Clashmore Mike

Spread and Pass, Brian Kelly’s (Somewhat) New Irish Offense

Anthony Pilcher — Wed, 10 Mar 2010 01:31:49 +0000

While the defense may be a bigger problem, one of the primary concerns for many Irish fans is the spread passing offense of new head coach Brian Kelly. Kelly makes no secret of his offensive goal, he wants to be aggressive and vertical, scoring on every possession. As such, he favors the pass over the run, operates heavily from the shotgun, and employs an up-tempo pace.

Some question the lack of a consistent, power running element while others worry about ball control. There are also concerns about the how a spread passing scheme will fare against good defensive competition and Kelly’s ability to fill the roster with elite talent at the skill positions.

Former head coach Charlie Weis’ recruiting record should be enough evidence to negate the last of these concerns, but the others may be valid. There are certainly negatives that come with Kelly’s offense, but many successful teams like Utah, Boise State, Texas, Oklahoma and Florida run versions of the spread, and excel doing it.

So what is a spread offense and how does Kelly’s particular brand work? Furthermore, what is the fundamental problem with his approach and is it compatible at Notre Dame?

What Is Kelly’s Spread Offense and How Does It Work?

At a fundamental level, the intent of a spread offense is to stretch the field horizontally with multiple wide receivers. This effectively accomplishes two goals. First, it makes crisp tackling in open space a commodity. And second, it forces defensive coordinators to use smaller, quicker personnel, and to empty the box in order to matchup on the outside. The result is an advantage for the offense on the interior. Defenses can’t overload the box and the offense has one-on-one blocking opportunities in the running game and in pass protection.

The guys over at NDNation asked Chris Brown of Smart Football to summarize Kelly’s flavor of the spread. True to form, Chris penned a solid synopsis. He makes some excellent points and the entire read is worth the time, but a few highlights are noted here with some additions of my own below.

Kelly’s offense is a “traditional” spread that, for the most part, maintains balance and doesn’t tilt too much towards the run (e.g. Michigan) or pass (e.g. Texas Tech).
The run game is simple, particularly without a running quarterback. There is a lot of zone blocking and Kelly’s approach is based on space and angles rather than power, but he does make frequent use of a lead blocker. Mostly, he utilizes inside and outside zone running plays, counters, and some power runs.
The concepts in the passing game are almost equally simple. Kelly prefers a vertical stem route tree aimed at getting upfield while giving the same initial post-snap motion. This accomplishes his goal of being aggressive, but also detracts from the ability of opposing defenses to read routes as they all appear similar through the first several steps.
Kelly also likes to use overloaded formations to isolate receivers on the backside. This generates favorable one-on-one matchups for players like wide receiver Michael Floyd or tight end Kyle Rudolph, or overloads the strongside of the field if the defense rolls the coverage to double the weakside receiver.

Some Additional Discussion Points…

Brown states that Kelly’s offense doesn’t make use of the fullback or tight end as much as Oklahoma or Texas, but that doesn’t mean he doesn’t use them at all. His running game often employs playside down-blocking and pulling linemen, tight ends, and/or H-backs that lead into the hole (counter and power plays). This is somewhat similar to the traditional counter-trey, albeit with much different personnel and run from spread formations.

Unlike Weis’ offense, in the future Irish signal callers won’t be tasked with an extremely high burden of execution. In Kelly’s scheme the quarterback position is primarily one of distribution. The offense uses similar concepts to combat the blitz, e.g. hot routes and sight adjustments, but the implementation is simple and requires less precision. Moreover, most of the drops in Kelly’s offense are fairly short and facilitate a quick release.

This simplicity translates into a high level of execution. Kelly’s offense is explosive, but the goal isn’t always to go downfield. He wants to accomplish what spread concepts were invented to do (stretch the field horizontally, empty the box and generate good one-on-one blocking opportunities, force open field tackling, etc.), but he mostly does this using complementing looks and concepts, rather than trying to intentionally generate a big play. Additionally, he wants to put a lot of pressure on opposing defenses by operating at a high pace, getting as many snaps as possible, and wearing defenders down.

In this regard, there should more consistency than the Irish offense displayed the past three seasons. Weis relied heavily on the big play, both as a form of randomness and as a catalyst for production. And, as Brown notes, this is why his offense required elite, experienced talent to effectively operate, and why it would be explosive at times and practically dormant at others.

What’s the Fundamental Problem?

In Brown’s opinion, the biggest question mark is if the offense can win the matchups generated by spreading the field.

Talented teams like Oklahoma, Texas and Florida use a spread scheme because they can recruit an abundance of skill talent. They want to get as much of it as possible on the field, isolate defenders, and win the one-on-one battles. Few teams have two good corners, let alone the four or five needed to effectively matchup against a spread offense with good wide receiver depth.

But this comes with the assumption that there is a threat to run and that offensive line can protect the passer, often times with little or no help. As recent Irish fans can attest, this isn’t always the case.

Last year the Irish had plenty of skill talent capable of winning one-on-one matchups (Floyd, Rudolph and wide receiver Golden Tate to name a few), but the offense frequently stalled due to the inability to keep opponents off-balance with the run and protect the quarterback with five and six players.

In other words, spread offenses are controlled by defenses that are able to contain the run and get pressure with four, drop seven, and play physical, press coverage on the outside.

The pressure from the front four allows the defense to drop multiple defenders and minimize passing lanes. The press play on the outside disrupts route running, frustrates timing between the quarterback and his receivers, and forces the passer to hold onto the ball. And the combination of the two allows aggressive outside secondary play with help over the top to prevent downfield throws.

If the offensive line can’t provide extra time for the quarterback, the passing game struggles. Alternatively, without a solid run presence to take advantage of the even numbers in the box, the defense isn’t required to adjust, commit more defenders to stopping the run, and open up the outside.

For most defenses, this is not an easy proposition.

But against USC the Trojan front four dominated the trenches, and the Irish struggled. Quarterback Jimmy Clausen was frequently pressured and the Irish had a razor-thin margin for error. The offense was productive at times, but largely inconsistent.

Likewise, Kelly’s offense was dismantled in the Sugar Bowl against Florida. Quarterback Tony Pike rarely had time to throw as the Gator defensive line consistently applied pressure. The corners played aggressive, tight coverage on the outside, and, without solid rushing production, the linebackers were able to flex and run free. There was obviously a huge talent gap at work as well, but (at least for the Bearcat offense) it was most evident in the line play.

Will It Work at Notre Dame?

There’s really no way to know.

Kelly’s offense has been successful everywhere he’s been and provided he recruits well he will have more talent at Notre Dame than any of his previous stops. This should help with the athleticism mismatches evident in the Sugar Bowl.

Additionally, Kelly’s approach differs from Weis’ style in that there is more focus on the running game, it is based on simplicity and execution rather than complexity and scheme, places less execution burden on the quarterback, and is less deliberate and predictable. All these things will certainly help.

But it still comes down to having balance and being able to protect with five—this is the crux of the problem.

The running game must be serviceable enough to force defenders into the box and prevent opposing defenses from keying on the pass and rushing the quarterback without restraint.

And the offensive line must be able to take advantage of the equal numbers in the box by winning the one-on-one battles. If opposing defenses are able to stop the run and consistently generate pressure with four or five defenders, Kelly’s unit will appear eerily similar to Weis’ squads of the past few years.

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This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Spring Football Focus Part I: Personnel Changes

Jonathan Hunn — Sun, 07 Mar 2010 03:47:56 +0000

For most Notre Dame Football fans this off-season has been a whirlwind of news—a somewhat reserved excitement and hopeful optimism for what the 2010 season holds for the Fighting Irish. Notre Dame let a coach go, hired a promising replacement, said goodbye to a handful of players who are currently demonstrating their abilities for the NFL draft, welcomed eight new position coaches (nine if you count the Strength and Conditioning Coach), and signed its newest recruiting class, including five early enrollees.

Soon, the football players will cease their “voluntary” workouts and dust off their jock straps in anticipation of spring football. With the annual Blue-Gold game just under two months away, Clashmore Mike will look at three separate areas of focus for the 2010 football team as spring practice commences in just under a month. These three areas of focus were major problem areas that plagued the 2009 squad nearly all season and should targeted for improvement this spring. The first is expected and unexpected personnel changes.

Offense

The hiring of Brian Kelly and his new staff, who will implement their own flavor of spread offense, will throw a big wrench in what is usually a simple matter of fitting current players into vacant positions left open through graduation and those bolting early to the NFL. With Kelly’s offense, there will be more reliance on the passing game which impacts the quarterbacks, wide receivers, and offensive linemen (because of increased emphasis on pass protection). This year’s offense will be missing last year’s record-setting and record-breaking quarterback, the reigning Biletnikoff Award winner, and three offensive linemen (both tackles and the center).

Substituting those positions out of a highly-potent offense is like taking the tequila out of a margarita and still expecting it to remind you of Jimmy Buffett. And because the offense will be plugging in players at so many crucial positions they will arguably be under more scrutiny than the defense this spring by Notre Dame staff and the passionate fanbase.

Quarterbacks

Obviously, most of the attention on offense will be directed at the one taking the most snaps. Dayne Crist is the leading candidate to be that guy, although he’s recovering from an ACL injury at a rapid enough rate that could allow him be under center the majority of the spring. Besides his bum knee, the only other problem with Crist is that he’s unproven— he’s never started a game for the Irish and he’s only totaled 38 minutes of playing time in his first two years. On top of that, he’s learning a new offensive system—-albeit an easier system to learn than Weis’ pro-style offense.

Crist may be the starter by default, but of all the quarterbacks who will be on the roster in the spring—Crist, Montana, freshman Tommy Rees, and possibly current wide receiver John Goodman—Crist is the one who fits Kelly’s offense the best. So the real question might be “Who is likely to backup Crist on the depth chart?” This may be the first year since 2005, when David Wolke and Evan Sharpley fought for the backup spot behind Brady Quinn, that there will be such a stark drop-off in talent and development from the starter to backup. Quarterbacks coach Charlie Molnar will certainly have his work cut out for him.

Running Backs

The running back position is pretty cut-and-dry this season. Unless something drastic happens, the odds are fairly good that Armando Allen will keep his starting job. I think the real question at running back is “Who stays?” and “Who goes?” The running game will certainly not be absent from Brian Kelly’s offense, but it isn’t utilized as much as it was for Weis’ offense, and certainly not in the same way. Kelly’s offense is more suited for speedier backs like Allen and Theo Riddick and not as well for bigger backs like Robert Hughes, Jonas Gray, or Cierre Wood.

There are also a couple of other backs like Steve Paskorz and Cameron Roberson who will be seeing very limited action, if at all. Obviously, it was necessary for Weis to stock up on running backs, but now that Brian Kelly is here, who will be seeing meaningful time in the backfield? Will Cierre Wood switch to the other side of the ball? Does Riddick move to wideout and contribute on Special Teams exclusively? Much like the quarterback position, the majority of the focus may not be on the starter, but on the backups and how things shake out.

Wide Receivers

The wide receivers will be a very fun group to watch this Spring. With Golden Tate gone, Mike Floyd will most definitely step up into the primary receiver roll. But again, as with the other positions, who will step up behind him? In Kelly’s offense, there is almost always two wide receivers on the field at the same time and sometimes as many as four or five. Shaquelle Evans is a player who has shown signs of promise, but only has 33 minutes of playing time under his belt. John Goodman was a surprising contributor last season, notching one touchdown (from Crist) in mop-up duty against Washington State. But, if Goodman moves to quarterback to give some depth, his ability to catch footballs is moot. Roby Toma, Deion Walker, and Barry Gallup could all see some action this season, but none of them have really shown anything noteworthy, with Toma surprisingly leading that bunch in productivity.

Finally we come to Duval Kamara. He has been somewhat of an afterthought these past two seasons after a promising freshman year. It appears Duval has regressed significantly and it’s hard to explain why. If Kamara can pull himself together and have a Mo Stovall type of senior season, he could definitely help the team with his modest experience and help himself if he’d like to play at the next level, which, at this point is a long shot at best. As Brian Kelly’s offense relies heavily on the passing game, the progression of this position could mean a highly explosive offense, or one that continues to sputter throughout the season.

Offensive Line and Tight Ends

The offensive line and tight end positions are in a very unique situation this season. Notre Dame will return both offensive guard and starting tight end positions and will look to replace both offensive tackles and the center. However, if Dan Wenger can get his act together, Notre Dame might just find itself only needing to replace both right and left tackles, which is a bit less daunting. Matt Romine could fill that right tackle spot, but he has been battling injuries through most of his career and he is certainly not a lock at that position.

It’s encouraging to see that all of Notre Dame’s tight ends are coming back and this is exactly the type of offensive system that could see Kyle Rudolph finally get the recognition he deserves as being an elite pass-catching tight end. If Mike Ragone can get to 100% following his knee injury a couple of years ago and someone like Tyler Eifert can provide quality depth at the position, the tight ends are easily in the best shape of any position on the team. The biggest positive aspect that these two positions have going for them is quality depth. It’s encouraging to see that Weis didn’t leave the cupboards bare when he left. As long as Brian Kelly can continue to recruit at these positions, the Irish should be able to avoid another 2007 disaster.

Defense

Besides the safety position, the trend on defense is not that the Irish have untested players, but rather that the Irish have highly-talented players who are not performing to their potential. No position is more guilty of this than the defensive line.

Defensive Line

As the Irish transitions yet again to a 3-4 base defense, there are likely to be changes along the line that will see Kerry Neal and Darius Fleming shedding some pounds and moving back to an outside linebacker/defensive end hybrid position. Ian Williams, Ethan Johnson, and Kapron Lewis-Moore could prove to be trouble for any opposing offensive line if they can be coached to provide consistent pocket pressure. However, come spring and summer, the name of the game for the defensive line will be technique and, perhaps more importantly, conditioning. If Brian Kelly’s offense performs as it should, expect the defense to be on the field a majority of the game. This definitely could spell disaster if the line isn’t conditioned properly. Also necessary will be a fresh rotation of players, which puts a lot of strain on the depth at this position. And while that depth is promising, it is untested.

Linebackers

Much like the defensive line position, the linebackers will be tested in their versatility. This group lost Scott Smith, who didn’t see much action last year, Toryan Smith who had marginal playing time, and Harrison Smith who, according to Brian Kelly, will be moving back to his original position of safety, which has more than one fan cringing. However, in Diaco’s 3-4 defense, they have likely gained Kerry Neal and Darius Fleming, as stated above.

To lead the group, Brian Smith and Manti Te’o are back, and will undoubtedly be the starting middle linebackers. But, again like most of the other positions, behind the four starters is a lot of untested talent. With the inexperience in the secondary, especially at the safety position, and the previous lack of production along the defensive line, it could be up to the linebackers to provide leadership and consistency throughout the season. It is crucial that players like Steve Filer, David Posluszny and Anthony McDonald ready themselves to be called upon if needed.

Secondary

Of all the other positions on the team, the secondary is unquestionably the weakest. While the cornerbacks aren’t in horrible shape this year, only losing Raeshon McNeil and special teams standout Mike Anello, their performance the past two years has been underwhelming, to say the least. After a promising showing in his sophomore year, Darrin Walls dipped a bit in production this past season, and his experience and leadership will be sorely needed in a secondary that is sure to be picked on throughout the year.

The real battle this spring could be on the other side of the field between Robert Blanton who has shown flashes of greatness and toughness throughout his career, and Gary Gray, whose play on the field hasn’t really lived up to his hype coming out of high school. The only other non-freshman cornerbacks on the roster are E.J. Banks and Jamoris Slaughter. The former hasn’t had a lick of playing time and the latter may make a switch to safety, depending on the situation.

The safeties are in a league of their own this off-season—and not in a good way. Besides Harrison Smith, who has been known to struggle in pass coverage, the only other safety on the roster who has seen more than 10 minutes of playing time is Zeke Motta, who saw a whopping 11 minutes last season. Losing Kyle McCarthy may have a greater impact on the secondary in 2010 than losing Tom Zbikowski after the 2007 campaign. Outside of Harrison Smith and Zeke Motta the only other safeties on the roster who aren’t incoming freshmen are Leonard Gordon and Dan McCarthy.

Because of the lack of depth at this position, we may end up seeing the staff jockey around with personnel and switch someone like Jamoris Slaughter from the cornerbacks or even someone from the offense switch sides of the football and lend a hand (perhaps Cierre Wood). Because of the additional time the defense will likely be on the field, and the lack of depth in the secondary as a whole, the safeties could once again find themselves being an Achilles’ Heel of the entire team.

Final Observations

Across the entire roster this spring, “Who starts?” may be less of a question than “Who is going to provide reliable depth?” At nearly every position, the number one spot on the depth chart should already be determined, it’s the backups that will really be fighting for position. On offense, Notre Dame will have the tools to field an explosive attack that should be capable of scoring points quickly.

This lack of emphasis on offensive ball control will mean the defensive starters will be on the field much longer than usual. In order to make sure that there are constantly fresh, experienced, and talented players on the field, each position must equip itself with a bevy of well-trained backups. This also means that excellent physical conditioning will prove to be a very precious commodity this fall in Notre Dame Stadium.

