directly comparable, and the same argument can be made for his tenure at Central Michigan. Historically the Irish have played a very strong schedule, and the Mid-American Conference is hardly a juggernaut. This leaves his three years at Cincinnati (excluding the 2006 International Bowl) as the most likely representation of what his Irish squads will look like, but here only his last two will be examined.

Measuring the Bearcats

The 2008 Bearcats amassed a 11-3 record, first place Big East finish, and BCS Orange Bowl birth against the Hokies of Virginia Tech, but certainly did not mimic a BCS champion. Cincinnati was minus eight in turnover margin and only met or exceeded three offensive and five defensive value/ranking cutoffs.

The offense was fairly balanced in its approach (49/51 run/pass split), but far more efficient and effective through the air averaging a ranking of 30.5 in the blueprint passing metrics. The defense ranked in the top 30 in all four total defensive blueprint metrics, was strong against the run (roughly a top 20 unit), and fairly good defending the pass (roughly a top 40 unit).

In 2009, Cincinnati went undefeated in the regular season and won their second consecutive Big East Conference title before being dismantled by the Gators in the Sugar Bowl. This unit improved dramatically in turnover margin (plus nine), and met or exceeded 16 value/ranking cutoffs on offense, but only one on defense.

Last year’s Bearcat offense was much more pass-heavy compared to 2008 (43/57 run/pass split), and the production on the ground suffered accordingly. Still, the offense met or exceeded every blueprint metric value and ranking cutoff with the exception of third down efficiency, rush attempts, rush YPG, and rushing touchdowns. The improvement on offense didn’t translate to the other side of the ball where the defensive performance regressed. But the loss of 10 starters obviously played a role as the unit ranked outside the top 40 in every defensive blueprint metric except rush YPA, YPC, and passing touchdowns.

What Does It Mean for Notre Dame?

Two years is a relatively small data set, but there are certain characteristics of Kelly’s teams that are very promising and others that are cause for concern. Offensively, his teams have shown the ability to be very efficient units capable of scoring early and often. Additionally, he was able to field a top 30 defensive unit in 2008 with a roster full of rather mediocre talent.

His offensive approach, however, is much more pass-heavy than the majority of recent champions. While the 2009 Bearcat offense was efficient on the ground (five rush YPA), they came up very short in rush YPG and the 361 rush attempts strongly suggests a de-emphasized running game. Additionally, Kelly hasn’t shown the ability to field the dominant, top 10 defense needed to capture a title, and his teams have also struggled to force turnovers.

Of course, Notre Dame isn’t Cincinnati. Weis left Kelly more talent—particularly on defense—than he has ever had, and he should continue to have a talented roster at his disposal provided he can recruit well.

Still, defensive coordinator Bob Diaco has only one year of coordinator experience and is a big bet for an Irish unit that needs immediate, dramatic improvement. Moreover, Kelly’s emphasis on throwing the ball isn’t consistent with the BCS championship blueprint and is a decidedly more risky approach than is needed. Morphing the defense into top 10 form is requisite to championship football, and, while a pass-happy offense certainly doesn’t doom him to failure, Kelly will need to go against the trend to bring the first title since 1988 to South Bend.

Similar Posts:

Blueprint for BCS Championship Success III: Defensive Results

Blueprint for BCS Championship Success I: Introduction and Approach

Blueprint for BCS Championship Success II: Offensive Results

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

The Power of a Coach That “Gets It”

Jonathan Hunn — Wed, 11 Aug 2010 19:05:32 +0000

It’s been no secret that Notre Dame has had a string of sub-par football coaches. For 14 years, the school has bounced back and forth like a pinball from one coach to the next. The last truly successful coach for the Irish was Lou Holtz. His career at Notre Dame spanned 11 seasons: a pretty respectable tenure. But, the most impressive thing about Holtz and his time at Notre Dame is that, outside of just a few seasons, he consistently had the Irish in the upper echelon of college football.

As Notre Dame embarks on it’s 2010 campaign with yet another new head coach, one has to wonder why the Irish have had such bad luck with their coaches since Holtz. What did Holtz have that Davie, Willingham, and Weis didn’t? Some point to X’s and O’s as the reason for a lackluster decade and a half on the Fighting Irish gridiron. Others point to a lack of elite recruiting or an ability to coach players who haven’t truly honed their technique and football “identity.”