Check back soon for the next Spring Football Focus Part II: Conditioning.

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This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Missed Opportunity and Failed Execution, Notre Dame’s Red Zone Woes

Anthony Pilcher — Wed, 03 Mar 2010 04:38:02 +0000

With few exceptions, the 2009 Irish offense had a very productive year. Quarterback Jimmy Clausen and wide receiver Golden Tate turned in brilliant performances and led an explosive unit that generated over 30 points per outing.

But if there was an Achilles’ heel—and there was—it was red zone point production.

The Irish struggled inside the 20-yard line in 2009, but this is hardly a new trend for former head coach Charlie Weis’ offensive unit. The same was true last year, and the red zone touchdown efficiency in 2007 was a paltry 52 percent. Coupled with an anemic running game, the recurrence of this fundamental problem was a tough pill to swallow for many fans.

Weis and his offense will not be back in 2010, but many of the same offensive players will and improvement in the red zone is a must to take pressure off a new starting quarterback, particularly if Dayne Crist does not completely recover from his ACL injury. But was Weis’ offensive scheme and play-calling really to blame for the red zone woes? Furthermore, is new head coach Brian Kelly’s spread attack the answer?

Before these questions can be answered, the fundamental problems must be identified. What follows is an evaluation of the 2009 Irish red zone offense framed in the context of Weis’ offensive approach and subsequent production, including a brief summary of how Kelly’s offense addresses these issues.

Definitions and Disclaimers

Before diving into the analysis, a few definitions and disclaimers are necessary to establish the framework for this assessment.

The personnel groupings referenced in the discussion below are grouped into two categories: “heavy” and “spread.” Heavy personnel groupings have two or fewer wide receivers and two or more players from the fullback and/or tight end positions. Spread personnel groupings have three or more wide receivers (with one exception). The two tables below outline the heavy and spread personnel packages and the guys over at Blue Gray Sky have a nice pictorial summary for a subset of them.

Heavy Personnel Groupings

Name	WR	TE	RB	FB
Detroit	2	2	1	--
Regular	2	1	1	1
Two Tites	1	2	1	1
New York	1	3	1	--
Goal Line	--	3	1	1
Double Deuce	1	2	2	--

Spread Personnel Groupings

Name	WR	TE	RB	FB
Half	3	1	1	--
3 Wides	3	--	1	1
Jax	4	1	--	--
5 Wides	5	--	--	--
4 Wides	4	--	1	--
Out People	2	1	2	--
Denver	3	2	--	--
Single	3	1	--	1
Trey Double	3	--	2	--

This analysis includes charting of the offensive plays from all 12 games in the 2009 season but does not include plays that were significantly influenced by situational characteristics. These are listed below and exclusion of this relatively small number of plays is not expected to significantly alter any conclusions.

Plays on which a penalty occurred—regardless of whether or not the penalty was on the Irish offense or accepted.
Plays which took place in an overtime period. All play-calling and production is influenced by situational characteristics (see below), but overtime periods occur under a very specific set of circumstances that are not replicated in regulatory quarters of play.
Plays that occurred in the “Victory ” formation, i.e. snaps where the quarterback simply takes a knee.

As scrambles and sacks are called pass plays, they are counted as such. Lost or gained yardage is included in the passing totals, but completion percentage calculations are based only on plays in which a pass was attempted.
An explosive—or big—gain is a running play that produces 15 or more yards or a pass play that gains 20 or more yards.
Finally, there are three categories of down series and plays:

Outside the red zone refers to down series and plays that occurred beyond an opponent’s 20-yard line.
Inside the red zone refers to down series and plays that occurred inside an opponent’s 20-yard line, but excludes goal-to-go situations. Nota bene, these are not the same as those characterized as red zone down series and plays which include goal-to-go situations.
Goal-to-go refers to down series and plays that begin with first and goal, i.e. where a first down is not possible without scoring a touchdown.

Wherever possible, the data from the game charting was corroborated with that found at the Notre Dame football statistics homepage.

Irish Scoring Production

Scoring points in football can be expressed as a function of opportunity. Every possession is an opportunity to generate points and the odds of scoring are increased by gaining first downs in succession, extending drives, and moving closer to the goal line.

In other words, scoring is a considerably more facile—and potentially more lucrative—proposition from 10 yards than from 40. Not only does the probability of a successful field goal attempt increase at closer distances, far more touchdowns are scored on a short field than via long gains.

This is where the higher payoff comes into play. The probability of scoring six points, rather than three, increases closer to the goal line.

To this end, part of an offensive play-caller’s goal is to generate situations that maximize scoring potential, i.e. red zone and goal-to-go opportunities. Once this is accomplished, the odds of scoring a touchdown are greatly increased and all that remains (in theory) is execution.

The table below outlines the 2009 Irish scoring production (production from point after attempts are not included) broken into three categories: possession, red zone, and goal-to-go. The red zone numbers are a subset of the possession numbers, and the goal-to-go values are a subset of the other two. Logically, the points per opportunity should increase in the red zone and then again in goal-to-go situations.

Offensive Scoring Production

	Number	Scores	Score %	TD	TD %	FG	FG %	Points per opportunity
Possessions	133	59	44.4%	41	30.8%	18	13.5%	2.3
Red zone appearances	46	39	84.8%	26	56.5%	13	28.3%	4.2
Goal-to-goal opportunities	23	20	87.0%	13	56.5%	7	30.4%	4.3

The Irish notched 20 scores—15 touchdowns and five field goals—from outside the red zone. These 15 touchdowns represent 36 percent of all touchdown scores and came via big pass plays as the Clausen and Tate-led air attack was extremely explosive.

As expected, the scoring percentages and per-point opportunity values significantly increased once the offense entered the red zone. Irish kickers did their part and were successful on 13 of 15 red zone field goal attempts. Additionally, the touchdown scoring rate increased by more than 83 percent once the Irish crossed the 20-yard line.

But in goal-to-go situations, the rate of scoring didn’t appreciably change. While all seven field goal attempts were successful, touchdowns were scored at the same rate on goal-to-go down series as in all red zone situations.

This represents missed opportunity. The touchdown efficiency in goal-to-go situations should certainly be higher than 56.5 percent, but the offense didn’t convert a large percentage of these high probability scoring opportunities into six points. Because of this, the overall red zone efficiency suffered.

Moreover, only half of the red zone appearances resulted in a goal-to-goal series and three of these resulted in zero points. The Irish turned the ball over on downs against Boston College and Navy, and fell short against USC as time expired (with an extra timeout and down no less). Additionally, one go-to-goal opportunity against Michigan State was squandered as a fumbled snap on third down led to a field goal.

What Was The Approach?

Why weren’t more points scored inside the red zone? And, in particular, why weren’t more touchdowns scored in goal-to-goal situations?

This is essentially a question of red zone touchdown efficiency. As noted above, red zone field goal kicking was efficient, but the touchdown efficiency was in the bottom half of the country and was the primary deficiency preventing a good offense from being great.

Understanding the offensive approach is the first step to an answer. While there are a host of ways to dissect play-calling, the focus of this discussion is a high-level investigation designed to uncover Weis’ play-calling intent and answer two primary questions.

First, how were runs and passes used to gain first downs and score. And second, what were the preferred personnel packages and alignments.

To answer these questions, three metrics will be used to characterize the play-calling approach:

Run/pass preference
Personnel preference, i.e. the use of heavy and spread personnel
Quarterback placement preference, i.e. the use of shotgun in the passing game

Run/Pass Tendencies

The charts below tackle the first category by illustrating the run/pass preference outside the red zone, inside the red zone, in goal-to-go situations, and as a whole (these four categories will be used for all subsequent charts).

As the charts indicate, the offense was pass-heavy in almost every category with a high of 60 percent outside the red zone. In contrast, the run was favored only in goal-to-go situations and comprised only 41 percent of total play calls.

The Use Of Heavy And Spread Personnel

Due to Weis’ penchant for creating player mismatches, the use of personnel groupings are often a strong indicator of his offensive approach. The charts below outline the use of personnel.

Under Kelly, the Irish won’t be changing to a spread offense as much as learning a new one.

As a whole, 64 percent of plays were executed from a spread personnel grouping with Half (3 WR, 1 TE, 1 RB) the overwhelmingly popular choice. Half was used 445 times during the 2009 season, good for nearly 85 percent of plays run from spread packages and 54.3 percent of all snaps.

The preference towards spreading the field was strongest outside the red zone where almost 70 percent of plays were executed from these packages. As the offense neared the goal line, this trend faded. Inside the red zone the split was virtually even, and in goal-to-go situations heavy personnel replaced spread groupings as the strong favorite.

Similar to the spread packages, one heavy grouping was strongly preferred as Weis used Detroit (2 WR, 2 TE, 1 RB) personnel on 26.5 percent of all snaps and 74.3 percent of all heavy packages.

Together, Half and Detroit accounted for 662 of 819 (80.8 percent) snaps and comprised the majority of the Irish offense. Integrating run/pass preference, the run was favored in Detroit (61.3 percent), while a pass was called on 70.8 percent of all plays run from Half (more on these integrated tendencies below). Even with these one-sided tendencies, the Irish still averaged 5.4 yards per carry in Detroit and 7.4 yards per pass attempt in Half.

Quarterback Placement

Clausen was in shotgun more than he was under center in 2009, but not by a large margin. Outside of the red zone Weis utilized the shotgun 54 percent of the time. Somewhat surprisingly, this increased to 57 percent inside the red zone before diving sharply to 34 percent in goal-to-go situations.

These percentages do, however, come with one caveat. The shotgun plays noted above include 35 snaps taken from the Wildcat formation. As these plays accounted for only five percent of all snaps, they were not excluded.

Putting It All Together

Personnel, quarterback placement, and run/pass tendencies are certainly of value, but more insight is gained from mixing the first two with the latter. The data above indicates strong trends in personnel use as well as the run/pass mix, but the chart below shows how the two were coupled.

The offense essentially moved form a spread passing attack outside of the red zone to a heavy, run-based approach in goal-to-go situations. Inside the red zone there was more balance, particularly in heavy packages, but spread personnel still strongly indicated a pass.

As a whole, 46 percent of all snaps were passes from spread personnel. In contrast, only 23 percent were runs executed from a heavy package. While the Irish were predictable, there is asymmetry to the trends, i.e. the personnel used in the running game was more balanced.

The charts below indicate sharper trends for quarterback placement.

The offense operated similarly outside and inside the red zone, but that doesn’t mean both weren’t predictable. In either situation shotgun formations were almost synonymous with a pass. There was more balance when Clausen was under center, but the run was still favored nearly two-to-one. Finally, goal-to-go situations were mostly runs from under center.

The data above indicates Weis preferred to place the quarterback under center and run with heavy personnel close to the goal line in lieu of the shotgun-based, spread passing attack utilized in the open field. In other words, inside the red zone—and especially in goal-to-go situations—the Irish offense looked nothing like it did beyond the 20-yard line.

Approach + Execution = Production

Does it really matter? Is there something fundamentally wrong with a spread passing team shifting to a more balanced, heavy-personnel offense in the red zone? The short answer is no, not if it is productive.

The table below shows the production in the running game outside and inside the red zone. The “Under center run %” and “Heavy run %” columns indicate the percentage of runs that occurred from under center and in heavy personnel groupings respectively.

As goal-to-go down series are entirely unique, production in these situations will be outlined later rather than directly compared to the numbers shown here.

Run Production

	Runs	Under center run %	Heavy run %	Avg/att	TD	TD %
Outside the red zone	274	73.0%	50.4%	5.3	0	0.0%
Inside the red zone	30	70.0%	60.0%	4.6	4	13.3%

The numbers indicate, as the charts did above, that more and more runs occurred from under center and in heavy formations once the Irish crossed the 20-yard line.

Due to the increased predictability and shorter field, the per-carry average dips approximately 13 percent, but a decrease of this magnitude doesn’t suggest the running game to be entirely ineffective inside the red zone. Additionally, no rushing touchdowns were scored outside the red zone and only four came from non-goal-to-go situations.

A quick glance at the passing data paints a slightly different picture (the under center and heavy run percentage columns have been replaced by shotgun, spread and play-action pass percentages).

Pass Production

	Passes	Shotgun pass %	Spread pass %	Play-action pass %	Comp %	Avg/att	Avg/comp	TD	TD %
Outside the red zone	408	72.1%	82.1%	20.8%	69.9%	8.4	13.2	15	3.7%
Inside the red zone	46	73.9%	60.9%	17.4%	54.5%	4.6	8.9	9	19.6%

Again, the numbers show Weis called fewer pass plays from spread formations on a shorter field. Play-action, on the other hand, was used at a fairly even rate.

The sharpest trend in the data occurs in the efficiency categories (completion percentage and average per attempt), as both decrease significantly on a short field. Due to the lack of real estate, the latter is somewhat expected. But the completion percentage declines from an exceptional 69.9 percent outside the red zone, to a pedestrian 54.5 percent inside the red zone.

“Equivalent” Production Outside And Inside The Red Zone

The production outlined above indicates that the offense didn’t perform as well inside the red zone as outside it, but the comparison isn’t back-to-back.

As noted, production will often appear lower on a compressed field as players can’t reel off big plays to increase averages. Additionally, offenses routinely face different, more compact defense inside the 20-yard line.

This is especially true for the Irish. Explosive gains were a huge part of the offensive output in 2009 as big plays accounted for 40.3 percent of the total offense and increased the per-snap average by almost 53 percent. In particular, the pass production was a huge contributor to this trend. The Irish averaged 4.7 yards per attempt excluding big plays but 7.6 yards per attempt overall.

These influences make it much more appropriate to use similar situations and exclude big plays than to directly compare production outside and inside the red zone. To this end, the two tables below show “equivalent” production by comparing the same run and pass metrics as above, but without big gains and only including plays on first and 10. To a large extent, this effectively removes situational bias and is a much more back-to-back comparison.

Equivalent Run Production

	Runs	Under center run %	Heavy run %	Big runs	Avg/att - big runs	TD	TD %
Outside the red zone	124	71.8%	46.8%	8	4	0	0.0%
Inside the red zone	10	90.0%	60.0%	0	3.3	0	0.0%

Equivalent Pass Production

	Passes	Shotgun pass %	Spread pass %	Play-action pass %	Comp %	Big passes	Avg/att - big passes	Avg/comp - big passes	TD	TD %
Outside the red zone	182	69.2%	76.9%	23.1%	76.0%	22	5.5	8.4	8	4.4%
Inside the red zone	16	75.0%	68.8%	12.5%	64.3%	0	5.1	9.2	4	25.0%

There are relatively few data points, but the equivalent comparison shows the offense performed similarly inside and outside the red zone, especially throwing the ball.

The Irish averaged 3.3 yards per carry inside the red zone compared to four outside the red zone, but the running game predictability certainly played a part in the lower production.

The passing data is very similar for both categories. Weis used play-action with less frequency inside the red zone and the completion percentage was lower, but the other numbers compare favorably and a 64.3 percent completion rate is still very high.

In other words, the Irish offense threw the ball with nearly equal efficiency inside and outside the red zone on first and 10. The per-attempt average inside the red zone is only slightly less than outside the red zone, a quarter of the pass plays inside the red zone were good for touchdowns, and the average per completion was actually higher.

This type of first down efficiency is critical on a short field. Maintaining favorable down and distance situations is always important, but on a short field defenses play much tighter and there is no opportunity make up ground via big gains. As such, getting behind the chains is severely limiting.

This wasn’t a problem for Notre Dame, particularly in the passing game. The run/pass balance was nearly even outside (40.5 percent run) and inside the red zone (38.5 percent run), but production in the latter category was actually better. So, if production inside the red zone wasn’t the problem, what was?

Goal-To-Goal Production

As stated above, goal-to-go situations are so specialized that they aren’t comparable to down series on other parts of the field. Whereas maintaining favorable down and distance situations and gaining first downs are both good measures of performance outside and inside the red zone, the only objective of a goal-to-go situation is to score a touchdown. Any play that fails to produce a touchdown or, in the very least, inch closer to the goal line is ultimately unsuccessful.

As such, the tables below use some different metrics than those above. First, the goal-to-go production is categorized by down. Additionally, “Run %” and “Pass %” columns have been added to indicate the run/pass split and an “Avg yds to goal line” column is used to gauge the impact of distance on play-calling. Finally, per-play averages have been replaced by “Gains <= 0″ and “Gains <= 0 %” to indicate how many and what percentage of plays went for zero or negative yardage.

Goal-to-go Run Production By Down

	Runs	Run %	Under center run %	Heavy run %	Avg yds to goal line	Gains <= 0	Gains <= 0 %	TD	TD %
1	17	63.0%	82.4%	82.4%	4.2	7	41.2%	5	29.4%
2	10	58.8%	80.0%	80.0%	4.2	3	30.0%	1	10.0%
3	6	42.9%	100.0%	100.0%	1.2	3	50.0%	3	50.0%
4	1	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0	1	100.0%	0	0.0%
Total	34	55.7%	82.4%	82.4%	3.6	14	41.2%	9	26.5%

Goal-to-go Pass Production By Down

	Passes	Pass %	Shotgun pass %	Spread pass %	Play-action pass %	Comp %	Avg yds to goal line	Gains <= 0	Gains <= 0 %	TD	TD %
1	10	37.0%	60.0%	40.0%	30.0%	33.3%	6.9	6	60.0%	3	30.0%
2	7	41.2%	28.6%	42.9%	28.6%	66.7%	5.9	4	57.1%	2	28.6%
3	8	57.1%	75.0%	50.0%	12.5%	14.3%	7.0	6	75.0%	0	0.0%
4	2	66.7%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	2.5	1	50.0%	1	50.0%
Total	27	44.3%	55.6%	44.4%	25.9%	37.5%	6.3	17	63.0%	6	22.2%

On goal-to-go series, Weis was run-heavy on first and second down but passed more on third and fourth. All but six runs came from under center in heavy formations while the passing game was more balanced in terms of personnel and quarterback placement.

On first down, runs and passes yielded nearly the same touchdown scoring percentage but other downs showed a bigger disparity as overall the run was slightly better than the pass. Weis preferred to keep the ball on the ground in shorter yardage situations as the average distance to the goal line was 3.6 yards for runs compared to 6.3 yards per pass attempt.

Compared to inside the red zone, rush attempts in goal-to-go situations generated a 50 percent increase in touchdown percentage as approximately one out of every four runs resulted in six points. The goal-to-go passing touchdown percentage (22.2 percent) isn’t appreciably different.

But perhaps the most disheartening trends are the relatively low use of play-action, the paltry completion percentages, and the number of negative or zero gain plays.

On the only part of the field where play-calling favored the run, play-action was only used on 25.9 percent of called passes, not much higher than inside (17.4 percent) or outside the red zone (20.8 percent).

Play-action or not, passes were completed at a dramatically lower rate in goal-to-go situations than anywhere else on the field and this ultimately limited its success.

Including incomplete passes, 63 percent of pass plays went for zero or negative yardage and 41.2 percent of runs fell into the same category. Combining both runs and passes, better than half of the goal-to-go snaps did not move the Irish closer to scoring a touchdown. In these situations, desire and execution are primarily responsible for success, and the Irish seemed lacking in both.

The Goal-To-Go Execution Problem And What Is To Come

The scoring and production data above illustrates that the poor red zone efficiency was really a goal-to-go touchdown problem.

The Irish didn’t generate enough of these scoring opportunities and didn’t take advantage of the ones they had. Five additional goal-to-go touchdowns (out of 10 non-touchdown outcomes) would have increased the goal-to-go touchdown efficiency to 78.3 percent. This is closer to the national average and would have put Notre Dame in the top 30 in red zone touchdown efficiency.

The drop-off in passing efficiency for goal-to-go situations can be attributed to the shorter field. But it is puzzling that the offense struggled running the ball near the goal line when they were very effective rushing for first downs in short yardage situations.

These first down conversions, however, mostly occurred in the open field where there remained the possibility of a downfield throw. In fact, Weis’ primary form of play-calling randomness is the big play, and the passing game was—by far—the biggest threat to produce an explosive gain. Without this threat, the offense sputtered trying to pound it into the end zone.

The deliberate and bipolar approach didn’t help.

It isn’t practical to create an even run/pass split in each personnel grouping, in every down and distance situation, and irrespective of quarterback placement, but the rushing and passing trends in 2009 were far too much in either direction. There is something to be said for keeping things simple, but simplicity doesn’t necessarily equal predictable, and the Irish certainly were.

Two personnel groupings (Half and Detroit) comprised better than 80 percent of all snaps and the run/pass mix was very one-sided for both packages. Compared to earlier versions of Weis’ offense, the lack of diversity is astounding. Heavy personnel with the quarterback under center meant run and shotgun, spread formations all but forecasted a pass.

This deliberate approach made execution difficult as opposing defenses were able to anticipate tendencies and force a very small margin of execution error. The Irish were talented and explosive enough throwing the ball to overcome this in the open field, but struggled in the red zone without the threat of a big play.

Similar to 2008, the offense was also disjointed and lacked synergy. Weis favored a spread passing attack in the open field, but morphed into run-first, heavy-personnel approach closer to the goal line. This made it difficult to establish any identity and created unnecessary complexity. Moreover, asking a third tight end (or reserve offensive lineman) to come off the bench, enter the game cold, and suddenly pound the rock in from first and goal, isn’t always reasonable.

Ultimately, the approach spelled disaster in goal-to-go situations where failed execution prevented the offense from cashing in on high probability scoring chances. The rate of zero and negative yardage plays in these situations is indicative of poor execution, and the efficiency and effectiveness throwing the ball elsewhere on the field suggests Weis would have been better served riding the spread passing approach all the way to the end zone. Perhaps most discouraging, both suggest a disproportionately small amount of practice time spent on goal-to-go offensive situations.

And this is where Kelly’s offense will help. He favors simplicity and execution over complexity and scheme. As Cincinnati quarterback Tony Pike’s 2009 red zone production indicates, better execution translates into more touchdowns and enables the offense to capitalize on high probability scoring opportunities.

Furthermore, Kelly’s offense has many more complementary looks including runs and passes in the shotgun, from the same personnel groupings, and on virtually all parts of the field. In other words, Kelly’s approach aids offensive execution via consistency and less predictable play-calling.

That isn’t to say he won’t use heavy personnel groupings or be deliberate and predictable in certain situations, but it does mean that his offensive strategy is consistent and applicable on all parts of the field and in almost all situations. His spread, pass-happy approach may not be well received by Irish fans pining for a more dominant run game, but results are all that matter.

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This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

Notre Dame’s NCAA Infractions: Ten Years Later

Michael Collins — Sat, 27 Feb 2010 04:50:30 +0000

The possibility of sanctions to our respected rivals USC and Michigan makes me flashback to Notre Dame’s only major NCAA sanction in its history a decade ago. Call it PTSD, but the similarities and obvious dissimilarities combined with the agony of the process haunt me.

Notre Dame’s NCAA Infractions, 1999

The majority of Notre Dame’s NCAA violations involved a South Bend bookkeeper, Kimberly Dunbar, who used an estimated $1.4 million she embezzled from her employer from 1991 to 1998 to create a lavish lifestyle for herself, including access to Notre Dame players. Dunbar became romantically involved with several football players and had a child with one of them. The players received benefits such as jewelry and trips.

Unfortunately, in 1995, Dunbar paid $25 to become a member of the Quarterback Club, a group for Irish football fans who met for a $12 lunch on the Friday before football games. Members heard coaches or players speak. Notre Dame had explained to members the NCAA rules committee that defined them as boosters, though no fund-raising was ever done.

As a member of the Quarterback Club, the NCAA regarded Dunbar as a representative of Notre Dame’s football interests, which fell under their rules severely restricting gift-giving to student-athletes.

When Notre Dame heard of the allegations, they launched an internal investigation, self-reported the possible violations, disbanded the Quarterback Club and ones like it in other sports, cooperated fully with the NCAA investigation and required players to pay back the $75 ticket to a Bulls game Dunbar had paid for.

A football coach on two different occasions had heard Dunbar and one of the players went to Las Vegas on a trip, but did not report it to ND’s Compliance Office because each thought it amounted to a romantic getaway. They had no idea Dunbar was part of the Quarterback Club.

After three years of investigations, allegations and stories in the media with recriminations, the University and the NCAA enforcement staff came to the same conclusion—the transgressions were secondary violations. The Infractions Committee was split on whether Dunbar was a booster, with an overseer’s vote breaking the tie, effectively deciding that Notre Dame had committed a major infraction.

Committee chair, Jack Friedenthal, said of the Irish coach’s knowledge of the trips, “If he had notified someone, then penalties might well have been averted.” Friedenthal commended the University for reporting and investigating the violations. He also told the NY Times, “We didn’t find any lack of responsibility. They were not charged with lack of institutional control.”

The NCAA Infractions Committee’s public report found “this case to be ‘major’ in nature because of the length of time during which these violations occurred, the extravagant nature of the gifts and benefits provided to Notre Dame football student athletes by the individual, the competitive advantage gained by Notre Dame and the fact that the violations were neither isolated nor inadvertent.” The penalty was a loss of one scholarship each year for two years and probation for the same time.

Notre Dame’s Reaction

Notre Dame did not appeal or offer excuses. Father Edward (Monk) Malloy, then President of Notre Dame, said in a prepared statement: ”We are embarrassed by these incidents, troubled that they occurred, and we have taken action to deal with the issues involved. Notre Dame has a proud tradition in athletics, not only for doing well but also for doing right.”

To the student newspaper, The Observer, Malloy said: “A jury of our peers said that it was major and they gave us a penalty. We will accept this and move on.”

Malloy told the NY Times how he felt: ”My reaction is one of sadness and disappointment. It really began when we found out about this because we felt we had failed as educators. From that moment until today, we have done everything we could to find out all the information and have taken very aggressive steps to make sure it won’t happen again. So this is sad closure, and we are concentrating on the future.”

Malloy also indicated that the behavior of Notre Dame’s football players would be reflected in the coaches’ annual performance evaluations.

Flash Forward

While the agony of charges investigated, the difficulty of controlling fringe elements to big-time football programs and the disagreement on the Infractions Committee’s decision may sound familiar 10 years later, much has changed in college football programs—more money, more vocal fan bases, more pressure to win, boosters welding greater power, some players even less focused on achieving an education.

The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics report—”A Call to Action“—said in 2001 (co-chaired by Fr. Hesburgh): “We find that the problems of big-time college sports have grown rather than diminished. The most glaring elements of the problems outlined in this report—academic transgressions, a financial arms race, and commercialization—are all evidence of the widening chasm between higher education’s ideals and big-time college sports.”

How many universities and fans regard the NCAA as “comprised of institutions, conferences, organizations and individuals committed to the best interests, education and athletics participation of student-athletes?” Or in Malloy’s words, “a jury of our peers,” when Infractions Committee decisions are made.

The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics was formed 15 years ago in response to some highly-visible scandals in college sports. At this week’s conference responding to the announcement of five major NCAA infractions by the Michigan football program, Mary Sue Coleman, Michigan’s President, said, “We will make all necessary changes. What we will not do is make excuses.” Coleman is a trustee of the Knight Foundation and signatory to “A Call To Action.”

Leadership

Notre Dame, USC and Michigan each encompass different NCAA compliance issues, each are ultimately judged on how they responded to the allegations and the NCAA decisions. More troubling is an underlying current of opinion that programs should not be held responsible for such infractions. Malloy and Coleman may now be expressing minority opinions.

The first step in distancing yourself and evading responsibility always seems to be to create a negative, hostile image of those appointed to judge you. Perhaps the second step is to revert to an adversarial approach, appropriate for the courtroom in an O.J.-esque attitude that “our lawyers are better than yours.” All infraction decisions are regarded as too harsh and appealed.

The leadership forward of Steven Sample, USC’s President, is harder to read. USC’s stated compliance policies are not. Located on the USC football website under the Compliance section are: the Principles of Institutional Control from the NCAA Committee on Infractions; extensive advice to parents and students defining extra benefits such as use of a car and reduced room cost from any USC employee, booster or parent; contact and inducements by agents and the consequences for the student and the USC athletic program.

The Knight Commission calls on presidents to lead their universities through such problems to “reconnect college sports and higher education.” We’ll all wait to see whether each president will lead their universities and accept responsibility for their infractions, as Monk did: “We will accept this and move on.”

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This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

College Football Coaching Changes 2010: True Believers or Carpetbaggers?

Michael Collins — Fri, 19 Feb 2010 05:56:41 +0000

We want to believe the coaches our universities hire are committed to us. We use words like loyalty to position ourselves on the high ground to throw stones at those leaving town for another job. We’re hurt and cry that our lifelong values are offended.

But, come on, really. We’re as likely to throw that coach under the bus unless he delivers to us, too.

In early January, as many of us thought the college coaching cycle was winding down, we had our college football coaching storylines. Many long-tenured coaches left their universities. Bobby Bowden (34 years) had to choose between coming back as a head coach in name only or retiring. FSU fans and administration wanted more wins than Bowden has delivered lately. Mike Leach (10 years), Mark Mangino (8 years), and then Jim Leavitt (12 years) were all fired after well-publicized investigations of allegations leading to their dismissals. Al Groh (9 years), Tommy West (Memphis, 9 years) and Charlie Weatherbee (7 years) were also fired.

In 2010, black coaches made a historic stride forward. Two black coaches replaced Mangino and Groh. Six African-American coaches were hired this year, bringing the total number of African-American coaches to thirteen, a historic high.

The Weis era came to an end after five years at Notre Dame.

Then Pete Carroll suddenly left for the greener pastures of the NFL, rocking USC.

The Trojans took Tennessee’s coach, who ended up hiring Louisiana Tech’s up-and-coming head coach. Notre Dame had taken Cincinnati’s head coach, who replaced their second coach in six years from a very successful Central Michigan football program.

We assume a pecking order in college football. Coaches recognize it and refer to their “dream jobs.”

Only those of us who have not been paying attention or have been insulated at the top of the pecking order are surprised at the coaching upheavals in 2010. Here’s an excerpt from an Athletic Director’s announcement in 2008: “—confirmed for me that he has accepted the head coaching position at ******. I’m disappointed for our [...] fans and student-athletes that he has chosen to leave our program after only two seasons. I understand that it is a dream job for him, but the timing and the way it played out has been hurtful and disappointing. Although this is a significant setback, we will get through the challenge because the ****** University Athletics program is far greater than one person.”

Substitute a coach’s name and any two universities for any recent high-profile departure and you have a pretty good description of any particular university’s response to most of these surprise resignations. In 2008, Gene Chizik’s AD issued the above response when he left for Auburn. Chizik had replaced Dan McCarney, who spent twelve years as the Cyclones’ head coach, resigning under fan pressure for more wins. Kiffin, Fulmer, Tennessee and USC are only another example of this recent pattern.

Loyalty, You’re Talking Loyalty?

In just the SEC, only two coaches (Richt and Johnson) have been their university’s head coach for more than five years. Ask Tommy Tuberville or Phil Fulmer about loyalty. Ed Orgeron was fired after three years at Ole Miss. Outside of Kiffin leaving Tennessee after one year and Auburn’s Chizik leaving Iowa State after two years, Nutt left Arkansas for Mississippi. Petrino replaced Nutt after one year at the Atlanta Falcons. Saban spent two years with the Dolphins, after leaving LSU in a similar manner as Carroll. We prize football success more than loyalty, don’t we? We’ll pay these carpetbaggers if they produce wins for us.

Overall, in the FBS after this season’s coaching changes, only 34 out of 119 head coaches (28%) have completed their fifth year or more at their current university football program. Only 24 coaches out of 119 (20%) have six years or more in their current positions. In other words, 85 FBS football programs (80%) have changed head coaches in a little over five years. Unless we have more coaching dominoes fall this year, 98 football head coaches have been hired (and fired) by FBS universities for their football programs in that time span. Many universities have had two hires in five years.

Old School — True Believers

Some coaches will not be carpetbaggers. David Cutcliff, Duke’s head coach for the last two years, turned down Tennessee’s offer, where he had spent nineteen years, in addition to seven years as head coach at Mississippi. “You follow your heart in big decisions. I have a lot of ties and a lot of people that I’m very close to, and a lot of respect for the University of Tennessee, but my heart is here. We’ve worked very hard these two years to change the culture, to change the team physically. You feel like the job’s not done, and in this era, it bothers me, what we do as coaches, moving here and there [...] this is mid-January. Nothing about that felt right to me as a person.”

Cutcliff believes: “Finish the job you start. That’s one of the things my dad also said, ‘If you’re going to do something, do it right and finish the job.’ It wasn’t about what was at Tennessee or what was involved in another world. It was about what was at Duke. I wasn’t looking for a job. And when you like the job you’ve got, you evaluate that first.”

Cutcliff considered his recruits in making his decision: “Good gosh. How fair is that? We’ve got guys that have dropped any other recruiting from any other institution long ago. How fair is that? [...] I felt a little dirty thinking about it.” Kiffin and Orgeron may have added another NCAA violation onto a their history of violations in contacting prospective members of the Tennessee class during a dead period and offering them scholarships to USC—especially if any recruits follow them to USC. That one would fall on Southern Cal’s Compliance Officer’s plate.

Rick Stockstill recently turned down the East Carolina position for similar reasons. “I could not look in the eyes of these recruits and their families and tell them the things I believe in and what I want them to believe in and then leave Middle Tennessee with only two weeks left in the recruiting process. Also, I have so much respect and admiration for our current players that they were ultimately the reason I could not pursue this any further. We have invested a lot together during these four years which played a major role in this decision.”

A Recruit’s Perspective

Recruits and their families are left to navigate their way through these coaching changes and the values that are involved in their recruitment. They have varying reactions to changes in coaches with whom they have formed relationships. Sometimes, coaches believe that recruits come to a university because of them—sometimes they do. Four-star athlete Delvin Jones decommitted from Tennessee after the departure of Lane Kiffin, Monte Kiffin and Ed Orgeron. “All three of them have come to my school plenty of times. They were the main reason why I wanted to go to Tennessee.”