Those are all valid points. But, perhaps the most glaring deficiency is one that is oftentimes overlooked—one that has nothing to do with what happens on Saturday, but every other day during the season and off-season. Perhaps the problem is right under our noses and has little to do with the nuances of schematics. Perhaps the reason Lou Holtz was the last truly successful coach at Notre Dame is that he was the last coach to truly “get” what it meant to coach at Notre Dame and instilled in his players what it meant to play at Notre Dame.

This school was founded on faith and a belief. This school means faith [...] family [...] a set of standards and commitment [...]

At Notre Dame, there’s a spirit, something that’s within you.

Sure, a lot of what Holtz said during one pre-game speech to his players is a little on the “touchy-feely” side. But, it’s also a refreshing look at the gravity the Head Coach of Notre Dame has to impress upon his players on a consistent basis. Understanding what it means to coach or play football at Notre Dame is a lot more than understanding the national attention that comes with the job. In fact, when coaches talk about coaching at Notre Dame, they refer to Notre Dame as a “special” place, which means they understand that they are under intense scrutiny.

“Getting it” means more than understanding that being the coach of Notre Dame is a high-profile position. It’s an understanding of the University—its history, values, and commitment to excellence in all pursuits—and instilling that in your players and “making” them understand that as well. It’s an underemphasis on the self and my accomplishments and intellect and an increased emphasis on the team, the group, the family, and the common goal. It’s this element that is at the heart of the distinction.

As Kelly begins his first series of summer workouts with his team, he will continue to be compared to the coaches who came before him—namely Holtz, the coach who last won a National Title, and Weis, the coach who possessed a winning bravado, but failed to do the same. And while most comparisons will deal with coaching style, schematics, or other quantifiable data (some of it on this website), perhaps the best comparison shouldn’t deal with any of that.

According to Sports Illustrated, shortly after arriving at Notre Dame, Weis was quoted in addressing his players, “every game, you will have a decided schematic advantage.” It was his formula for winning games—sit in front of the press and rattle off offensive and defensive formations or talk about the nuances of a proper throwing motion. That was his bread and butter—outsmarting your opponent. The problem, however, was that he was outsmarting his own players. And even though Weis attended Notre Dame as a student, he still didn’t “get” it, oftentimes being described as the Ghost of Notre Dame—arriving early in the morning and leaving late, out of the view of the students and community.

This off-season, Brian Kelly made between 150 and 160 stops at various Alumni Clubs and other public events in order to reestablish the Notre Dame community that, over the past seven or eight months has been somewhat scattered and disconnected due to the discontent with Charlie Weis. Sure, it’s nice to grease the palms of people who make monetary contributions to Notre Dame on an annual basis. But more than that, Kelly understands that the most powerful Notre Dame community is one that is united under a common goal: not just the players and staff, but the school, its students, staff, alumni, and fans as well.

When asked at his opening press conference for the 2010 season what his message will be to his players this season, Kelly simply responded, “We’re here for Our Lady. We’re here to play for Notre Dame. There’s only one way to play this game: with great passion and spirit to play for your teammates, to play for our University [...] and we will talk about that every single day. The rest takes care of itself.”

Finally, a coach who gets it.

Similar Posts:

Here Come the Irish 2010

Spring Football Focus Part II: Conditioning

670 the Score Radio Interview Audio and Reflections

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Blueprint for BCS Championship Success IV: Outlining the Blueprint

Anthony Pilcher — Sat, 07 Aug 2010 04:04:39 +0000

Editor’s note: This is the fourth installment of a five-part series detailing the blueprint for winning the BCS national championship and measuring the Irish performance against this standard.

As the offensive and defensive results indicate, there is certainly a blueprint for winning a BCS national championship. The overwhelming majority of the last 10 champions performed at very similar levels in the same statistical categories, and, while there are always exceptions to the rule, most of the data is consistent and compelling.