Glen Fulton, father of Tennessee commit Zach Fulton, said: “We bought into him (Kiffin) and I made the biggest mistake I ever made. I bought into the man instead of buying into the university. Always buy into the university instead buying into the man. The university is going to be there.”

Gary Willis, the father of Vols’ verbally-committed recruit Brandon Willis, countered Ed Orgeron’s offer of a scholarship to USC instead of Tennessee with this: “When Coach Orgeron made that offer, I told him, ‘I gave you my word, and Brandon gave you his word, and you gave us your word and then you leave. How do we know someone else won’t offer you $5 million, and you’ll be gone again (from USC)?’” Brandon has switched his commitment to North Carolina.

A couple of years ago, in a story well-known to many Irish fans, Omar Hunter, a highly sought after Defensive Tackle, had switched his verbal commitment from Notre Dame to Florida. Omar heard just prior to Signing Day: “I got a voice mail left to me last night by a coach that was recruiting me that coach Greg Mattison (who was recruiting Hunter for the Gators) was leaving Florida to go to Baltimore. They told my coach the same thing.”

Urban Meyer and Mattison assured Omar and his father that this was not going to happen. Hunter faxed in his signed Letter of Intent. The next day it was reported that Mattison was gone, though no official announcement had been made. Florida announced the hiring of his replacement. Mattison announced he had accepted the Ravens “second offer” as their Defensive Line coach afterwards. All this in less than four days!

Greg Mattison’s replacement was ex-Iowa State head coach, Dan McCarney! McCarney, who became defensive line coach for USF after leaving Iowa State, said at his announcement: “I’m thrilled about joining the Gator Nation. I have the utmost respect for Coach Meyer and the Florida football program. It is a dream come true for me and my wife and we are looking forward to the opportunity.”

Mattison has been promoted to the Ravens Defensive Coordinator. Urban Meyer has assured all his recruits he will be back this fall after a medical leave. McCarney coaches Hunter and the rest of the defensive line players.

Who Pays Fired Coaches?

In a zero sum game, we want our team to come out on top and are willing to push for it. It’s easy when you are not the final bill-payer.

Who’s making the money in the 98 head coaching college football hires over the past six seasons? Not the colleges—only 25 of the 119 FBS institutions reported an athletic department budget surplus during the 2007-08 academic year. Those 25 had a surplus of $3.87 million. The other 94 institutions had an average deficit of $9.87 million.

Attendance and fan support can determine a coach’s fate, and, ultimately drive up salaries.

At Louisville, Athletic Director Tom Jurich had seen Petrino look around for jobs for four years before abruptly departing. Prior to his hiring, Kragthorpe assured his AD, “I don’t want to be a guy that moves around, I want to be a guy that stays in one place.” Jurich said, “Steve, I’ve heard all these things before, that you want to be here forever. But he said ‘Tom, you’ve never heard it from me.’” Kragthorpe, the “hot name” in 2007, was fired this year by Jurich due to declining attendance and wins. Average attendance at Louisville home games has dropped 9,000 fans from the 2006 season.

In 2009, Jurich says, “I want to get a great leader of men and somebody that will take us to the heights we want to be at. I watched as the whole season progressed and I feel like we needed a change in culture, a change in scenery.” Steve Kragthorpe was paid for his three seasons at Louisville and the two years left on his contract.

Charlie Strong from Florida has been hired as the Cardinal’s new head coach to jumpstart the football program. Jurich admits that paying off Kragthorpe’s remaining contract years will “strap” the athletic department programs.

Rising coaches salaries and paying off contracts at public institutions means you, the taxpayer, actually do foot the bill—whether you follow those state teams or not.

Show Me the Money

The Jerry McGuire in this story is an agent named Jimmy Sexton, who represents most college football coaches in the South. Sexton benefitted when one of his clients, Lane Kiffin, left paying a buyout of $800,000 against his one year salary of $2 million at Tennessee and signed a new deal with USC. Sexton is also rumored to be the agent for new UT coach, Derek Dooley. Isn’t that like paying your real estate broker twice—once for selling your home and again for obtaining your new home?

The less loyalty universities and coaches have, the more money Sexton makes. Sexton takes a 3-5% of a coach’s contract every time. He enhances his reputation and bank account with each contract. Sexton’s client list includes many of the coaches who changed jobs in the last few years—Saban, both Kiffins, Fulmer, Cutcliff, Kevin Steele (now at Tennessee), Will Muschamp, Tuberville, Chizik, Butch Davis, Jimbo Fisher, Spurrier, Mike MacIntyre (new San Diego State coach), Doug Marrone (Syracuse), Larry Porter (Memphis), Weatherbie, and West.

If you can get a piece of 98 college coaching hirings (and firings) in six coaching hiring cycles, you are making a significant income. When 94 of those 119 institutions have average annual deficits of almost $10 million, that’s making money in a down market.

The Down Market

Except for the select universities like Tennessee, Notre Dame, Texas, Alabama, Michigan, Ohio State, etc. the down market is a university’s football program. With such largesse being syphoned away from normal university activities, college presidents ask who is more loyal to the university and represents university values—a full professor or the new football coach whose longevity may be five years at best? When assistant coaches make three times as much as full professors at institutions like Texas, Alabama, LSU and stay for a few years, the universities take notice.

The NCAA made recommendations to its universities on ways to cut costs last fall. Last week at their annual meeting one economist suggested going to Congress for an exemption from antitrust laws to limit coaching salaries. Other suggestions included cutting the number of football scholarships, cutting overnight stays prior to a game, and cutting back on the seasons in other sports.

Since 2007, head coaches compensation packages have broken the $4 million ceiling with twice as many head coaches today making $2 million and $3 million as two years ago. Over 100 FBS head coaches now make more than $1 million.
Meanwhile, attendance is falling for the bottom of the FBS teams, most of whom have replaced their coaches. At the top, game attendance cannot go higher. With rising costs, including coaching contracts, increasing ticket prices or tuition is the only way to break even.

Still, turnover creates opportunity, leading to more hires of up and coming assistant coaches and a faster way of hiring qualified African-American coaches. Imagine if all those head coaches were kept until the end of their contracts.

Turnover vs. Retention

Regardless, one way of keeping carpetbaggers like Kiffin and Chizik for longer than 1 or 2 years would be to restructure contracts with tapering buyout clauses to a three year minimum. If the head coach left after one year—$3 million buyout, after two years—$2 million, after three years—$1 million. In general, colleges would be limiting some coaching salary escalation with more retention.

Lane would have then paid Tennessee more than his salary to leave for his “dream job.”

On the other hand, Kevin Sumlin, Houston’s black head coach with two years there, would not be interviewing for positions at Kansas, Texas Tech, Cincinnati or East Carolina.

Either way, loyalty in such a fiscal environment can be ephemeral, relative and totally at odds with university values.

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Pre-Season Polls: What Happened to the Bulldogs?

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Notre Dame Recruiting Signing Day Recap

Anthony Pilcher — Fri, 05 Feb 2010 05:19:09 +0000

Notre Dame head coach Brian Kelly and his staff notched 23 commitments on National Signing Day. The Irish garnered the 21st ranked class by ESPN and the 19th ranked class by Scout, while Rivals was a bit more generous and placed Notre Dame at number 14.

Considering the underwhelming on-field product of the three previous seasons and a late-year coaching change, the results were about as good as one could hope for. The Irish lost a couple of recruits late in the cycle, but still managed a very solid haul. So who are the future superstars, hidden gems, and probable busts?

Offense

Cameron Roberson

RB, 6′1″, 220 lbs
2nd ranked FB by Scout (3 stars)
17th ranked RB by Rivals (4 stars, #231 overall)

Jon: Cameron will be a bigger back, similar to current running back Robert Hughes. However, I see him putting on a few pounds and playing as a fullback for the Irish. He has good hands for a running back and has decent speed overall. However, if he does move to the fullback position, he will need to learn not to bounce so many runs outside of the tackles and run behind his guards. Fullbacks don’t play a major role in Brian Kelly’s offense, however, so there is a chance that Cameron will stay at the running back position and with that position already loaded with running backs, I’m not sure how much of a chance he will get to see the field before his junior or maybe his senior season.

Anthony: Roberson is a bigger back with very good feet and vision to accompany a decisive running style. He accelerates well, hits the hole hard, and is a determined runner, albeit without a bruising, tackle-shedding style. Additionally, he has soft hands and catches the ball well out of the backfield. From the press conference it sounds as though Kelly is very high on Cameron and excited to have him on board. In former head coach Charlie Weis’ offense, he would have been a good change of pace back. But in Kelly’s offense I’m not sure he is a great fit and may struggle running from the shotgun and behind a large dose of zone blocking.

Matt James

OT, 6′6″, 291 lbs
11th ranked OT by Scout (4 stars)
14th ranked OT by Rivals (4 stars, #86 overall)

Jon: If he puts on a bit of bulk, James could turn into a player in the same mold as Sam Young. He has nice size and could develop nicely into a solid contributor in the years to come. However, most lineman Matt’s size struggle with pad level and he is no exception. Furthermore, he is prone to injury and the right injury will bring down any football player’s chances of contributing in the way they are expected (see: James Aldridge).

Anthony: James is a very solid offensive line prospect with great upside that could play either tackle position. He finishes plays, has a good first move off the ball, and has very good size with the frame to grow even bigger. Linemen with James’ combination of footwork and size aren’t extremely common. It will, however, probably take a while for him to contribute. While his footwork is good, he tends to play tall and will need to learn to utilize a pad level that maximizes leverage. Additionally, he doesn’t have great length and tends to over-reach when blocking in space, something that could limit his pass blocking performance.

Bennett Jackson

WR, 6′1″, 170 lbs
51st ranked WR by Scout (3 stars)
61st ranked WR by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Bennett Jackson will definitely need to hit the weights hard before his body will be big enough to stand taking hits at the next level. While not particularly tall, Bennett Jackson could turn into a great all-around player (flanker). He is very elusive and hard to tackle with just one defender. If Jackson’s size keeps him from making a contribution at wide receiver, look for him to make a splash as either a punt or kickoff returner.

Anthony: While Jackson’s strength and size will likely limit him from making an early contribution, there is a lot to like about his future. He is very good after the catch, displaying good speed and acceleration. But his biggest assets are elusiveness and body control. He has the ability to adjust to the ball on the move and is a very fluid runner. His route running isn’t excellent, but his natural abilities should help his progress in this area.

Christian Lombard

OL, 6′5″, 293 lbs
2nd ranked OG by Scout (4 stars)
5th ranked OG by Rivals (4 stars, #221 overall)

Jon: Christian already possess the size needed to play at the guard position on the offensive line. He is a very explosive lineman who gets to the second level of the opposing defense quickly. However, Lombard will need to work on his blocking and footwork technique. He comes off the ball too high and has lazy hand technique. Being an interior lineman is all about leverage, and right now, Lombard is not going to win that match. If he shores up his technique difficulties, he has the ability to be a solid contributor on the offensive line when his time comes.

Anthony: Lombard doesn’t possess the same the footwork as James, but he doesn’t necessarily have to as an interior lineman. He moves well getting to the second level and getting position, and finishes blocks with authority. Christian excels as a straight-line blocker, but often struggles to engage in space. His biggest challenge appears to be developing his technique, as size, strength and attitude were all he needed to be successful at the high school level. Improved footwork and hand placement will go a long way to seeing meaningful minutes on the field.

Alex Welch

TE, 6′5″, 225 lbs
4th ranked TE by Scout (4 stars)
12th ranked TE by Rivals (4 stars)

Jon: When it all is said and done, Alex Welch could be similar to John Carlson. Welch should put on a few pounds in the weight room, but he already has some good blocking ability. What Welch will need to work on is his speed and route running. He has decent hands for a tight end but after the catch, he lacks that little extra speed to elude some linebackers in pursuit. Whether or not Alex contributes to the team the way John Carlson did his junior and senior season will depend on his development in size and speed.

Anthony: While Welch doesn’t have the same speed and at athleticism as current Irish tight end Kyle Rudolph, he is a very similar prospect. Hailing from the same high school as Rudolph, Welch has good hands and is very fluid for a player his size. At this point in his career, he is a better blocker than Rudolph, mostly due to better hand placement, strength and tenacity. From a receiving standpoint he doesn’t match the current tight end, as his speed and route running need time to develop.

Daniel Smith

WR, 6′4″, 215 lbs
53rd ranked WR by Scout (3 stars)
89th ranked WR by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: While Smith will not likely need to add a ton of weight, getting into the weight room and adding a bit of muscle for strength wouldn’t hurt. He posses great leaping ability and will be a force to be reckoned with in the red zone. However, Smith will definitely need to refine his route running skills as he sometimes makes lazy cuts. Regardless, in Brian Kelly’s spread system, look for Smith to be a solid contributor, at least in the red zone, once he adds a bit of muscle.

Anthony: Smith is a possession receiver that has the size and length to be a threat in the red zone. He elevates well, has good body control in the air, and possesses very soft hands. Smith will, however, need to develop his strength, speed and quickness to be more effective. Even at 6′4″ and 215 pounds, he struggles off the line against more physical corners and isn’t going to beat most opposing defensive backs down the field in one-on-one situations.

Andrew Hendrix

QB, 6′3″, 226 lbs
29th ranked QB by Scout (3 stars)
13th ranked QB by Rivals (4 stars, #235 overall)

Jon: Of the three quarterbacks in this year’s recruiting class, Andrew Hendrix is probably the most physically ready to play right now. He has good arm strength, even when throwing on the run, which could prove valuable in Kelly’s offense. However, Hendrix has a tendency to turn the ball over, and in an offensive system that stresses scoring fast, turning the ball over could prove very disastrous as the Irish defense will already be on the field much more than they were last year. If there’s one area that Hendrix needs to improve on, it’s his decision-making with the football.

Anthony: Hendrix is a solid quarterback prospect from Cincinnati with good measurables and raw talent. He throws with good velocity and has surprising mobility for his size. The primary drawback for Hendrix is his experience. He didn’t play in an offense that stressed reading progressions and his decision-making skills and ability to identify coverages are lacking as a result. From a pure talent perspective, he has good upside. However, he is raw and will need time to develop.

Austin Collinsworth

WR, 6′1″, 195 lb
99th ranked S by Scout (3 stars)
Unranked by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Collinsworth is your typical project. While he already posses some intangibles like toughness, he will definitely need to work on other qualities, such as speed, strength, and route running, that make a sub par wide receiver great. If he does this, he could definitely be projected as a solid slot receiver. If he can’t seem to refine these qualities, however, look for Collinsworth to make a switch to the other side of the ball and play as a free safety.

Anthony: Collinsworth is a tough, determined football player with good pedigree and production in high school on both sides of the ball. He is agile and quick for his size, and displays very good change of direction, acceleration in and out of breaks, and body control. He lacks elite athleticism, speed, size and strength but, like many other prospects in this class, his attitude and intangibles may be able to make up for those deficiencies. He should be a very good fit at the slot receiver position in Kelly’s offense and figures to make a splash on special teams as well.

Tate Nichols

OL, 6′7″, 291 lbs
70th ranked OT by Scout (3 stars)
62nd ranked OT by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Even though most people project Nichols as a project, tabbing him as an outside lineman, I don’t necessarily see him playing that role for the Irish. He could bulk up a bit and make a solid contribution as a prototypical blocking tight end. He has excellent blocking ability and he already has experience at that position. If there’s anything that keeps Nichols from that role, it’s that blocking tight ends don’t have a big role in the spread offense. If this is the case, Nichols may not make much of an impact on Saturdays, but more during the week on the scout team.

Anthony: Nichols is more of a “project” recruit. Due to his height and frame, he projects as an exterior offensive linemen but will need time to grow into his body and transition from the tight end position he played in high school. He displays good intensity and physicality when he blocks, particularly when he drives opposing players. But it may take some time for him to learn to play in space and master pass blocking.

Luke Massa

QB, 6′5″, 205 lbs
75th ranked QB by Scout (3 stars)
28th ranked QB by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: On Scout.com, Massa is listed as 175 pounds. Massa will definitely need to hit the weights in order to add some size and strength. He is a good pro-style quarterback and obviously Brian Kelly sees something he likes in Massa, as Luke was previously committed to Cincinnati, giving Brian Kelly is verbal this past summer. The one thing that Massa will need to improve is his arm strength. Sometimes, rather than getting the ball to his receiver in a tight window, he puts too much air under the ball. Massa will need to learn to make quick decisions and quick throws in Brian Kelly’s offense.

Anthony: Massa does not have the physical skill set of Hendrix, but he does have plenty of upside in his own right. In high school Luke played in a more traditional offensive system and as a result has better footwork and good play-action ability. He is not as raw as Hendrix, but he will need to improve physically to compete. The good news is that Massa has plenty of room to add size and strength to his 6′5″ frame. Increasing this measureables will also improve his arm strength.

Tommy Rees

QB, 6′3″, 192 lbs
65th ranked QB by Scout (3 stars)
31st ranked QB by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: If Rees has a leg up on any of the other quarterbacks in this class, it’s with his decision-making. He is very proficient at making reads at the line of scrimmage. Unfortunately, his body size may overshadow that and make it hard for him to contribute right away, even though he is needed badly. Enrolling early to work with Strength and Conditioning Coach Paul Longo can only help Rees as he, alongside current wide receiver John Goodman, will be taking the majority of the reps this Spring if Dayne Crist is still not healthy enough to do so.

Anthony: Rees is perhaps the least physically ready to play of the three quarterback recruits in this class, but what he lacks in arm strength he makes up for in accuracy. He isn’t as polished in fundamentals as Massa, and will have to improve his technique going forward. Enrolling early will greatly benefit him as he prepares to become a viable option behind projected starter Dayne Crist. But it may be too much to expect for him to be ready to contribute meaningful minutes by the fall.

Tai-ler Jones

WR, 6′0″, 183 lbs
21st ranked WR by Scout (4 stars)
19th ranked WR by Rivals (4 stars, #141 overall)

Jon: Jones doesn’t have the greatest size for a wide receiver, but his ball-catching abilities and speed definitely make up for that. While I hesitate to compare him to Golden Tate, he could very well play a similar role in Brian Kelly’s offense. Jones did play in a spread offense in high school and has experience being highly productive running the ball on reverses as well. Even though the wide receiver position is very full right now, Jones could very well work his way into the mix by his sophomore year at the slot receiver position.

Anthony: While he does lack some size and strength, Jones is an elite wide receiver prospect for a host of reasons. He is a polished route runner, has excellent ball skills, and is very quick and agile. Jones is also one of the more dangerous wide receiver prospects in the country with the ball in his hands. He will need to develop physically before he is ready to consistently compete, but he is certainly one of the more exciting prospects in this class.

Danny Spond

ATH, 6′3″, 232 lbs
14th ranked MLB by Scout (3 stars)
27th ranked ATH by Rivals (4 stars)

Jon: Danny Spond is probably the most versatile recruit in this class. He has played a whole host of positions in high school, but I see him in a similar position that Bobby Burger is playing now. He could line up as a second receiving or blocking tight end, but he is also a bruiser running the ball. The other position I can see him at is the hybrid Defensive End/Linebacker position. The only worries I would have with that is his vulnerability defending passing situations. Out of all of the recruits in this class, Spond definitely has the most upside.

Anthony: There is a lot to like about Danny Spond. He is very athletic for his size, displaying good speed and quickness. Spond is also tough, runs with determination and authority, and doesn’t shy away from contact on either side of the ball. His versatility is nearly unmatched as he could play a host of positions. It is most likely that he bulks up and lines up at tight end/H-back or at a linebacker spot, but it isn’t out of the realm of possibilities for him to see some time in other, more niche roles as a situational player on defense.

Derek Roback

ATH, 6′3″, 225 lbs
103th ranked QB by Scout (2 stars)
Unranked ATH by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Technically, Derek Roback is Notre Dame’s fifth quarterback in this recruiting class, however, I don’t think that’s where he’ll end up. I’m sure that he may take a few snaps there this summer, but I think it is much more likely that Roback heads to the weight room and comes back as a linebacker. He is a very similar prospect to Danny Spond, but he doesn’t have a general direction that he’s headed. If heavily competing for the job at quarterback doesn’t pan out for Roback, I expect him to be Zeke Motta’s replacement as the nickle linebacker/safety position once Zeke graduates or moves to safety.

Anthony: Roback is a rather intriguing prospect in that he may suffer from not projecting at a specific position at the college level. Early in the recruiting process he seemed to generate good measurables and accolades, but the recruiting services never matched this with good evaluations. Like Spond, Roback is versatile, but has more quickness and is position-limited by his smaller size. He is certainly athletic, but hasn’t played any position long enough to fully develop into a polished player. Because of this it will likely take him some time before he can contribute for the Irish.

Defense

Kona Schwenke

DL, 6′4″, 227 lbs
33th ranked DE by Scout (4 stars)
34th ranked DE by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Schwenke is an interesting prospect. He shows plenty of potential at his position, but he currently lacks the technique to be truly productive. He is truly explosive off the ball, but sometimes that speed hurts him as he tends to over-pursue his targets. He either needs to add about 40 or 50 pounds and become a true defensive end in Brian Kelly’s 3-4 defense or add 25 to 30 pounds and fit in at the outside linebacker/defensive end position. Luckily with his 6′4 frame, he has the ability to do this without really affecting his speed.

Anthony: Similar to many of the recruits in this class, Schwenke is a prospect that needs grow into his projected position. He is a fearless pass rusher who has excellent speed and quickness upfield, but he will need to add size and get stronger to consistently contribute at the college level. Fortunately, he has the frame to do it. Schwenke will also need to become a more complete player. Raw ability and determination made him a potent force in high school, but better fundamentals will be needed to be productive at Notre Dame.

Justin Utupo

DE, 6′3″, 250 lbs
50th ranked DE by Scout (3 stars)
62nd ranked DT by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: I’m very excited with landing Justin Utupo. He doesn’t rank very high on Scout or Rivals, but he is a solid prospect nonetheless. He has great speed and strength, often times, allowing him to chase down running backs or quarterbacks from behind. And at 250 pounds, he won’t have to add much size to his frame to fit in at defensive end in the 3-4 defense. If there’s one thing Utupo could improve, it’s his tackling technique. Many times, he tries to take down ball carriers with arm tackles. That may have worked in high school, but he will need to learn the importance of putting a body on the opposition to bring them down. If anything else, expect him to make an impact on special teams while he waits his turn to make an impact on the defense.

Anthony: Utupo is a team player with a motor that is second to none. He has decent size, strength and speed, but what he lacks in natural athletic ability he makes up for with determination. He relentlessly pursues the ball and plays much bigger and faster than his measurables indicate. It is somewhat unclear where he will line up in the 3-4, but his attitude and approach to the game can be contagious and elevate the work ethic of those around him.

Kendall Moore

LB, 6′3″, 235 lb
18th ranked MLB by Scout (3 stars)
22nd ranked OLB by Rivals (4 stars)

Jon: Kendall Moore will be a punishing linebacker–against the run. Right now, he lacks the speed and agility to be a force in pass coverage, even if only keeping up with bigger running backs and tight ends. Look for Moore to either bulk up and move to defensive end, or continue to hone his ball hawking skills and remain as an inside linebacker, stuffing the run.

Anthony: Moore reminds me a lot of Irish linebacker Toryan Smith. He is a punishing tackler with good size, strength and instincts, but lacks the requisite athleticism to play well in space. Moore does produce in the interior, particularly against the run, but struggles in coverage due to limited lateral movement. It is difficult to imagine him being an every down defender with his coverage limitations, but he could be productive as a run-stuffing linebacker. He could also bulk up and move to the defensive line.

Louis Nix

DL, 6′3″, 315 lbs
9th ranked DT by Scout (4 stars)
7th ranked DT by Rivals (4 stars, #85 overall)

Jon: Louis Nix is a solid defensive lineman. He comes off the ball with great explosion and forward lean to gain leverage against opposing offensive lineman. He is also a very powerful tackler who can usually take down ball carriers by himself and at 315 pounds, he already has the size to fit in at nose tackle at the next level. He will, however, need to work on his technique. Some of the pass rushing moves he put on opposing lineman in high school will not work in college, as lineman are much stronger at the next level.

Anthony: Nix reminds me of Omar Hunter as he is a terrific talent due to his blend of size and athleticism. He is very quick off the ball, especially for a player of his size, and uses his strength well to generate excellent inside push. Nix isn’t a pass rushing interior defensive lineman, but pursuit isn’t a strong requirement for the nose tackle in a 3-4. His primary concern may be keeping his weight down and playing with the appropriate pad level. At 6′3″ he has a tendency to come off the ball high, and a nose tackle must maintain leverage to hold his ground and control both A-gaps against frequent double teams. If he can maintain conditioning, he could contribute early and often.

Prince Shembo

LB, 6′2″, 232 lbs
42nd ranked OLB by Scout (3 stars)
7th ranked ILB by Rivals (4 stars, #238 overall)

Jon: I expect Prince Shembo to add a bit of weight and muscle to move to the outside linebacker position. He could play as a defensive end, but his body type isn’t ideal for that position. He certainly has the speed necessary to come off the corner and rush the passer, but he must work on his side-to-side mobility to truly be effective in that capacity.

Anthony: Shembo is a “tweener” who could play at the linebacker position or could grow into a defensive end. He has the frame to add more weight, but at only 6′2″ lacks ideal height to play on the defensive line. Shembo is athletic, with good straight-line speed and excellent pass rushing skills, but does have limited lateral movement and lacks good tackling technique. My bet is that he ends up as a pass rushing specialist from an outside linebacker spot in the 3-4, and he has the skills to do very well in that role.

Bruce Heggie

DL, 6′6″, 240 lbs
Unranked DE by Scout (2 stars)
Unranked TE by Rivals (2 stars)

Jon: The recruitment of Bruce Heggie is a bit of a mystery to me. Besides his offer from Notre Dame, the only other offer from a Division I school came from William and Mary. Because there is little information on Heggie, it’s hard to gain an accurate assessment of his build, natural abilities, and technique. All signs point to him making an impact on the scout teams in practice and nothing more. I guess in this case, we’ll have to trust that Kelly sees something in Heggie that the rest of us don’t.

Anthony: Heggie is a bit of an unknown. His lack of other offers and listless cohort make him a surprise recruit for the Irish. He has good size, with room to grow, and is athletic for his build. However, it is difficult to imagine him as anything but a utility player.

Lo Wood

DB, 5′11″, 176 lbs
46th ranked CB by Scout (3 stars)
44th ranked CB by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Wood, at best, is a very inconsistent player. He truly lacks, what some would call, the necessary attributes to be a good cornerback at the college level. He doesn’t have the greatest size or speed and sometimes lacks the toughness to keep with a determined wide receiver. He does, however, have good instincts. If he can work on his size and technique in college, he could turn out to be a decent backup option. If not, look for Wood to make his biggest impact on special teams coverage.

Anthony: Wood is primarily a cover corner. He lacks the size to compete right away, but has plenty of room for growth and decent height to play on the outside. Wood shows good anticipation and awareness in the secondary, but doesn’t have elite speed, lacks physicality, and frequently struggles to wrap up when tackling. Instincts are tough to teach, and Wood has them, but his athleticism and lack of physical play may limit his ability to contribute as a corner at the college level.

Chris Badger

DB, 6′1″, 192 lbs
28th ranked S by Scout (3 stars)
41st ranked S by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Say hello to your next Tom Zbikowski. If he adds a bit of muscle to his frame, Badger could turn out to be a very bruising hitter. He hits like a freight train and has decent closing speed, but could afford to increase that area with some training. However, the one thing keeping Badger from being a very good prospect is his coverage abilities. If he can improve his technique in coverage, Badger could turn out to be a solid contributor on the defensive side of the ball, especially as a strong safety focusing on screen passes and underneath crossing routes.

Anthony: In my opinion, Badger is one of the more underrated prospects in this class, and, if used correctly, could be a strong contributor for the Irish. He lacks the ideal speed to perform well as a coverage safety, but his change of direction is underrated and his instincts and anticipation are very sharp. Badger’s most impressive attributes are his toughness and tackling skills. He breaks extremely well, arrives at the point of attack with tenacity, and punishes opposing ball carriers. Once he reads the play, he closes on the ball like a torpedo. I can easily see Chris growing into a hybrid safety-linebacker and making strong contributions as a situational player on defense.

Spencer Boyd

DB, 5′10″, 175 lbs
59th ranked CB by Scout (3 stars)
39th ranked CB by Rivals (3 stars)

Jon: Boyd is another interesting recruit. He doesn’t have outstanding coverage abilities, but what he lacks in coverage technique, he makes up for with his speed and instincts. He has great closing speed and is very good at playing as a defensive receiver when the ball is in the air. If he could add a bit of muscle to his frame and retain his speed, he could be a solid coverage cornerback. If anything else, he could be an interesting special teams returner.

Anthony: Boyd is an interesting corner prospect and one that I feel is underrated by the recruiting services. He has the physicality and tackling ability to play strong against the run, but better speed, agility, and change of direction than Wood. Boyd is excellent with the ball in the air, and this is an asset that may make him more suited to play the field corner position. Like Badger, Boyd has good instincts, but he is a more gifted athlete with good quickness and a sharp ability to break on the ball. I think Boyd could be one of the sleepers in this class.

Biggest Commitment

Jon: Matt James would have to be my biggest contributor to this class. There is no mystery to the shortage of quality defensive lineman prospects and Louis Nix definitely fills that need, but it is imperative that, in Brian Kelly’s offense, that there is also no shortage of good offensive lineman to provide the protection necessary to run the offense effectively. With the right weight training and practice, James could step in and contribute very early.

Anthony: I’d have to say Nix. He is the type of interior defensive lineman the Irish have whiffed on in the past, an elite talent with the ability to contribute early and develop into a dominant force down the line. Outside of Nix I really like the ability of Jones to create with the ball in his hands and think he will be a very deadly receiver in the not too distant future.

Biggest Miss

Jon: The biggest prospect that got away from the Irish would have to be Chris Martin. Seantrel Henderson would have been a great acquisition for this class, but the pure lack of bodies along the defensive line makes losing Chris Martin an even tougher pill to swallow. However, I’m not sure there is much that Brian Kelly and his staff could have done to keep Martin with this class. I even think that Charlie Weis may have had difficulty keeping Martin. I believe Martin will be a solid professional prospect and I would rather him be wearing Blue and Gold in college.

Anthony: More of Nix. Losing Blake Lueders and Martin hurt at a position where the Irish are dangerously thin. Kelly will need to shore up this area with quantity and quality in next year’s class. Skill talent means little if the offensive and defensive lines can’t win the battle in the trenches. Some more athletic safeties would have also helped this class and will be another need for next year.

Rating The Class…

Jon: This recruiting class was an interesting one. It started out being fairly solid, but as the wire drew closer, there were a lot of personnel changes. The Irish lost Chris Martin, but gained Louis Nix. They “lost” Seantrel Henderson, but gained Matt James. I think overall it’s a decent class, but it truly lacks the star power to push it over the top like some of Charlie Weis’ previous classes. Good coaching will do wonders for this class, but sometimes a program needs true impact players in order to be productive on Saturdays and I’m not sure this class has enough of those impact players.

Anthony: From top to bottom, this class appears similar to last year, albeit lacking the star power of a Manti Te’o-type recruit. There are several very solid commitments, but also a fair share of “project” players that will take time to develop and may lack the athleticism needed to compete at an elite level. Some needs were addressed but the defensive front and safety still loom as positions where quality and depth are a concern going forward. The versatility of some recruits will provide flexibility, which is an advantage for Kelly if he needs to fill holes from transfers or injury. If I had to assign a letter grade I’d probably go with a B.

On Rating Kelly’s Recruiting Approach…

Jon: It’s hard to gauge the type of recruiter that Brian Kelly is from this class. We will gain a more accurate depiction of his style next year when he has more than a month to recruit players. But the time he did have to recruit players, he signed players like Derek Roback, Kona Schwenke, and Bruce Heggie. His approach remains somewhat of a mystery to me. Judging by this class alone, he is either a great evaluator of potential or a horrible evaluator of talent. Only time will tell which one it is.

Anthony: Kelly did his job. He minimized defections, maintained most of the current commits, and even managed to pull in a few of his own prospects. As stated above, the class is heavy on players that will need time to develop before being able to contribute, but with current roster this isn’t a huge concern. Going forward, it will be more important to gain commitments from elite players, as well as avoid taking too many athletes and prospects that require substantial growth in order to contribute. Over-reliance on player development is not an option for Kelly at Notre Dame, the competition level is higher than anywhere he has been.

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They Call It Powder Blue, Irish vs. Tar Heels News and Notes

Spread and Pass, Brian Kelly’s (Somewhat) New Irish Offense

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

How Good Are the Irish? A Year-End Defensive Statistical Review

Anthony Pilcher — Mon, 04 Jan 2010 06:29:58 +0000

The 2009 Irish offense has been dissected, detailed and summarized. Now it’s time to turn to the other side of the ball.

Many (myself included) believed Notre Dame’s 2009 defense would be a large step forward from a 2008 unit that was below average. The Irish returned a host of starters, an off-season coaching responsibility realignment by head coach Charlie Weis put co-defensive coordinator Jon Tenuta in charge of play-calling, and the personnel seemed to fit Tenuta’s aggressive scheme.

The reality was far different as poor tackling and confusion in the secondary doomed the Irish. The former is both inexcusable and inexplicable while the latter is mostly the result of inconsistency derived from the scheme and coordinator changes of the past four years.

What follows is a comprehensive analysis of Notre Dame’s 2009 defensive unit. Four tables (defensive efficiency, total defense, rushing defense, and passing defense) with 21 statistical categories are listed below with supplementary data used to understand the more subtle factors that contributed to the high-level performance.