Teams that follow this blueprint ensure a high probability of winning a title. The fundamental concepts that enable teams to perform at this level is potentially of more value, but setting the bar is also of merit as it establishes a benchmark for success.

The Blueprint Defined

The value and ranking cutoffs are outlined below for the three categories (miscellaneous, offense, defense). As with the offensive (which include the miscellaneous metrics) and defensive results, the data is presented in tabular form with the ranking and value cutoffs, as well as the number of teams above/below these cutoffs, identified for each metric.

Only those metrics found to be common and/or important are shown here but the full list of investigated metrics can be found in the introduction. Metrics absent from this discussion were excluded because of insufficient data (more on this below) or because the majority of the last 10 champions did not perform at a high level in the statistical category. Keeping consistent with the three previous installments, the cutoffs presented below only include the last 10 BCS champions, although some distinctions are made between the winners and losers of these games.

Miscellaneous

Miscellaneous Blueprint

	Value		Rank
Metric	Cutoff	Number above cutoff	Cutoff	Number above cutoff
Turnover margin	6	8	29	9

Simply put, a team must protect the ball and generate turnovers to win a championship. No team with a BCS title in the last decade had a turnover margin lower than five and the average of 14.2 is worth about an extra possession per game. Comparing the winners and losers reinforces the importance of this metric. The losing squads posted an average turnover margin of approximately nine and an average ranking of 27.5—five less in turnover margin and almost 14 spots lower in ranking than the winners.

Offense

Offensive Blueprint

		Value		Rank
Offensive category	Metric	Cutoff	Number above cutoff	Cutoff	Number above cutoff
TOTAL	3rd down efficiency	0.43	7	--	--
	Yards per play (YPP)	5.8	9	28	9
	Yards per game (YPG)	403	8	31	8
	Points per game (PPG)	32.1	8	23	9
RUSHING	Attempts	476	8	34	8
	Yards per attempt (YPA)	4.3	9	32	8
	Yards per game (YPG)	177.4	8	33	8
	Touchdowns	24	10	21	9
PASSING	Yards per attempt (YPA)	7.9	8	24	8
	Touchdowns	22	8	21	8
	Completion percentage	0.61	8	30	8
	Pass Efficiency	138.5	9	15	8

Offensively, BCS championship caliber teams are solid overall units that rank in the top quarter of the country, are efficient and effective running the ball, and efficient in the passing game.

Eight of the past 10 champions ranked 31st or better in yards per play, yards per game, and points per game, and the 10 teams posted a very high average third down efficiency of 43 percent.

The data also indicates a high level of efficiency (4.3 rush YPA cutoff) and effectiveness (177.4 rush YPG cutoff) running the ball and scoring on the ground. As a group the 10 teams averaged 4.9 rush YPA (average ranking of 20.4), nearly 200 rushing YPG (average ranking of 25.3), and more than 32 rushing touchdowns per season (average ranking of 13.7) with every offense scoring at least 24 times on the ground.

These squads were also very efficient throwing the ball. Yards per attempt, completion percentage, and pass efficiency all have relatively high value and ranking cutoffs that strongly indicate the necessity of being proficient in the passing game.

Last decade’s championship teams averaged 8.2 pass YPA, a 62.4 percent completion rate, and nearly a 149 pass efficiency rating, good for average rankings of 17.8, 21.2 and 14.5 respectively. These squads were also productive scoring through the air as the group averaged 25.8 passing touchdowns per year (average top 30 ranking) with eight offenses notching at least 22 passing scores.

But while efficiency in the passing game is important, the majority of these teams didn’t employ pass-first offenses, weren’t overly productive throwing the ball, and didn’t excel vertically stretching the field.

Only three units ranked in the top 38 in pass attempts and only four attempted more than 400 passes as the group averaged 375.3 attempts per year (average ranking of nearly 60), roughly 29 pass attempts per game. Expressed differently, seven of the last 10 championship offenses ranked 45th or lower in pass attempts. None of the previous 10 title winners ranked in the top 10 in passing YPG, only four teams ranked 34th or higher, and six ranked 40th or lower. As a group, these teams averaged a modest 232.3 passing YPG (average ranking of 47.5). Finally, only five teams ranked in the top 37 in yards per completion, with an average YPC of 13.2 and an average YPC ranking of roughly 37.