For clarity, a detailed description of the table columns can be found here. I highly recommend this refresher in order to understand the data presented below.

This assessment is consistent with previous analyses that benchmark the Irish production against the competition. Please visit here or here for an explanation of this benchmarking process and the benefits associated with assessing statistical production from this perspective.

Definitions and Disclaimers

The following disclaimers and definitions are pertinent to this analysis:

Disclaimer: The numbers presented here were taken from the NCAA statistics website and the Notre Dame football statistics homepage and are accurate to the best of my knowledge as of December 14, 2009, i.e. these values do not include any bowl production of Irish opponents.
Definition: An explosive—or big—gain is a running play that produces 15 or more yards or a pass play that gains 20 or more yards.
Definition: A short yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires three or fewer yards for a first down.
Definition: A medium yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires greater than three, but fewer than seven, yards for a first down.
Definition: A long yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires seven or more yards for a first down.

Additionally, for reference purposes, the following are links to the statistical recaps for each 2009 Irish opponent: Nevada, Michigan, Michigan State, Purdue, Washington, USC, Boston College, Washington State, Navy, Pittsburgh, Connecticut and Stanford.

No Efficiency To Speak Of

Third down defense was poor despite fairly good situational characteristics while red zone touchdown efficiency was inflated by a handful of games.

Defensive Efficiency

Statistic	Notre Dame	Notre Dame Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank	PR
3rd Down Efficiency	39.4	65	40.2	55	0.01
Red Zone Efficiency	75	15	83.6	44	0.1
Red Zone TD Efficiency	56.8	60	63.5	44	0.1

The Irish ranked in the bottom half of the country in two (third down and red zone touchdown) of the three major defensive efficiency categories.

Red zone efficiency ranked 15th, but the performance in this area is largely exaggerated by the few (eight) opponent red zone field goal attempts as the Irish allowed 88.4 percent of all red zone points to come on touchdowns (86th in the country).

The third down woes started on first down where the defense was largely bipolar.

Notre Dame allowed 6.1 yards per snap on 350 first down plays with two or fewer yards surrendered on over 44 percent of these plays. However, 43.7 percent of first down plays generated five or more yards including 43 explosive gains. These big plays accounted for almost 50 percent of the total first down production for opposing teams.

Despite this poor first down play the third down situations were fairly favorable for the Irish. Out of 350 play series, 158 (45.1 percent) resulted in a third down and more than 74 percent of these were medium or long yardage situations that favored the defense.

Normally, this would be a good thing. Outside of short yardage situations the defense gains the advantage on third down. The Irish just didn’t play well on medium and long distance third downs ranking only 65th in third down efficiency despite opponents needing an average of 7.6 yards to move the chains.

Conversely, on short yardage third downs the defense performed admirably, holding their opposition to a 56.1 percent conversion rate and only 47.8 percent on the ground. But the defense struggled with more than three yards to go as they allowed conversions on almost one-third of opportunities and surrendered 14 big plays, 11 of which came through the air.

The most palpable example of this rather inexplicable phenomena occurred against Boston College. Despite an average distance of 9.5 yards, the Eagle offense converted six of their 13 third down attempts as the Irish allowed five passing plays of 20 or more yards.

The red zone touchdown inefficiency was arguably worse and was most deficient in the season finale against Stanford where the Cardinal scored a touchdown on five of their six red zone trips.

Officially, the Irish allowed touchdowns nearly 57 percent of the time their opponents crossed the 20-yard line as 25 of 35 offensive touchdowns (71.4 percent) came inside the red zone. Expressed differently, 18.4 percent of opponent drives resulted in red zone touchdowns.

Three games, however, significantly skewed these numbers.

Whether it was turnovers by the opposing team (Nevada), stout short goal-to-go play by the Irish (Washington), or the opponent’s conservative game plan (Pittsburgh), these three outings substantially bolstered Notre Dame’s performance in the red zone. Excluding these contests, Irish opponents were exceedingly efficient, scoring touchdowns on 81.3 percent of their red zone appearances.

Totally Offensive Defensive Production

Considering the competition, points allowed weren’t that bad, but opposing offenses were very efficient and effective with their yard production.

Total Defense

Statistic	Notre Dame	Notre Dame Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank	PR
Points/Game	25.9	64	29	48	0.1
Yards	4773	86	4630	58	-0.03
Yards/Play	6.2	103	5.9	47	-0.05
TDs	38	64	44	47	0.14
Yards/Game	397.8	87	385.8	56	-0.03

The total defensive numbers appear poor, but are just about on par with opponents’ yearly production.

The Irish allowed 25.9 points per game and 38 touchdowns on the year, both good for rankings in the middle of the country and the bright spots of the total defense numbers. The highest point total allowed was 45 in the final outing against Stanford.

The majority of the point production occurred in the second and fourth quarters as 166 of 311 points (53.3 percent) were scored in these periods. However, the point per quarter averages—five, 6.8, six, and 7.1 points per quarter—were fairly similar. Points came fairly evenly on the ground and through the air as well as the defense allowed 18 rushing touchdowns and 17 passing scores.

The remaining three touchdowns came via special teams (two kickoff returns) and a Jimmy Clausen fumble recovery by Washington’s Desmond Trufant. Adjusting for these three non-defensive touchdowns reduces the points per game allowed to 24.2 and bumps the points per game ranking about 10 spots.

Additionally, Notre Dame generated positive PR’s in both points per game and touchdowns. While both rank in the middle of the country, the performance came against good scoring offenses.

The preferred method of moving the ball against the Irish was on the ground. The yards gained favored the pass as 57.2 percent of yards came through the air, but this was mostly due to the large per-play averages throwing the ball. The first down production mimics this as more first downs were generated passing (118) than running (103).

The true preference is in the play-calling.

Opposing offenses ran the ball almost 56 percent of the time (430 runs to 341 pass attempts) against the Irish. On first down, a more apt characterization of play-calling preference, opposing offenses ran the ball on nearly 59 percent of plays. On second and third down short yardage situations a run was called 70 percent of the time.

Moreover, only four games (Michigan State, Purdue, Washington and Boston College) featured a pass-first approach by the opposing offense, i.e. greater than 50 percent of snaps were passes. The remaining eight games were characterized by run-first play-calling while three opponents (Navy, Connecticut and Stanford) called runs on more than 60 percent of plays.

Excluding overtime periods, opponent drives averaged 5.7 plays, 34.1 yards, 2:28 in time of possession, and 1.7 first downs. Most drives were rather short as only 15 generated 10 or more plays and only eight lasted five or more minutes. These short drives were largely the result of big plays (see below) that led to quick scoring opportunities.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, 31 of 136 (22.8 percent) drives were three plays and punt while 33.1 percent of drives resulted in scores. Expressed differently, 23 of 136 non-overtime drives (16.9 percent) ended in red zone touchdowns while eight other touchdowns were allowed from beyond the 20-yard line.

But the most deficient statistics in the table above are the yard efficiency and effectiveness categories as the Irish rank 103rd in yards per play (6.2) and 87th in yards per game (397.8). The former is largely due to big plays and the ability of opponents to exploit the Irish secondary with play-action. The season-high in both categories came against USC as the Trojans gained 501 yards at an incredible rate of 8.1 yards per snap.

Can’t Stop Bleeding Yards On The Ground

Against a tough slate of running teams, the Irish did little to impress.

Rushing Defense

Statistic	Notre Dame	Notre Dame Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank	PR
Yards	2043	90	2205	48	0.07
Yards/Carry	4.8	101	4.6	45	-0.02
TDs	18	66	24	45	0.25
Yards/Game	170.3	90	183.8	47	0.07

Opponents preferred the run because Notre Dame couldn’t stop it, and because they were built to do it. Five opponents—Nevada, Michigan, Navy, Pittsburgh, Stanford—ranked 30th or better in rushing yards per game and all of these teams but Michigan ranked 30th or better in yards per carry. Unfortunately, with few exceptions, the Irish did little to slow these potent running offenses.

The defense ranks 101st in yards per rush (4.8) and 90th in rushing yards allowed per game (170.3), both dubious honors. Excluding sacks, the per-carry average increases to 5.3 yards.

Seven Irish opponents (Nevada, Michigan, Washington, Navy, Pittsburgh, Connecticut and Stanford) exceeded 150 yards rushing. Seven (Michigan, Michigan State, USC, Navy, Pittsburgh, Connecticut and Stanford) opponents also recorded two or more rushing touchdowns.

The last four Irish foes accomplished both of these feats in addition to averaging 5.7 yards per carry (5.9 yards per rush excluding sacks). It seems that late-season fatigue coupled with good running teams spelled disaster for the Irish run defense.

The problem started on first down, but it didn’t end there.

Despite strong run tendencies, opposing offenses averaged 5.6 yards per first down rush and gained five or more yards on 88 of 205 running plays (41 percent). The defense managed to hold opponents to two or fewer yards almost 43 percent of the time, including 27 negative rushing plays, but it was the frequency of the bigger gains that were the primary problem.

Second down wasn’t much better.

Notre Dame allowed 5.2 yards per second down carry including gains of five or more yards on 42.1 percent of rush attempts. Similar to first down, inconsistent play was also evident on second down as the defense was able to hold opposing offenses to two or fewer yards on a good percentage of plays (40.7).

Short yardage situations were also problematic.

Notre Dame faced 89 short yardage down and distance situations of which 62 (almost 70 percent) were runs. These 62 rush attempts averaged 3.9 yards and over 30 percent produced five or more yards. Perhaps most problematic, nearly 60 percent of these short yardage runs resulted in first downs.

About the only bright spot of the running game was holding opponents to fewer rushing touchdowns than they routinely scored and the performance on third and short. Irish opponents called runs on 23 of 41 (56.1 percent) short yardage third downs. Seven of these 23 attempts (30.4 percent) went for negative yardage and only 11 (47.8 percent) moved the chains.

Giving Up Huge Chunks Of Yards Through The Air

The run was preferred, but selling out to stop it cost the Irish dearly down the field and prevented consistent quarterback pressure despite frequent blitzing.

Passing Defense

Statistic	Notre Dame	Notre Dame Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank	PR
Yards/ Attempt	8	100	7.6	47	-0.05
Yards/ Completion	13.8	113	13.3	42	-0.03
Completion %	58	56	57.3	69	-0.01
Interceptions	12	44	11	54	0.11
TDs	17	57	17	62	0
Sacks	19	89	20	45	-0.06
Attempts/ Sack	17.9	76	20.7	53	0.13
Pass Efficiency	134.8	81	132.1	53	-0.01
Yards/Game	227.5	76	202.1	70	-0.12

Because opponents were able to run the ball effectively, they were also able to throw it with great efficiency. The Irish allowed a 58 percent completion percentage and ranked 81st in pass efficiency as opponents that ran the ball the best also generated the highest per pass attempt and completion averages.

Against these strong rushing offenses Tenuta was forced to stack the box to stop the run. The result was vulnerability to the vertical passing game, particularly off play-action. Both directly led to the defense surrendering eight yards per attempt (100) and 13.8 yards per completion (113).

A stronger, more experienced front four would have partially rectified this problem, but poor tackling also contributed to high yard-after-contact production for opposing ball carriers.

Additionally, because opponents preferred the run and made heavy use of play-action, Notre Dame was unable to consistently pressure quarterbacks. The Irish averaged one sack per 17.9 pass attempts (76), with 19 sacks on the year (89). However, five sacks came against Washington State. Excluding this game the Irish notched only 14 quarterback takedowns, one per 22.7 pass attempts. This is especially puzzling given Tenuta’s penchant for blitzing and applying pressure.

But perhaps most troubling was the inability to stop big gains through the air in obvious passing situations.

On third down, opposing quarterbacks averaged 8.3 yards on 104 pass attempts despite being very pass-heavy (65.8 percent third down pass preference) and facing long distances (average of 8.4 yards to go). The result was a 42.3 percent third down conversion rate when a pass was attempted.

Fourth down was even worse. The Irish allowed 9.6 yards per pass attempt despite opponents needing an average of 8.4 yards to move the chains. Moreover, opponents generated 16 explosive pass plays on third and fourth down for an average of 30.4 yards per play.

Performance in long distance situations was more of the same. Excluding first down, the Irish faced 256 long yardage plays of which 153 were pass attempts (59.8 percent). Opponents averaged 7.6 yards per attempt, gained five or more yards 70 times (45.8 percent), and notched 23 big gains that averaged 28.7 yards per play. On these downs, despite needing an average of 10.9 yards to move the chains, 31.4 percent of these pass plays resulted in a first down. On many of these obvious passing situations, confusion in the secondary led to big gains down the field.

The secondary was, however, somewhat opportunistic, notching 12 interceptions (44) on the year. But 11 of these picks came in the first eight games and the defense was only able to force an interception once every 28.4 pass attempts.

Explosive Gains = Achilles’ Heel

As (painfully) illustrated above, big gains were the crux of the issue for the 2009 Irish defense. And they came in all shapes and sizes.

As a whole, Notre Dame allowed 89 big plays that gained 2,321 yards, an average of 26.1 yards per play. This accounted for 48.6 percent of the total production. Expressed differently, 11.5 percent of opponent offensive plays gained nearly half of their yards. Without these plays the Irish defense allowed 3.6 yards per play, up from the 3.3-yard value in 2008.

But the per-game numbers are simply baffling as opponents averaged 7.4 explosive gains and 193.4 big play yards per game.

The most production occurred on first down where 43 of 350 plays (12.3 percent) gained 1,056 yards (24.6-yard average). The Irish allowed 46 explosive plays on the other downs for an average of 27.5 yards per play.

Running

Almost half (47.2 percent) of the big gains came on the ground as Irish opponents generated 42 runs of more than 15 yards.

These 42 plays gained 958 yards (22.8 yards per attempt), good for 46.9 percent of the rushing production and 20 percent of the total offense. Without these big gains the Irish surrendered only 2.8 yards per carry.

Most of the big runs came on first down or medium and long yardage situations.

The defense allowed 24 explosive rushes on first down, at an average of 22.2 yards per attempt. This production was good for 46.2 percent of all first down rushing yardage without which opponents’ averaged only 3.4 yards per rush.

Excluding first down, 14 more big running gains came in medium and long yardage situations. These 14 plays gained 327 yards (23.4-yard average) and produced 40.5 percent of the total rushing production in these down and distance situations. Many of these big plays were the result of Irish defenders blitzing themselves out of position.

Passing

The other half of the big play production came through the air as the defense allowed 47 big passes go for 1,363 yards (29 yards per completion). These 47 plays accounted for just under 50 percent of the passing yards and 28.6 percent of the total offense. Excluding these plays the Irish allowed 4.6 yards per attempt and 9.1 yards per completion.

Unlike the big play production in the running game, the explosive gains through the air were fairly evenly split on first, second and third down. However, as detailed above, the most costly big play production came through the air in down and distance situations that favored the Irish defense.

Facing long yardage down and distances, opposing offenses managed 23 big gains. These 23 plays gained 606 yards and averaged 28.7 yards per play. In other words, 40.4 percent of big pass plays occurred when defenders knew—or should have known—that the ball was going downfield.

In Summary, Is There Any Good News?

There is seemingly little good in the numbers above.

Situationally, first down defense was erratic for the Irish. Opponents were able to run the ball efficiently and effectively as well as frequently generate big gains. At times the defense performed well, but inconsistent first down play was a critical element to the deficiencies of this unit as the Irish often faced unfavorable situations on second and third down.

But the Irish also struggled in favorable down and distances. Far too many big plays occurred in these situations due to poor tackling (yards after contact) and confusion in the secondary. The latter problem is mostly attributable to constantly changing schemes and play-calling over the prior three seasons, and was exacerbated by the blitz-heavy approach in 2009.

From a higher level perspective the Irish simply could not stop the run.

A good defense can consistently defend the run with seven defenders, at least against most teams. A weak and inexperienced front four and rather unphysical play frequently forced Tenuta to drop an extra defender into the box.

But even with eight defenders the defense was often unable to slow opposing runners. This resulted in vulnerability to vertical passes, particularly those off play-action, and hampered attempts to pressure opposing quarterbacks.

Perhaps most disheartening was the impact of the Irish defense on the offense. The defense all but forced an offensive game plan with a low probability of success. Moreover, the defensive values above would likely be much worse if the Irish offense wasn’t so productive and if ball control hadn’t favored Notre Dame in almost every contest.

But there is a silver lining—small improvements could lead to dramatically better play.

Not only did the Irish surrender a large percentage of production from explosive plays, they also allowed many of them in favorable defensive situations. Moreover, the causes of the breakdowns are correctable.

In other words, the problems aren’t with personnel. With the possible exception of the front four, the Irish defense doesn’t lack for athleticism. And the young defensive line should be considerably helped by another year of maturation.

The issues are more closely tied to fundamentals and coaching.

The former is easily rectified. If Brian Kelly and his defensive staff focus on physicality and tackling, first down defense will improve and become more consistent and the Irish will surrender fewer big plays.