Furthermore, the BCS title game losers were typically more pass-heavy than the winners—the losing squads averaged 3.7 pass attempts and 33.3 passing yards more per game, and nearly seven more passing touchdowns per season.

So while balance is important, particularly scoring balance, running the ball is preferred to a dynamic air attack as the last 10 BCS champions were far more productive on the ground via a run/pass split of approximately 60/40.

Defense

Defensive Blueprint

		Value		Rank
Defensive category	Metric	Cutoff	Number below cutoff	Cutoff	Number above cutoff
TOTAL	3rd down efficiency	0.33	7	--	--
	Yards per play (YPP)	4.5	9	10	9
	Yards per game (YPG)	303	9	10	9
	Points per game (PPG)	16.4	9	8	9
RUSHING	Yards per attempt (YPA)	3.4	9	25	9
	Yards per game (YPG)	109	8	23	8
	Touchdowns	9	7	10	7
PASSING	Yards per attempt (YPA)	5.7	9	9	9
	Yards per completion (YPC)	11.8	8	27	8
	Yards per game (YPG)	200	9	34	9
	Touchdowns	14	9	16	8
	Completion percentage	0.5	9	19	8
	Pass Efficiency	101.3	9	9	9

In contrast, championship defenses of the last decade were extremely sound in virtually every facet.

The three primary total defensive metrics (yards per attempt, yards per game, and points per game) all have ranking cutoff values of 10 or higher with nine teams meeting this standard. As a group, these championship defenses allowed an average of 277.9 YPG, 13.7 PPG and 4.3 YPP. This equates to extremely high average rankings of 7.4 (YPG), 5.1 (PPG) and 7.4 (YPP).

Additionally, eight teams ranked in the top 10 in all three of these statistical categories with only the 2002 Buckeyes and 2007 Tigers failing to meet this standard. And, as one reader so astutely indicated, the 2007 Tigers played in two triple-overtime games that likely inflated their numbers. Perhaps most impressive was the Nick Saban-led LSU defense which was tops in the country in YPP, YPG and PPG in 2003.

These units also excelled getting off the field, posting an average third down efficiency of 31.3 percent as seven teams allowed no better than a 33 percent conversion rate on third down.

The run defense was almost as impressive allowing an average of three YPA, 95.8 YPG, and only 8.6 rushing touchdowns per year—good for average rankings of 14.5, 13.7 and 12.3 respectively. Nine teams ranked in the top 25 in rush YPA, eight ranked 23rd or higher in rush YPG, and seven ranked 10th or better in rushing touchdowns.

The strong performance continued against the pass where nine teams ranked in the top 10 in pass efficiency and yards per attempt, posting an average of 94.6 in the former (average ranking of 6.2) and 5.5 in the latter (average ranking of seven). The remaining pass metric ranking cutoffs (YPC, YPG, touchdowns and completion percentage) are 34th or better, highlighted by stout pass scoring defenses. On average these BCS title defenses surrendered only 11.5 passing touchdowns per year, and no team allowed more than 19.

Similar to the offensive metrics, there were distinct ranking differences amongst the winners and losers as the winning defensive units averaged a ranking of almost 10 spots better in YPP, YPG and PPG, and almost 13 spots better in rushing touchdowns.

A Few Caveats and Noteworthy Items

Value and ranking data for some of the metrics were not readily available making it difficult to determine if they were crucial to success. Time of possession, overall and touchdown red zone efficiencies, and sacks and sacks allowed (along with their normalized counterparts) all had missing values and/or rankings for at least one of these teams.

However, even with limited data, there didn’t seem to be a clustering of teams at the upper or lower ends of the spectrum for these metrics. Intuitively, both red zone efficiency metrics are critical to a high level of team performance, but the limited data didn’t support this conclusion. The same can be said for the various sack categories. While there were a few teams that excelled protecting the passer and pressuring opposing quarterbacks, it was more exception than rule.

Only time of possession showed a somewhat clustered trend in that eight of the past nine (missing data for the 2000 Sooners) BCS national championship teams averaged better than 30 minutes of possession per game. Including 19 of the 20 BCS title game participants, nearly 80 percent fell into the same category. It is difficult to determine if this is due to the offensive or defensive prowess of these teams. Most were run-heavy units which can churn through possession, but the teams also excelled in third down efficiency on both sides of the ball. Either way, 30 minutes of possession is not in indicative of a ball-hogging team or in the top quarter of the country in any given year.

Some metrics were purposefully excluded from this analysis. Fumbles, interceptions and their normalized counterparts (rush attempts/fumble and pass attempts/interception) were not included as turnover margin effectively captures a team’s ability to protect the ball and generate turnovers. Whether these turnovers come in the form of fumbles or interceptions was deemed irrelevant for the purposes of this study, but in most cases the teams that ran the ball well did not fumble often and teams that threw the ball effectively did not throw many interceptions.

Yards per play and rush/pass yards per attempt have a similar relationship, but were included. While YPP is a composite of the other two, excluding yards per rush and pass attempt would not allow for the determination of which is more important—efficiency running or throwing the ball. A similar case can be made for PPG and rushing and passing touchdowns, as well as total, rushing and passing YPG. Since one of the goals of this study was to determine the relative importance of being able to run and/or throw the ball, as well as being able to defend against the run and/or pass, these were included.

Pass efficiency is also a composite metric of many other statistical categories (attempts, yards, completions, touchdowns and interceptions) but was included because it is a relatively good characterization of a team’s overall efficiency throwing the ball and defending against the pass. Despite certain flaws, it is the easiest way to compare two teams across multiple years.

As previously indicated, rush and pass attempts were included for the offense, but not for the defense. Offensively, identifying the run/pass preference provides insight into the philosophy (run-first vs. pass-heavy). But not much value is added by exploring how opposing offenses chose to attack these defenses on an average basis. Offenses that are pass-heavy throw the ball more and run-first teams attempt more rushes. In the end, the run/pass split of offenses playing against these 10 defensive units was very nearly 50/50.

Finally, special teams metrics were not included as part of this analysis but some are likely critical to championship success. Field position plays a huge role in scoring opportunity (the chance of scoring on a drive starting from your own 20-yard line, as opposed to your own 35, is significantly different), and kickers are often the highest scoring players on a team. So there is certainly merit in investigating these metrics, it just wasn’t part of this particular assessment.

Tying It All Together

As noted in the introduction, football hasn’t fundamentally changed. Teams successful at the highest level excel in fundamentals, protect the ball and generate turnovers, play all-around good defense, and run the ball well. There is certainly luck involved, particularly in a 14-plus game season, but the data shows that following this blueprint is the highest probability method for winning a title.

Intuitively, this makes sense.

Solid fundamentals lead to good blocking and tackling. Protecting the ball and generating turnovers maximizes the number of possessions, and, thus, the number of scoring opportunities. Playing good defense limits opponents’ scoring opportunities and makes it “easier” to win. And running the football is a relatively simple, low-risk offensive strategy that comes with several ancillary benefits.

Teams that are efficient and productive on the ground routinely perform well on third down and wield an efficient passing attack. The former is helped by good rushing gains on early downs that result in manageable distances on third down. The latter is a common byproduct of forcing opponents to respect the run, utilizing play-action, and maintaining favorable down and distance situations that enable an equal run/pass threat. A four yard rushing gain on 1st-and-10 is overwhelmingly preferred to an incomplete pass as the nearly equal threat of running and passing on 2nd-and-6 keeps an opposing defense off-balance while the likelihood of running the ball on 2nd-and-10 is much lower.

In fact, out of the last 10 champions the two most prolific rushing offenses—Texas in 2005 and Florida in 2008—were also the most efficient passing teams. So while wide-open, pass-heavy offenses may excite fans and fills stadiums, it isn’t the preferred modus operandi of title teams.

But, compared to the defensive performances, the offenses take a back seat. While a top 30 offense is the common denominator of the last 10 BCS champions, a top 10 unit is needed on the other side of the ball. None of the offensive metric ranking cutoffs are inside the top 10 (average of just over 27), but half of the defensive ranking cutoffs are (average ranking of 16.7). Moreover, the losers of the title games almost always fielded more prolific offenses but less stout defenses. It appears the age-old mantra “defense wins championships” is as true today as it has always has been.