However, the inevitable change back to a 3-4 alignment will be a tough challenge for a unit beset with inconsistent coaching styles and schemes. This constant change is largely responsible for the confusion that enabled so many big plays and only excellent teaching by the new defensive staff will mitigate this problem.

Similar Posts:

How Good Are the Irish? A Year-End Offensive Statistical Review

Missed Opportunity and Failed Execution, Notre Dame’s Red Zone Woes

They Call It Powder Blue, Irish vs. Tar Heels News and Notes

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

2009 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Fourteen and BCS Championship Predictions

Anthony Pilcher — Thu, 24 Dec 2009 05:20:31 +0000

Disclaimer: The following is not intended for betting purposes.

Similar to last year, the final AV Ranking values (see the values in the table below) will be used to predict the BCS bowl game winners against the spread.

The BCS games are as follows:

Rose Bowl presented by Citi: Ohio State vs. Oregon
Tostitos Fiesta Bowl: Boise State vs. TCU
Allstate Sugar Bowl: Cincinnati vs. Florida
FedEx Orange Bowl: Iowa vs. Georgia Tech
Citi BCS National Championship: Texas vs. Alabama

The AV Ranking predicts the following winners:

Ohio State (0.836) over Oregon (0.765), margin of 0.071
TCU (0.855) over Boise State (0.839), margin of 0.016
Cincinnati (0.882) over Florida (0.838), margin of 0.044
Iowa (0.784) over Georgia Tech (0.747), margin of 0.037
Alabama (0.986) over Texas (0.897), margin of 0.089

The BCS National Championship game has the largest AV Ranking margin while the Fiesta Bowl seems to be the most evenly matched contest. The AV Ranking correctly predicted the winner in 80.8 percent of the regular season contests last year. This year is not much different, as the outcomes of 82.3 percent of the regular season games were correctly predicted.

But predicting the winner is far less interesting than predicting which teams will cover the spread.

Using the methodology outlined here, the AV Ranking was used to generate a point spread for the five BCS games listed above. The table below shows these point spreads along with the Vegas point spreads and the corresponding delta. The Vegas spreads were taken on December 7th, so they have likely changed since then.

AV Ranking and Vegas Predictions

Bowl Game	AV Ranking Favorite	AV Ranking Point Spread	Vegas Point Spread	Delta
Rose	Ohio State	-4.2	+3.5	+7.7
Tostitos	TCU	-0.9	-7	-6.1
Sugar	Cincinnati	-2.6	+10	+12.6
Orange	Iowa	-2.2	+3.5	+5.7
BCS National Championship	Alabama	-5.2	-5	+0.2

As the table shows, the AV Ranking is against the odds in three (Rose, Sugar and Orange) of the five games. This effectively means that the AV Ranking predicts people are overestimating the favorites.

The largest disparity is in the Sugar Bowl, where Vegas has Florida as 10-point favorites while the AV Ranking predicts Cincinnati to win the game. The second largest difference is in the Rose Bowl, where Vegas predicts Oregon to beat Ohio State while the AV Ranking likes the Buckeyes. Both Vegas and the AV Ranking predict about a five-point win for Alabama in the BCS National Championship Game.

As a side note, predicting the Bowl Game winner is not a facile proposition. The best indicator of winning is previous wins, i.e. the strongest corollary to predicting the winner of a game is the Adjusted Win Percentage (AWP) of the two participants. As such, this is the most heavily weighted metric of the AV Ranking.

In Bowl Games the AWP values of the two teams are nearly always similar, as the teams are usually evenly matched. In this scenario, Strength of Schedule (SOS) or Team Performance Ratio (TPR) are better predictors of which team will win as the AWP of both teams is virtually identical.

The AV Ranking SOS predicts the following winners:

Oregon (0.728) over Ohio State (0.589), margin of 0.139
TCU (0.310) over Boise State (0.251), margin of 0.059
Florida (0.578) over Cincinnati (0.552), margin of 0.025
Iowa (0.608) over Georgia Tech (0.432), margin of 0.176
Alabama (0.608) over Texas (0.595), margin of 0.014

The AV Ranking TPR predicts the following winners:

Ohio State (0.778) over Oregon (0.724), margin of 0.054
TCU (0.835) over Boise State (0.762), margin of 0.073
Florida (0.847) over Cincinnati (0.691), margin of 0.156
Georgia Tech (0.669) over Iowa (0.625), margin of 0.044
Alabama (0.957) over Texas (0.906), margin of 0.052

This data supports the Vegas odds favoring Florida over Cincinnati rather than the AV Ranking prediction of the Bearcats over the Gators. Cincinnati’s number one AWP ranking (see below) trumps its lower SOS and TPR. In other words, the delta between the AV Ranking and Vegas point spreads above is likely overestimated. Additionally, the turnover in Cincinnati’s coaching staff likely favors the Gators even more.

The final ESP and AV Ranking values are shown below. For reference purposes the weekly releases can be found here: week seven, eight, nine, 10, 11, 12 and 13.

Elite Selection Playoff (ESP)

Rank	Team	AP Poll	Coach's Poll	AV Ranking	Points
1	Alabama	1	1	1	1
2	Texas	2	2	2	0.96
3	TCU	3	3	4	0.906
4	Cincinnati	4	4	3	0.893
5	Florida	5	5	6	0.826
6	Boise St	6	6	5	0.813
7	Ohio State	8	8	7	0.733
7	Oregon	7	7	9	0.733
9	Iowa	10	11	8	0.653
10	Georgia Tech	9	10	11	0.64
11	Penn State	11	9	12	0.613
12	Virginia Tech	12	12	10	0.586
13	Miami FL	14	15	13	0.48
14	Brigham Young	15	14	14	0.466
14	LSU	13	13	17	0.466
16	Pittsburgh	17	16	15	0.4
17	West Virginia	18	17	16	0.36
18	Nebraska	20	19	20	0.253
19	Oregon St	16	20	28	0.213
19	Oklahoma St	21	18	23	0.213
21	Wisconsin	24	22	19	0.173
22	Stanford	19	21	30	0.16
22	Arizona	22	23	21	0.16
24	Central Michigan	25	NR	18	0.12
25	Utah	23	24	25	0.08

AV Ranking

Rank	Team	Points	Strength of Schedule	Quality Wins/Losses	Adjusted Win Percentage	Margin of Victory	Team Performance Ratio
1	Alabama	0.986	34	1	5	5	1
2	Texas	0.897	39	23	4	3	2
3	Cincinnati	0.882	51	8	1	15	17
4	TCU	0.855	103	13	2	2	4
5	Boise St	0.839	110	11	3	1	11
6	Florida	0.838	46	22	6	4	3
7	Ohio State	0.836	43	2	10	9	9
8	Iowa	0.784	35	3	10	36	32
9	Oregon	0.765	13	38	13	14	13
10	Virginia Tech	0.765	4	19	15	11	5
11	Georgia Tech	0.747	83	12	7	23	21
12	Penn State	0.723	82	67	10	6	7
13	Miami FL	0.703	42	21	15	30	26
14	Brigham Young	0.702	89	59	9	18	29
15	Pittsburgh	0.694	45	47	20	17	8
16	West Virginia	0.691	44	17	25	46	30
17	LSU	0.688	29	31	20	29	25
18	Central Michigan	0.677	112	93	7	8	19
19	Wisconsin	0.67	47	93	20	24	14
20	Nebraska	0.659	33	36	27	13	16
21	Arizona	0.657	23	14	33	41	33
22	Southern Cal	0.656	38	7	28	44	41
23	Oklahoma St	0.655	56	93	20	34	23
24	North Carolina	0.652	66	4	33	37	31
25	Utah	0.646	84	28	20	26	36

Adjusted Win Percentage (AWP)

Rank	Team	Points
1	Cincinnati	0.886
2	TCU	0.882
3	Boise St	0.88
4	Texas	0.874
5	Alabama	0.868
6	Florida	0.81
7	Georgia Tech	0.757
7	Central Michigan	0.757
9	Brigham Young	0.756
10	Ohio State	0.743

Strength of Schedule (SOS)

Rank	Team	Points
1	Mississippi St	0.947
2	Florida St	0.902
3	Miami OH	0.894
4	Virginia Tech	0.779
5	Washington St	0.762
6	Oklahoma	0.756
7	Syracuse	0.755
8	Colorado	0.753
9	Louisville	0.753
10	Washington	0.751

Team Performance Ratio (TPR)

Rank	Team	Points
1	Alabama	0.957
2	Texas	0.905
3	Florida	0.846
4	TCU	0.834
5	Virginia Tech	0.816
6	Oklahoma	0.803
7	Penn State	0.789
8	Pittsburgh	0.778
9	Ohio State	0.777
10	Air Force	0.763

Margin of Victory (MOV)

Rank	Team	Points
1	Boise St	0.94
2	TCU	0.933
3	Texas	0.924
4	Florida	0.881
5	Alabama	0.837
6	Penn State	0.762
7	Oklahoma	0.758
8	Central Michigan	0.753
9	Ohio State	0.75
10	Houston	0.739

Quality Wins/Losses (QWL)

Rank	Team	Points
1	Alabama	1
2	Ohio State	0.833
3	Iowa	0.577
4	North Carolina	0.52
4	Northwestern	0.52
6	Purdue	0.434
7	Southern Cal	0.419
8	Cincinnati	0.416
9	Florida St	0.405
10	Stanford	0.398

Similar Posts:

2009 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Eleven

2008 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Fifteen and BCS Championship Predictions

2009 Elite Selection Playoff: Week Ten

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

How Good Are the Irish? A Year-End Offensive Statistical Review

Anthony Pilcher — Sun, 20 Dec 2009 05:50:55 +0000

With all of the recent and dramatic change in the Irish football program, the 2009 season seems to be mostly forgotten.

There is no bowl game. Sensational quarterback Jimmy Clausen and unanimous All-American and Biletnikoff Award-winning wide receiver Golden Tate have left for the NFL. And Notre Dame head coach Charlie Weis has been replaced by Brian Kelly.

This seemingly serves as a forward-looking time for Notre Dame football and many are wondering about the direction of the program under its new leadership.

There are several obvious challenges. Can an offensive-minded head coach restore respectability to a woeful defense? Where will the Irish turn without Clausen and Tate and with little depth at quarterback? Will the running game continue to be an afterthought and can the offense solve the red zone problems persistent in the past two seasons? In short, how will Kelly address these looming problems moving forward?

But this does not mean a look back isn’t of value and can’t provide insight into the subtle, fundamental deficiencies plaguing the Irish. As such, this is the first of a two-part, comprehensive statistical review of the 2009 Irish offense and defense. The former will be addressed here, saving the latter for a future installment.

The Benchmarking Discussion

Consistent with previous assessments (including the 2009 offensive and defensive mid-year analyses), the results presented here will be benchmarked to the competition. This approach plays a vital role in appropriately gauging the efficiency and effectiveness of a team’s performance in two primary facets.

Mathematically, examining a team’s production in a vacuum excludes how the competition impacts the results as the largest variable in comparing two teams’ statistical is the schedule they play. Performance ratios (or PR’s), while imperfect, provide insight into how the opposition can skew a team’s performance. Here, PR’s are used to adjust the production of the Irish relative to their competition.

But there is also a practical reason.

At the mid-point of the 2008 and 2009 seasons Notre Dame’s offense appeared to be a juggernaut, amassing points and passing yards with seeming ease and ranking with the best in the country in most of the statistical metrics associated with both categories. However, there were fundamental problems that weren’t readily evident until the Irish suffered through second-half season slumps.

In 2008 it was an over-reliance on the big play. While wide receiver Michael Floyd’s injury certainly hurt production, the inability to produce yards without going downfield ultimately spelled disaster.

This season the dependence on the vertical passing game diminished, but a lack of consistency frequently created unfavorable down and distance situations and the pass-heavy play-calling was mostly ineffective inside the red zone. Additionally, the front-end of the schedule featured a slate of weak defensive teams that artificially overstated offensive production. A critical, benchmarked evaluation of the Irish offense revealed these problems long before the losses did.

What Do The Table Values Mean?

The tables below contain 24 statistical values divided into five categories (miscellaneous, offensive efficiency, total offense, rushing offense, and passing offense). This data will be supplemented with more detailed analyses aimed at understanding underlying causes.

For clarity, a detailed description of the table columns can be found here. I highly recommend this refresher in order to understand the data presented below.

Definitions and Disclaimers

The following disclaimers and definitions are pertinent to this analysis:

Disclaimer: The numbers presented here were taken from the NCAA statistics website and the Notre Dame football statistics homepage and are accurate to the best of my knowledge as of December 14, 2009.
Definition: An explosive—or big—gain is a running play that produces 15 or more yards or a pass play that gains 20 or more yards.
Definition: A short yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires three or fewer yards for a first down.
Definition: A medium yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires greater than three, but fewer than seven, yards for a first down.
Definition: A long yardage situation is any down and distance pair that requires seven or more yards for a first down.

Possession, Discipline and Turnovers

Ball control was solid, penalties were untimely, and turnover margin is respectable despite a second-half season slide.

Miscellaneous

Statistic	Notre Dame	Notre Dame Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank
Time of Possession	31:55	16	29:43	64
Penalty Yards/Game	55.5	71	49.1	49
Turnover margin	5	31	-1	65

The Irish faced a time of possession deficit only three times (Washington, Navy, and Stanford) during the 2009 season en route to averaging 31:55 per game, good for 16th in the country. The possession was spread fairly evenly in the four quarters of play as Notre Dame averaged more than eight minutes of possession in all but the fourth quarter.

Excluding overtime periods the offense had 140 drives that averaged 2.1 first downs, 6.1 plays, and 38 yards per drive. This production was good for an average time of possession of 2:44 per drive.

Many drives were fairly quick as only 27 (19.3 percent) exceeded 10 plays and only 15 (10.7 percent) eclipsed the five-minute mark. However, to the credit of Clausen and company, only 27 drives (19.3 percent) were three plays and punt.

For the second straight year Weis’ unit showed a significant lack of discipline, ranking in the bottom half of the country in penalty yards. In 2009, however, the number of penalties wasn’t as critical as their timing. Holding and personal fouls, in particular, frequently took away yards, removed points from the scoreboard, and extended opposing team’s drives.

The Navy game aside, protecting the ball was a strong point of the 2009 season as the offense surrendered five turnovers through the first six games and nine in the last six. Those 14 turnovers are good for 13th best in the country. The passing game was particularly good protecting the ball with one interception per 89.4 attempts.

The takeaways aren’t as positive. The Irish rank 76th with only 19 gained turnovers, but struggled most down the stretch as only four turnovers were generated in the final five games.

Not Terribly Efficient

Not much changed from the mid-year point: the kicking game is strong but third down and scoring touchdowns in the red zone continue to be problematic.

Offensive Efficiency

Statistic	Notre Dame	Notre Dame Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank	PR
3rd Down Efficiency	41	50	38.9	62	0.05
Red Zone Efficiency	84	46	83.4	68	0
Red Zone TD Efficiency	56	68	56.6	59	-0.01

No offense can be considered great without consistently efficient play. The Irish offense was able to move the ball well (see below), and with a good per-play average. However, the third down and scoring efficiencies were pedestrian against average defensive teams.

Notre Dame had 402 play series of which 38.8 percent contained a third down. These opportunities were converted at a rate of 41 percent, good for 61st in the country. The third down inefficiency is mostly due to inconsistent first down offense.

The offense averaged seven yards per first down play, a very respectable number. But it was largely hit or miss as big plays skewed this value (see a more detailed discussion of big plays below).

Better than 50 percent of first down snaps went for more than five yards including 34 out of 73 explosive gains (46.6 percent). However, 36.6 percent of first down plays gained two or fewer yards and excluding big plays the Irish averaged only 4.5 yards per first down snap.

The result is long distances on third down. The Irish offense averaged 6.9 yards to go on third down in addition to needing more than three yards for a conversion on 69.2 percent of third down tries. The third down efficiency in these situations was a paltry 33.3 percent compared to a 60.4 percent conversion rate when faced with short yardage.

While many play series didn’t require a third down, the Irish struggled when faced with one. This was mostly due to the absence of a methodical running game. Sustaining drives with big passing plays is a high rish, low probability modus operandi.

The red zone offense was also problematic. While the field goal kicking was very respectable, the Irish only scored touchdowns 56 percent of the time they entered the red zone. As has been discussed ad nauseum, the offense bogged down inside the 20-yard line where a spread passing game is least effective (more details on the red zone woes forthcoming in a future article).

Let’s Talk Totals

Still more than respectable, but red zone touchdown efficiency hurts the scoring and a tougher slate of defensive teams has dimmed the overall picture.

Total Offense

Statistic	Notre Dame	Notre Dame Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank	PR
Points/Game	30.1	38	25.5	59	0.17
Yards	5421	13	4545	64	0.19
Yards/Play	6.4	15	5.6	69	0.13
TDs	44	45	37	57	0.17
Yards/Game	451.8	9	378.7	66	0.19

Save scoring, the total offensive picture is very good and stacks up very similarly to the mid-year numbers.