Admittedly, some of the conclusions outlined here may be obvious—i.e. a team can’t turn the ball over frequently and expect to win a lot of games—but others certainly aren’t. It isn’t necessarily intuitive that protecting the passer and being able to generate pressure on opposing quarterbacks isn’t a common element of modern championship teams, particularly given the number of prolific, spread passing offenses.

These results ultimately lead to a question: Can a team win a title without performing at the levels outlined above? Yes, without one or two. But for teams that do not align with the majority of the items in this blueprint, winning the BCS national championship is certainly not a high-probability proposition.

Up next, benchmarking Notre Dame to the blueprint, what has been missing and needs improvement, and how does new head coach Brian Kelly’s philosophy align with these shortfalls.

Similar Posts:

Blueprint for BCS Championship Success III: Defensive Results

Blueprint for BCS Championship Success II: Offensive Results

Blueprint for BCS Championship Success I: Introduction and Approach

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Blueprint for BCS Championship Success III: Defensive Results

Anthony Pilcher — Tue, 03 Aug 2010 03:00:15 +0000

Editor’s note: This is the third installment of a five-part series detailing the blueprint for winning the BCS national championship and measuring the Irish performance against this standard.

What is the defensive recipe for winning the BCS national championship? The aforementioned approach has been used to parse the data and identify the statistical metrics common to BCS champions. Staying consistent with the offensive results, these metrics have been divided into three categories (total, rushing and passing), and the data is presented in tabular form.

Each table includes the metric value (e.g. points allowed per game) and the corresponding national rank for the last 10 BCS champions. The last two rows indicate the established metric ranking and value cutoffs and the number of teams above (for ranking) and below (for value) these cutoffs.

The investigated metrics for each category are listed above each table and those found to be common and/or important characteristics of a BCS national championship caliber defense are italicized. Below each table is a brief discussion detailing pertinent characteristics and strong trends of the data. Where noted, data from all 20 BCS title game participants (winners and losers) has been incorporated.

The intent here is merely to present the results. The conclusions and implications of the data will be discussed in the fourth installment (Outlining the Blueprint).

Total

Metrics investigated:

Third down efficiency
Red zone efficiency
Red zone touchdown efficiency
Yards per play (YPP)
Yards per game (YPG)
Points per game (PPG)

Blueprint Total Defense Value And Ranking Data

		3rd down efficiency		Yards per play (YPP)		Yards per game (YPG)		Points per game (PPG)
Year	BCS Champion	Value	Rank	Value	Rank	Value	Rank	Value	Rank
2000	Oklahoma	--	--	4.1	7	278.9	8	16	7
2001	Miami	0.33	--	3.9	4	270.9	6	9.4	1
2002	Ohio State	0.36	--	4.7	24	320.9	23	13.1	2
2003	LSU	0.24	--	4	1	252	1	11	1
2004	USC	0.28	--	4.3	5	279.3	6	13	3
2005	Texas	0.31	10	4.4	9	302.9	10	16.4	8
2006	Florida	0.33	26	4.3	6	255.4	6	13.5	6
2007	LSU	0.35	29	4.4	4	288.8	3	19.9	17
2008	Florida	0.33	21	4.5	10	285.3	9	12.9	4
2009	Alabama	0.3	6	4.1	4	244.1	2	11.7	2
Cutoff		0.33	--	4.5	10	303	10	16.4	8
Number Above/Below Cutoff		7	--	9	9	9	9	9	9

Third Down Efficiency

Similar to the offensive results, ranking data was not readily available for third down efficiency in 2000-2004 and the value of Oklahoma’s 2000 defensive unit could not be found.

But the available numbers show a strong trend. Of the five teams with available ranking data, all fall in the top 30 and two posted top 10 rankings. Additionally, seven teams held opposing offenses to a third down conversion rate of 33 percent or less, and none of the nine defensive units allowed more than a 35.6 percent third down conversion rate. As a group, the nine defenses allowed an average third down conversion rate of 31.3 percent. Including all 20 participants, 14 teams generated a third down efficiency of 35 percent or lower.