The Irish rank 15th or better in yards, yards per play, and yards per game, mostly due to one of the country’s most productive passing offenses. The scoring, however, doesn’t match the ability to move the ball. Many times—most notably against Washington and Navy—the Irish were able to churn out yards with ease only to fail to score a touchdown inside the 20-yard line. The relatively low per-game point total is a direct correlation to the poor red zone efficiency.

Excluding overtime periods the Irish had 140 drives and scored on 59 of them (42.1 percent). Of these 59 scores, 20 occurred outside of the red zone (33.9 percent), as 15 touchdowns and 5 field goals came from beyond the 20-yard line. The 15 non-red zone touchdowns account for more than 36 percent of the Irish touchdowns. Expressed differently, 29 percent of drives (41 of 140) resulted in touchdowns but only 18.6 percent (26 of 140) of drives ended with a red zone touchdown.

With the exception of Navy and Pittsburgh, the first half belonged to the Irish. Excluding these two contests the offense averaged almost a touchdown more than their counterparts through two quarters of play.

The second quarter was the most productive as the offense notched 119 of 361 total points (33 percent). The third quarter was quite the opposite as the Irish managed only 47 points (13 percent).

As a whole, the numbers in the last seven games are lower than those in the first five as almost every statistic and ranking are down from the mid-year point. This is mostly due to tougher defensive opposition which has not only lowered the values and rankings, but the PR values as well. It seems the Irish offense was good, but certainly not as prolific as the early season results suggested.

Was Running The Ball Really That Bad?

Efficiency and effectiveness were understated by the way the run was used.

Rushing Offense

Statistic	Notre Dame	Notre Dame Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank	PR
Yards	1539	86	1712	53	-0.1
Yards/Carry	3.8	76	4.1	60	-0.05
TDs	13	97	17	55	-0.23
Yards/Game	128.3	85	142.7	54	-0.1

Notre Dame ranks 76th or worse in all four major rushing categories. Based on the data above, the effectiveness (yards, touchdowns and yards per game) is equally as low as the efficiency (yards per carry). Moreover, the Irish ground game wasn’t as productive as the opposing defenses typically allowed as every PR is less than zero.

A cursory glance at these numbers shows that the 2009 Irish ground game isn’t much better than last year’s version. A more critical examination leads to a different conclusion.

Officially, Notre Dame attempted 401 rushes for 1,539 yards, a paltry 3.8 yard per carry average. Perhaps more disheartening is the long gain of the year, a 37-yard scamper by running back Robert Hughes.

But removing Clausen’s attempts (sacks, scrambles, sneaks and a handful of designed read option plays) increases the average to 4.8 yards per carry. Additionally, the top four players in rushing yards—running backs Armando Allen, Theo Riddick, Hughes, and Tate—gained 1,489 yards on 284 carries and averaged a solid 5.2 yards per carry. In other words, had Clausen been better protected (see below), the rushing efficiency would be much better.

But there were also other factors that impacted the effectiveness and efficiency of the running game: frequency and situational use.

Notre Dame ranks 90th in rushing attempts with a run/pass split of 401 to 447—52.7 percent in favor of the pass. Excluding Clausen’s carries the offensive rushing attempt rank falls to 115th and the run/pass split decidedly favors the pass as nearly 60 percent of plays were called passes. With so few opportunities, the per-game rushing yards are understandably low.

Additionally, the running game was most heavily used in short yardage situations which decreased the per-attempt average.

Counting sacks as passes, 44.8 percent of first down plays were runs that gained 803 yards at a clip of 4.5 yards per attempt. The 803 yards is more than 52 percent of the total rushing production and the per-carry average is significantly (18.4 percent) above the 3.8-yard team average. On first down, i.e. when there is a relatively equal threat of running and passing, the running game was both effective and efficient.

But in short yardage situations, the running game was used much more frequently with (expected) lower production. Excluding first down, Weis called 195 runs out of 447 snaps (43.6 percent). Of these 447 plays, 24.4 percent were short yardage situations where runs were attempted 68.8 percent of the time, a disproportionately higher amount than any other down and distance situation.

The offensive line and backs delivered, converting nearly 71 percent of these runs into first downs compared to a 55.9 percent conversion rate in the air. But the per-carry average is obviously lower and skews the overall efficiency.

In summary, considering the frequency and method in which it was used, Notre Dame’s running game was both efficient and effective.

Is This What A Weisian Offense Looks Like?

Play-calling made protection difficult and partially limited an otherwise exceptional air attack.

Passing Offense

Statistic	Notre Dame	Notre Dame Rank	Opponent Average	Opponent Average Rank	PR
Yards/ Attempt	8.7	10	7.3	71	0.18
Yards/ Completion	12.9	39	12.1	62	0.07
Completion %	67.3	7	60.5	76	0.11
Interceptions	5	10	10	69	0.49
TDs	30	8	18	58	0.68
Sacks	25	68	27	50	0.06
Attempts/ Sack	17.9	49	16.3	56	0.09
Pass Efficiency	160.2	6	132	72	0.21
Yards/Game	323.5	5	236.1	80	0.37

With very few exceptions, the Irish passing game was phenomenal. Notre Dame ranks 10th or better in every category except yards per completion and the two pass protection metrics.

The former is a result of more conservative play by Clausen. The maturation process came full circle in 2009 as passes to the outlet receivers were preferred to ill-advised downfield throws.

Clausen and company averaged 323.5 yards per game through the air at a clip of 8.7 yards per pass attempt. The junior signal caller finished his career by completing 68 percent of his passes for 3,722 yards, 28 touchdowns, and only four interceptions. Clausen eclipsed the 300 yard passing mark in eight games, had his highest output against Navy (452 yards), and threw a season-high five touchdown passes in the finale against Stanford.

His favorite targets were Floyd and Tate. The former averaged 113.6 receiving yards per game and 18.1 yards per reception. The latter set record after record, catching 93 passes for 1,496 yards—good for a 16.1-yard per-reception average. The Irish receiving tandem also combined for 24 touchdowns.

The pass offense was most dangerous on first down. Counting sacks as pass attempts, the Irish averaged a gaudy 9.2 yards per attempt on 222 plays. Additionally, 59 percent of first down passes went for five or more yards compared to only 32 percent of plays gaining two or fewer yards. It is no coincidence that the down when the run/pass threat was almost even was also the down with the greatest production through the air.

Perhaps most impressive was the pass efficiency. On average, Notre Dame was more efficient than opposing defenses with a mean PR of 0.25 in the “efficiency categories” (yards per attempt, completion percentage, interceptions, and pass efficiency). The ability to operate at this efficiency level is directly responsible for the ball control advantage.

About the only deficiencies were a puzzling regression in pass protection from a very respectable 2008 campaign and poor third down play.

Much of this can be attributed to play-calling, the burden of execution on the offensive line was very difficult as the Irish frequently attempted to protect with five out of the shotgun and with very little pocket diversity, e.g. play-action, roll-out’s and/or bootlegs.

These factors also contributed to poor third down passing where the offense needed an average of 8.5 yards for a conversion. In these situations the Irish only managed to move the chains 34.7 percent of the time. But even on short yardage third downs the Irish struggled to gain first downs throwing the ball (three of nine).

And this is what makes this performance even more impressive . The Irish pass offense was exceptionally efficient despite throwing the ball with great frequency, without a solid running presence, and with fairly predictable tendencies.

It’s Always About The Big One

The 2008 Irish offense was far too reliant on the big play. This was not a problem in 2009 as a dramatically more efficient passing attack emerged. The 2009 unit was certainly explosive, but was efficient even without the vertical passing game.

Notre Dame ran 848 plays of which 73 (8.6 percent) were big gains. These 73 plays gained 2,183 yards (29.9 yard per play average) and accounted for 40.3 percent of the total offense. Excluding the explosive gains, the Irish averaged a respectable 4.2 yards per play, a substantial increase over the 3.3-yard per play average last season. On average, the Irish offense generated 6.1 plays and 181.9 yards per game in explosive gains.

As expected, most of the big play production occurred on first and second down. The Irish notched 34 explosive gains on first down and 29 on second. The average per explosive play, however, was considerably more on first down—33.7 yards compared to 27.3 yards per play on second down.

Running

The running game’s big play production wasn’t as prolific as that through the air as only 34.2 percent of the 73 explosive gains came on the ground.

The Irish averaged 2.1 big runs and 41.2 explosive rushing yards per game. All in all, 32.1 percent of the ground production came on big runs which averaged 19.8 yards. Without these runs the offense gained only 2.8 yards per carry, a value that is not markedly better than last year, but was undoubtedly impacted by the heavy use of the run in short yardage situations.

Most of the big runs occurred on second down where nearly 44.7 percent of the explosive rushing yards came on 12 plays (18.4 yards per attempt).

Passing

Clausen and company notched 48 big gains through the air, averaging 35.2 yards per completion and good for 43.5 percent of the total passing production. Without these plays the Irish passing offense still managed 5.5 yards per attempt and 8.7 yards per completion.

As noted above, the majority of these pass plays occurred on first down as 25 big completions (52.1 percent) accounted for 953 yards (56.4 percent), a 38.1-yard per play average. All three values were, by far, well above the other down averages. Excluding these big gains on first down, however, cuts the average gain by more than 40 percent and was largely responsible for the inconsistent first down production referenced above.

So What Was The Offensive Game Plan?

It seems Weis’ high-level game plan was consistent throughout the year: score early and often to counter an inept defensive unit. The former aimed at forcing opposing offenses to become one-dimensional while the latter was necessary to offset the 25.9 points per game surrendered by the Irish defense.

As the running game lacked an explosive element, the preferred method of accomplishing this was a pass-heavy play-calling approach and virtually every offensive statistic supports this interpretation.

Notre Dame ranked 20th in pass attempts, rarely had long drives, and gained over 71 percent of their yards through the air. The most productive Irish players were integral to the passing game (Clausen, Floyd, Tate and tight end Kyle Rudolph) and with such efficient play from Clausen, ball control wasn’t an issue and the running game wasn’t needed to chew the clock. Moreover, the best PR values are all directly or indirectly related to throwing the ball.

The run was mostly used to keep defenses honest (fairly even run/pass split on first down) and convert short yardage situations (nearly 69 percent of short yardage plays were runs), both of which contributed to artificially underestimate its effectiveness.

This offensive approach is only problematic on third down and in the red zone, the two fundamental deficiencies keeping an otherwise strong unit from being truly great.

Erratic first down play—mostly in the passing game—frequently led to long down and distances and the spread passing scheme struggled to produce touchdowns inside the red zone. Additionally, the lack of diversity and play-calling predictability led to protection problems.

Better—read, more balanced—use of the running game would have likely produced more consistent first down gains and created more favorable down and distances. More than 57 percent of second downs and almost 43 percent of third downs were long distance situations. Given the efficiency of the Irish backs (and Tate), this seemed like viable option.

But these problems aside, the offense was certainly good enough to win 10 or 11 games. With a more respectable defensive unit the Irish could have exhibited more balance and been even more productive.

Perhaps most frightening is what lies ahead. As Clausen and Tate depart for the NFL, not only will Kelly have to replace one of the finest quarterbacks and wide receivers in the illustrious history of Notre Dame, he will also have to replace 70.1 percent of the total yardage output and 76.7 percent of the Irish touchdown production.

Similar Posts:

How Good Are the Irish? A Year-End Defensive Statistical Review

Missed Opportunity and Failed Execution, Notre Dame’s Red Zone Woes

They Call It Powder Blue, Irish vs. Tar Heels News and Notes

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.

670 the Score Radio Interview Audio and Reflections

Anthony Pilcher — Tue, 15 Dec 2009 13:02:08 +0000

Clashmore Mike staff writer Anthony Pilcher was interviewed Saturday on the Joe O. & Rock show on 670 The Score regarding the hiring of Brian Kelly as the head coach at Notre Dame.

What follows are some further responses and elaboration on questions from the interview. The audio of the interview itself can be found at the bottom of this article.

On Brian Kelly’s Impact On The Irish Fan Base And Whether Or Not Notre Dame Settled…

Many fans will never be satisfied, especially after 20-plus years of mediocrity in a football program that defines tradition. As such, some fans will view this hire as a failure.

Other fans will view it as an upgrade. Kelly is a very different coach than Charlie Weis, and this will breath life into those frustrated with Weis’ consistent trumpeting of X’s and O’s.

The reality is somewhere in between.

There are a lot of positives about Kelly. He’s coached in the college game at three levels (Division II at Grand Valley State, Central Michigan in the Mid-American conference, and Cincinnati in the Big East) and has been successful at all three. His 85 percent win rate (34-6 record) at Cincinnati includes 5-3 against teams that finished in the AP top 25 and 16-4 against teams with a winning record. This performance is very impressive, as is his 118-35-2 overall record. Kelly consistently does more with less, and he will certainly have more talent in South Bend than at any of his previous stops.

But a good argument can be made that he doesn’t meet Notre Dame athletic director Jack Swarbrick’s criteria as a coach who has built and sustained a successful program at the highest level of college football. And from that standpoint, his hiring carries a certain amount of risk.

On The Importance Of Defense vs. Recruiting…

This is not an either/or question. It is a both/and proposition.

Recruiting is the bloodline of a program, and a particularly challenging task at Notre Dame. The Irish are not in a talent-rich part of the country and compete with schools that have a strong regional presence.

As such, recruiting must be national, and Kelly has yet to face this challenge. He must continue—if not improve upon—the momentum of Weis. Getting less talented, but passionate, players will not be sufficient to consistently compete in South Bend.

Defense is also important.

Weis’ tenure has been mostly characterized by dynamic passing teams with poor production on the defensive side of the ball. This was never more true than this season when the record-setting production of quarterback Jimmy Clausen and wide receiver Golden Tate was undermined by poor defensive play. A respectable defensive unit would have been worth four or five more wins.

A head coach must be well-versed in all aspects of the game, and, in the case of the Irish defense, simplicity and continuity trump everything else. The current defensive players have been through three defensive schemes (4-3, 3-4, and blitz-heavy 4-3) and three defensive coordinators (Rick Minter, Corwin Brown and Jon Tenuta) in four years. They need continuity and simplicity to reach their potential and gain confidence.

On The Cincinnati Players’ Reactions And Handling The Media…

Kelly has yet to coach at a program with a heavy dose of national media attention. The spotlight at Notre Dame is second to none and it is absolutely certain that he will live under a microscope while in South Bend.

This is a unique problem to football programs like Notre Dame, one that he has never dealt with. His responses to questions pertaining to the job weren’t handled particularly well, even with a hired public relations consultant, and he doesn’t seem prepared for what is coming.

This is a skill Kelly must learn quickly in order to handle the scrutiny coming his way. As Weis proved, even comments from your opening press conference can become sound bites characterizing your coaching tenure.

On Academic Standards…

The media overstate the extent to which high admission standards limit the success of Notre Dame’s football program. It seems to be a convenient, blanket excuse like “no team speed” given by pundits who haven’t critically evaluated the program.

While it is true that admissions requirements for student-athletes are higher at Notre Dame than at many other schools, it isn’t a limiting factor. The Irish coaching staff has a smaller pool of potential recruits to select from, but that doesn’t mean consistent recruiting at a high level is impossible, it just means there is a smaller margin for error. Hard work and casting a nationwide net can overcome this problem.

Weis certainly proved this.

Over his tenure recruiting was very good and the roster holes weren’t because of admissions problems. Most of the misses were elite players who were admitted, they simply chose to go elsewhere for a variety of reasons. The players that could not gain admission to Notre Dame were few and far between.

There is also the other side of the argument. Academics can be a selling point. A very small percentage of college football players make it to the NFL, and even those who do have very short careers. A degree from Notre Dame is a strong asset if a professional football career isn’t possible, or when a player’s time in the NFL is over. The high graduation rate of Irish players and reputation of Notre Dame as an academic institution all but guarantees a sustainable, lifelong career in a non-football related job.

On Clausen And Tate Departing And The Irish Skill Talent…

Skill talent gets fans excited. Winning the battle in the trenches allows the skill players to succeed.

The Irish will boast a bevy of talent at the running back, tight end and wide receiver positions in 2010, but it matters little if the front five cannot perform adequately or if there is no quarterback capable of distributing the ball.

Provided there is some defensive improvement, Kelly won’t need Dayne Crist or one of the incoming freshman to win games in 2010. Kelly has proven capable of developing quarterbacks and in his offense where this position is primarily one of distribution.

It is really about the defense next season. Notre Dame will have plenty of weapons in the running and passing games, and Kelly’s track record on the offensive side of the ball should produce good results. The real question mark will be a defense that struggled throughout the 2009 campaign.

[Audio clip embedded: please view full post to listen.]

Similar Posts:

670 the Score Radio Interview Audio and Reflections

Spread and Pass, Brian Kelly’s (Somewhat) New Irish Offense

Spring Football Focus Part I: Personnel Changes

This article is © 2007-2010 by De Veritate, LLC and was originally published at Clashmore Mike. This article may not be copied, distributed, or transmitted without attribution. Additionally, you may not use this article for commercial purposes or to generate derivative works without explicit written permission. Please contact us if you wish to license this content for your own use.