Yards Per Play (YPP)

Nine teams posted top 10 rankings as only the 2002 Buckeyes fell outside the top 10 and allowed more than 4.5 yards per play. The 10 squads averaged 4.3 YPP, a number that doesn’t change when the losing teams are also considered. Additionally, 16 of the 20 participants allowed 4.6 YPP or less and 15 ranked in the top 10.

Yards Per Game (YPG)

Similar to YPP, nine teams posted top 10 rankings in yards per game. Again, the 2002 Buckeyes fall outside the 10th-ranked cutoff value and are the only defense that allowed more than 303 YPG. On average, the 10 defenses allowed 277.9 YPG with Alabama’s 2009 squad leading the pack at just over 244 YPG, good for 2nd in the country. Including the losers, 17 teams allowed 303 or fewer YPG and ranked 13th or better in this category.

Points Per Game (PPG)

Same story, third verse. One team—LSU in 2007—ranked outside the top 10 as nine teams posted rankings of 8th or better and allowed fewer than 16.5 PPG, and seven teams were under 13.6 PPG. The average per game point production of the 10 teams is just under two touchdowns per game (13.7 PPG). Using all 20 data points, 16 teams allowed 16.8 PPG or less and ranked in the top 12 in this metric.

Rushing

Metrics investigated:

Yards per attempt (YPA)
Yards per game (YPG)
Touchdowns

Blueprint Rushing Defense Value And Ranking Data

		Yards per attempt (YPA)		Yards per game (YPG)		Touchdowns
Year	BCS Champion	Value	Rank	Value	Rank	Value	Rank
2000	Oklahoma	3.2	25	108.2	23	13	30
2001	Miami	3.1	20	132.7	40	7	6
2002	Ohio State	2.6	7	77.7	3	5	1
2003	LSU	2.4	3	67	3	5	1
2004	USC	2.6	2	79.4	1	5	2
2005	Texas	3.7	40	130.9	33	15	41
2006	Florida	2.7	6	72.5	5	8	6
2007	LSU	3.2	19	106.1	12	14	25
2008	Florida	3.4	19	105.4	15	9	10
2009	Alabama	2.8	4	78.1	2	5	1
Cutoff		3.4	25	109	23	9	10
Number Above/Below Cutoff		9	9	8	8	7	7

Yards Per Attempt (YPA)

Nine teams ranked 25th or better in yards per attempt and eight ranked 20th or better. The 10 teams allowed a paltry average of three YPA and an average ranking of 14.5 as nine teams held opposing rushers to 3.4 YPA or less. Including all 20 participants does not change the average as 19 teams allowed 3.8 YPA or less and 17 ranked in the top 30 in this category.

Yards Per Game (YPG)

The 10 teams allowed an average of 95.8 yards per game (average ranking of 13.7) in this category and include a 1st place ranking by the 2004 Trojans and a group-low 67 YPG by the 2003 Tigers. Additionally, eight teams allowed fewer than 110 YPG and ranked 23rd or better. Including the losing squads, 16 teams allowed fewer than 117 YPG and ranked 23rd or higher.

Touchdowns

Seven teams ranked in the top 10 in rushing touchdowns allowed, eight ranked in the top 25, and nine ranked in the top 30 including three first place finishes (2002 Buckeyes, 2003 Tigers, and 2009 Crimson Tide). As a group, the 10 teams allowed an average of 8.6 rushing touchdowns per year and a ranking of 12.3 as no team surrendered more than 15 touchdowns on the ground. Those on the losing side of the equation fared differently as only four losing squads allowed nine or fewer touchdowns and only three ranked in the top 10.

Passing

Metrics investigated:

Yards per attempt (YPA)
Yards per completion (YPC)
Yards per game (YPG)
Touchdowns
Completion percentage
Sacks
Attempts/sack, normalized to account for differences in pass attempts
Pass efficiency

Blueprint Passing Defense Value And Ranking Data

		Yards per attempt (YPA)		Yards per completion (YPC)		Yards per game (YPG)		Touchdowns		Completion percentage		Pass Efficiency
Year	BCS Champion	Value	Rank	Value	Rank	Value	Rank	Value	Rank	Value	Rank	Value	Rank
2000	Oklahoma	5.2	2	10.5	5	170.8	9	9	8	0.5	19	89.2	2
2001	Miami	5.2	4	11.8	27	138.2	2	5	1	0.4	2	75.6	1
2002	Ohio State	6.2	32	10.8	8	243.1	95	14	27	0.6	79	111.9	32
2003	LSU	5.4	4	12.2	48	185	18	12	14	0.4	2	89.8	2
2004	USC	5.7	7	10.6	5	199.9	34	13	16	0.5	29	101.3	9
2005	Texas	5.1	1	10	2	172	8	10	9	0.5	10	96.7	4
2006	Florida	5.6	4	10.5	8	182.9	33	10	8	0.5	18	98.3	4
2007	LSU	5.7	9	12.1	78	182.7	9	19	48	0.5	2	98.4	3
2008	Florida	5.5	5	10.4	12	179.9	20	12	13	0.5	16	96.8	3
2009	Alabama	5.2	2	11.1	24	166	10	11	12	0.5	1	87.7	2
Cutoff		5.7	9	11.8	27	200	34	14	16	0.5	19	101.3	9
Number Above/Below Cutoff		9	9	8	8	9	9	9	8	9	8	9	9

Yards Per Attempt (YPA)

All but one team—Ohio State in 2002—ranked in the top 10 as nine squads posted rankings of 9th or better and allowed 5.7 yards per attempt or less. As a group, the last 10 BCS champions allowed an average of 5.5 YPA (average ranking of seven). Including the losing defensive units, 16 teams allowed 5.7 YPA or less and ranked 9th or better.

Yards Per Completion (YPC)

Eight teams posted a ranking of 27th or better and allowed 11.8 yards per completion or less as the 10 defenses surrendered an average of 11 YPC for an average ranking of 21.7. Additionally, six teams allowed fewer than 11 YPC and five ranked in the top 10 in this metric. Finally, 17 of the participants allowed 12 or fewer YPC and 15 ranked 27th or better.

Yards Per Game (YPG)

Only the 2002 Buckeyes performed poorly in this category, allowing over 240 YPG and ranking 95th in the country. As a group, the defenses allowed an average of 182 passing yards per game and a ranking of just under 24 as nine teams allowed fewer than 200 YPG and ranked 34th or better. The losing defensive units aren’t appreciably different averaging 183.8 YPG and a 32nd ranking as 17 of the 20 participants allowed fewer than 205 YPG and 15 ranked in the top 35.

Touchdowns

Eight teams ranked 16th or better allowing touchdowns through the air and nine performed well enough to garner at least a 27th place ranking including the 2001 Hurricanes who allowed only five passing scores. Nine teams also allowed 14 or fewer touchdowns and four units allowed 10 or fewer touchdowns. On average, the 10 teams allowed 11.5 touchdowns per year and ranked in the top 16. Adding the losing teams, 17 allowed 15 or fewer touchdowns and 16 ranked in the top 30 in this metric.

Completion Percentage

On average, the defenses allowed opposing passers to complete only about half of their passes, a level of performance good enough to generate an average ranking slightly better than 18. Nine of the championship teams allowed less than a 54 percent completion rate and ranked 19th or better and 17 of the 20 participants allowed less than 56 percent completion rate and ranked 33rd or better.

Pass Efficiency

Nine teams ranked in the top 10 with pass efficiency ratings of less than 102 as the 10 defenses averaged a pass efficiency of 94.6 and a ranking of 6.2—the highest average ranking value of any defensive category with the exception of points per game. The 2001 Hurricanes led the way once again, posting a gaudy, 1st place pass efficiency of 75.6. Including the losers, 16 teams generated pass efficiency ratings of 105 or better and ranked in the top 10.

Next up, summarizing the offensive and defensive results, conclusions, and defining the blueprint.

Similar Posts:

Blueprint for BCS Championship Success II: Offensive Results

Blueprint for BCS Championship Success I: Introduction and Approach

Blueprint for BCS Championship Success IV: Outlining the Blueprint

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.